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The real problem is that the unencrypted nature of email makes most solutions non-starters. If end-to-end were the default, then you could imagine having a proc
by XorNot 10y ago
The real problem is that the unencrypted nature of email makes most solutions non-starters. If end-to-end were the default, then you could imagine having a process whereby you ran a P2P service which kept your MX records pointed to a cluster of network members, all of whom agreed to act as your MX fallback if you went down and which collectively handled monitoring and distributing blacklist notifications.
- Karlozkiller 10y agoYou're implying that this is not advisable to do because any such fallback could snoop the data? I'm sorry I'm not sure I quite understand what you say the problem is and how it relates to the unencrypted nature of email.