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Despite this malicious use-case, it's entirely possible that the underlying proof-of-work technique (using the target server's TLS signatures for validation) ca
by Rauchg 10y ago
Despite this malicious use-case, it's entirely possible that the underlying proof-of-work technique (using the target server's TLS signatures for validation) can inspire some noble applications or smart contracts :)
As a somewhat contrived example, instead of blindly trusting that a certain monitoring system like "Uptime Robot" is checking your servers (or going through an expensive access_log based verification), you could verify their proof-of-connection.
- vessenes 10y agoThat's a nice idea. I think you'd want the opposite though, mostly, proof that the site is down. That's a bit harder. I guess you could ask someone to provide a TLS-notarized response from a TLS-compatible uptime checker.
- droffel 10y agoYou could include the hash of the last block in the network as part of your handshake, along with a nonce, and pay out tiny amounts of currency to whoever produces a signed handshake containing that hash (as long as the signed handshake is below a certain number? Not sure if that's useful or not in this situation). But if you want proof of uptime, having a TLS-notarized response with a handshake containing a previous block hash is pretty solid proof.