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The free will conversations drive me insane. People can't shut up about how Heisenberg's uncertainty principle proves random phenomena (which isn't exactly true

The free will conversations drive me insane. People can't shut up about how Heisenberg's uncertainty principle proves random phenomena (which isn't exactly true) but worse, they insist it indicates that we have free will. But a) what it really indicates is that it would be unmeasurable whether we have free will, and b) it also doesn't really prove that, because while electron positions are unpredictable, molecular reactions, the sort that happen in the human brain are pretty predictable. Basically, my response to this is "That would be relevant if we had black holes or large hadron colliders in our heads, but we don't, so...". But people really really want to believe in free will and will use any sliver of half-truth to believe they've proved it. EDIT: To be clear, I do not believe free will has been proven OR disproven. EDIT 2: More sophisticated wrong people argue from Bell's Inequalities rather than the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, but that also results from a misunderstanding of the theory and also neither proves nor disproves determinism.

semi-extrinsic 10y ago
On the flip side of this, superdeterminism (that we have absolutely no free will at all) is a third way of explaining Bell inequality violations (apart from Copenhagen and hidden variables), but essentially everyone in the physics community refuses to consider superdeterminism seriously.
- wnoise 10y ago
  It's not that they don't take it seriously -- it's that it's boring and says nothing useful. Yes, everything could be a giant conspiracy that makes it appear as if the standard ways of approaching quantum mechanics are simple, nice, and right, but ...
  - devishard 10y ago
    That's not what superdeterminism would indicate at all. "Conspiracy" indicates free will on a large number of actors. And a superdeterministic system could exist which differs from standard ways of approaching quantum mechanics. One obvious way in which it could exist is if our means of gathering data remain as limited as they are currently--i.e. we don't ever find a way around Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and therefore can't ever model quanta deterministically. Superdeterminism doesn't mean that we'd always be able to measure the deterministic phenomena.
bdrool 10y ago
> [W]hile electron positions are unpredictable, molecular reactions, the sort that happen in the human brain are pretty predictable. Basically, my response to this is "That would be relevant if we had black holes or large hadron colliders in our heads, but we don't, so...". What about those quantum effects that have recently been shown to potentially be part of brain activity: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.htm https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.h...
- 0134340 10y ago
  You could make the same argument to say that your PC adding 2+2 is indeterminate because it has the same underlay of supposed random quantum behavior. But at our material level, the world is pretty deterministic just as your PC or phone adding 2+2 is. And as far as neuroscience has gathered, quantum randomness hasn't affected it enough for those scientists to think it's non-deterministic, or else they wouldn't have a job.
- devishard 10y ago
  Quantum effects are part of brain activity because they underly all electrochemistry--that's never been in question. The question is whether those quantum effects impart any non-determinism to the brain system, and the link you posted doesn't make any claims that they do or don't.
peteretep 10y ago
Given what we know about brains so far, doesn't it need to be proven, rather than disproven? Surely the burden of proof here is on people claiming a non-biological and non-predictable basis for brain function?
- marcoperaza 10y ago
  I don't see how subjective experience, i.e. consciousness, can come about from purely material interactions as currently understood. That means that a Turing Machine would be able to produce them, which means that a bunch of monks working with paper and pencil for thousands of years would be able to produce them. There's something fundamental that we don't understand and the scientific community is very opposed to talking about it, dismissing any and all speculation as quackery. This taboo is holding back serious inquiry into the matter.
  - peteretep 10y ago
    > I don't see how Isn't that just The God of The Gaps? I suspect that many intelligent people 500 years ago wouldn't have been able to "see how" a 500 ton metal object could take controlled flight. > That means that a Turing Machine would be able to > produce them Is there any specific reason to think it wouldn't? > the scientific community is very opposed to talking > about it It sounds like you're suggesting there's a super-natural force at play, in which case, the scientific community is entirely justified in being opposed to talking about it.
    - marcoperaza 10y ago
      I'm not suggesting anything supernatural. I'm suggesting that there's possibly physical phenomenon that do not fit our current materialist model. Further, my big problem is with people trying to ignore the problem completely by claiming that there is no Hard Problem or even suggesting that consciousness is not real. It's a total head-in-the-sand position to take but it's the dominant stance.
      - 10y ago
Retra 10y ago
Free will is the sensation of being in a brain that models counterfactuals. It is also a token concept that people like to use to do their "worship the mystery" so they can secretly believe that scientists are stupid and thus not have to be held responsible for their failure to understand them or their work. Free will is akin to an emotion. Just because physicists haven't explained it in excruciating detail doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or we'd all be running around debating the existence of fear and love and curiosity.
- 77pt77 10y ago
  > Free will is the sensation of being in a brain that models counterfactuals No. Free will is the ability to make a choice not completely dependent on history.
  - 0134340 10y ago
    I don't consider that free will then, that would just be "not completely" free will. If it's not dependent on a history, what would be the directive that effects the choice? To me, the notion of free will just defeats the ubiquitous cause-effect nature in everyday life and observance. What would be the nature of the effector that makes the "free" choice then?
  - Natsu 10y ago
    That depends on the person defining it. Why can't it be the outcome my brain has determined for me to take which I subjectively understand as a self-chosen action? That may well depend on my history--my emotions, memories and all the things that shape me--but those are more reasons than constraints. Isn't that like saying I want to fly, so I don't have free will if I can't?
  - CamperBob2 10y ago
    Would flipping a coin count? If you respond, "No, because the particles that make up the coin and the muscles that drive my thumbnail have a history that determines the outcome," then how about a slight variation? "I can't decide what to do. I have no idea what time it is, so if the minute digit on my clock is odd, I'll do X, otherwise I'll do Y." Here I've explicitly refrained from using either a source of randomness or anything else with its own history to determine my fate. The decision to consult the clock might have been an act of free will on my part, but the outcome certainly wasn't.
noobermin 10y ago
Right, I would clarify though, "single electron positions are unpredictable exactly[0]" but, I know that there are more electrons on this side of the cap than the other side, and it's physics at that scale (S >> \hbar) that matters. [0] To be more pedantic than enlightening, add before wavefunction collapse.
- devishard 10y ago
  Exactly.
whyrt12 10y ago
Can tou explain why qm and bell's inequality do not categorically undermine determinism and prove deep randomness ? Is it because on a macro scale amd normal energy levels effects are negligible? Because there are well followed probability distributions?
- chriswarbo 10y ago
  Bell's inequality refutes theories with local hidden variables (e.g. some unknown property of particles or spacetime). That leaves two possibilities: no hidden variables (the results truly are non-deterministic) or non-local hidden variables (e.g. some property which exists outside the spacetime which we're constrained to)
  - devishard 10y ago
    There's a third possibility, superdeterminism, in which literally everything is determined by previous conditions, so that no communication is needed, even via a property outside of our spacetime, because everything was determined by preconditions. Think of it this way: you set two clocks to the same time. The next day, they both have the same time on them. This isn't because the clocks are communicating via nonlocal hidden variables, it's because their precondition was the same and the sequence of events which followed was deterministic.
amscanne 10y ago
Many people believe that free will and determinism are not incompatible (compatibilists). Personally, I'm not even sure introducing non-determinism matters much. What would it even mean? That beyond determinsitic actions defined by our precise history, we get a bit of randomness permuting the whole thing? Does that really make it any freer?
- devishard 10y ago
  > Many people believe that free will and determinism are not incompatible (compatibilists). Could you explain how that works? I'm unfamiliar with that, but I suspect that they may be using a different definition of "free will" than I am familiar with. > Personally, I'm not even sure introducing non-determinism matters much. What would it even mean? That beyond determinsitic actions defined by our precise history, we get a bit of randomness permuting the whole thing? Does that really make it any freer? I think free will and randomness are both forms of non-determinism. Non-determinism doesn't prove free will, but it allows for the possibility that it might exist (and post people intuit that randomness could be indistinguishable from non-determinism).
  - amscanne 10y ago
    To me, free will is the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions. That is, I can decide things for myself, even if those decisions are a deterministic product of my current state. How are you defining it such that it must be non-deterministic and distinct from randomness? I don't really understand what that means. Assuming there's a single shared reality, what's the source of the non-determinism? Even if you say that's the free will itself, you'd be asserting that our "wills" are somehow capable of randomness.
    - devishard 10y ago
      > To me, free will is the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions. That is, I can decide things for myself, even if those decisions are a deterministic product of my current state. Without some place in the sequence of events that isn't deterministic, I don't see how you can separate your current state from external forces. That is, if your decisions are a deterministic product of your current state and your current state is a deterministic product of other states before it (including states that existed before you did, such as your parents) then I don't see that as "the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions". > How are you defining it such that it must be non-deterministic and distinct from randomness? I don't really understand what that means. Assuming there's a single shared reality, what's the source of the non-determinism? Even if you say that's the free will itself, you'd be asserting that our "wills" are somehow capable of randomness. Part of the difficulty with talking about free will is that there isn't a clear definition of what it is. However, I do think I can say what it isn't--I think most people don't consider randomness or determinism to be free will. But I also think that it would be nigh impossible to distinguish randomness from free will without a clearer definition of free will. The fallout of this belief is that I think we could disprove free will if we could prove determinism (but, I don't think we can prove determinism currently). But I don't think we can prove free will, even if we could disprove determinism (I don't think we can do that either). In order to prove free will we would have to disprove both determinism and randomness.
maverick_iceman 10y ago
How would you test free will?

semi-extrinsic 10y ago

On the flip side of this, superdeterminism (that we have absolutely no free will at all) is a third way of explaining Bell inequality violations (apart from Copenhagen and hidden variables), but essentially everyone in the physics community refuses to consider superdeterminism seriously.

wnoise 10y ago
It's not that they don't take it seriously -- it's that it's boring and says nothing useful. Yes, everything could be a giant conspiracy that makes it appear as if the standard ways of approaching quantum mechanics are simple, nice, and right, but ...
- devishard 10y ago
  That's not what superdeterminism would indicate at all. "Conspiracy" indicates free will on a large number of actors. And a superdeterministic system could exist which differs from standard ways of approaching quantum mechanics. One obvious way in which it could exist is if our means of gathering data remain as limited as they are currently--i.e. we don't ever find a way around Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and therefore can't ever model quanta deterministically. Superdeterminism doesn't mean that we'd always be able to measure the deterministic phenomena.

bdrool 10y ago

> [W]hile electron positions are unpredictable, molecular reactions, the sort that happen in the human brain are pretty predictable. Basically, my response to this is "That would be relevant if we had black holes or large hadron colliders in our heads, but we don't, so...". What about those quantum effects that have recently been shown to potentially be part of brain activity: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.htm https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.h...

0134340 10y ago
You could make the same argument to say that your PC adding 2+2 is indeterminate because it has the same underlay of supposed random quantum behavior. But at our material level, the world is pretty deterministic just as your PC or phone adding 2+2 is. And as far as neuroscience has gathered, quantum randomness hasn't affected it enough for those scientists to think it's non-deterministic, or else they wouldn't have a job.
devishard 10y ago
Quantum effects are part of brain activity because they underly all electrochemistry--that's never been in question. The question is whether those quantum effects impart any non-determinism to the brain system, and the link you posted doesn't make any claims that they do or don't.

peteretep 10y ago

Given what we know about brains so far, doesn't it need to be proven, rather than disproven? Surely the burden of proof here is on people claiming a non-biological and non-predictable basis for brain function?

marcoperaza 10y ago
I don't see how subjective experience, i.e. consciousness, can come about from purely material interactions as currently understood. That means that a Turing Machine would be able to produce them, which means that a bunch of monks working with paper and pencil for thousands of years would be able to produce them. There's something fundamental that we don't understand and the scientific community is very opposed to talking about it, dismissing any and all speculation as quackery. This taboo is holding back serious inquiry into the matter.
- peteretep 10y ago
  > I don't see how Isn't that just The God of The Gaps? I suspect that many intelligent people 500 years ago wouldn't have been able to "see how" a 500 ton metal object could take controlled flight. > That means that a Turing Machine would be able to > produce them Is there any specific reason to think it wouldn't? > the scientific community is very opposed to talking > about it It sounds like you're suggesting there's a super-natural force at play, in which case, the scientific community is entirely justified in being opposed to talking about it.
  - marcoperaza 10y ago
    I'm not suggesting anything supernatural. I'm suggesting that there's possibly physical phenomenon that do not fit our current materialist model. Further, my big problem is with people trying to ignore the problem completely by claiming that there is no Hard Problem or even suggesting that consciousness is not real. It's a total head-in-the-sand position to take but it's the dominant stance.
    - 10y ago

Retra 10y ago

Free will is the sensation of being in a brain that models counterfactuals. It is also a token concept that people like to use to do their "worship the mystery" so they can secretly believe that scientists are stupid and thus not have to be held responsible for their failure to understand them or their work. Free will is akin to an emotion. Just because physicists haven't explained it in excruciating detail doesn't mean it doesn't exist, or we'd all be running around debating the existence of fear and love and curiosity.

77pt77 10y ago
> Free will is the sensation of being in a brain that models counterfactuals No. Free will is the ability to make a choice not completely dependent on history.
- 0134340 10y ago
  I don't consider that free will then, that would just be "not completely" free will. If it's not dependent on a history, what would be the directive that effects the choice? To me, the notion of free will just defeats the ubiquitous cause-effect nature in everyday life and observance. What would be the nature of the effector that makes the "free" choice then?
- Natsu 10y ago
  That depends on the person defining it. Why can't it be the outcome my brain has determined for me to take which I subjectively understand as a self-chosen action? That may well depend on my history--my emotions, memories and all the things that shape me--but those are more reasons than constraints. Isn't that like saying I want to fly, so I don't have free will if I can't?
- CamperBob2 10y ago
  Would flipping a coin count? If you respond, "No, because the particles that make up the coin and the muscles that drive my thumbnail have a history that determines the outcome," then how about a slight variation? "I can't decide what to do. I have no idea what time it is, so if the minute digit on my clock is odd, I'll do X, otherwise I'll do Y." Here I've explicitly refrained from using either a source of randomness or anything else with its own history to determine my fate. The decision to consult the clock might have been an act of free will on my part, but the outcome certainly wasn't.

noobermin 10y ago

Right, I would clarify though, "single electron positions are unpredictable exactly[0]" but, I know that there are more electrons on this side of the cap than the other side, and it's physics at that scale (S >> \hbar) that matters. [0] To be more pedantic than enlightening, add before wavefunction collapse.

devishard 10y ago
Exactly.

whyrt12 10y ago

Can tou explain why qm and bell's inequality do not categorically undermine determinism and prove deep randomness ? Is it because on a macro scale amd normal energy levels effects are negligible? Because there are well followed probability distributions?

chriswarbo 10y ago
Bell's inequality refutes theories with local hidden variables (e.g. some unknown property of particles or spacetime). That leaves two possibilities: no hidden variables (the results truly are non-deterministic) or non-local hidden variables (e.g. some property which exists outside the spacetime which we're constrained to)
- devishard 10y ago
  There's a third possibility, superdeterminism, in which literally everything is determined by previous conditions, so that no communication is needed, even via a property outside of our spacetime, because everything was determined by preconditions. Think of it this way: you set two clocks to the same time. The next day, they both have the same time on them. This isn't because the clocks are communicating via nonlocal hidden variables, it's because their precondition was the same and the sequence of events which followed was deterministic.

amscanne 10y ago

Many people believe that free will and determinism are not incompatible (compatibilists). Personally, I'm not even sure introducing non-determinism matters much. What would it even mean? That beyond determinsitic actions defined by our precise history, we get a bit of randomness permuting the whole thing? Does that really make it any freer?

devishard 10y ago
> Many people believe that free will and determinism are not incompatible (compatibilists). Could you explain how that works? I'm unfamiliar with that, but I suspect that they may be using a different definition of "free will" than I am familiar with. > Personally, I'm not even sure introducing non-determinism matters much. What would it even mean? That beyond determinsitic actions defined by our precise history, we get a bit of randomness permuting the whole thing? Does that really make it any freer? I think free will and randomness are both forms of non-determinism. Non-determinism doesn't prove free will, but it allows for the possibility that it might exist (and post people intuit that randomness could be indistinguishable from non-determinism).
- amscanne 10y ago
  To me, free will is the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions. That is, I can decide things for myself, even if those decisions are a deterministic product of my current state. How are you defining it such that it must be non-deterministic and distinct from randomness? I don't really understand what that means. Assuming there's a single shared reality, what's the source of the non-determinism? Even if you say that's the free will itself, you'd be asserting that our "wills" are somehow capable of randomness.
  - devishard 10y ago
    > To me, free will is the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions. That is, I can decide things for myself, even if those decisions are a deterministic product of my current state. Without some place in the sequence of events that isn't deterministic, I don't see how you can separate your current state from external forces. That is, if your decisions are a deterministic product of your current state and your current state is a deterministic product of other states before it (including states that existed before you did, such as your parents) then I don't see that as "the lack of external forces controlling my decisions and actions". > How are you defining it such that it must be non-deterministic and distinct from randomness? I don't really understand what that means. Assuming there's a single shared reality, what's the source of the non-determinism? Even if you say that's the free will itself, you'd be asserting that our "wills" are somehow capable of randomness. Part of the difficulty with talking about free will is that there isn't a clear definition of what it is. However, I do think I can say what it isn't--I think most people don't consider randomness or determinism to be free will. But I also think that it would be nigh impossible to distinguish randomness from free will without a clearer definition of free will. The fallout of this belief is that I think we could disprove free will if we could prove determinism (but, I don't think we can prove determinism currently). But I don't think we can prove free will, even if we could disprove determinism (I don't think we can do that either). In order to prove free will we would have to disprove both determinism and randomness.

maverick_iceman 10y ago

How would you test free will?