3 ms·
While eminent domain is a rule in property law, that's not the same thing as saying that it applies to property generally. Copyrights and patents are regulator
by wahern 10y ago
While eminent domain is a rule in property law, that's not the same thing as saying that it applies to property generally.
Copyrights and patents are regulatory property. They're created by government, and what rights such property entails are defined entirely by the government. All "property" is conceptually fictional, but government is effectively restricted from, for example, redefining the meaning of real property in a way that subverts constitutional protections against takings.
I don't know what the law is in this area, or even if it's settled, but I can easily imagine a scenario where the courts say that if a government implicitly or explicitly changes the rights that attach to _their_ grant of regulatory property, that such a change is not a taking (i.e. expropriation of property) for which the constitution requires compensation.
The opposite is certainly allowed. For example, SCOTUS has said (at least in dicta, if not in binding rule) that Congress can put back under copyright material that already fell into the public domain, even though other people have already relied upon it.
Generally, when discussing regulatory property and regulatory takings, the courts assume there are implied limitations to your rights such that merely because the government restricts your property rights causing you financial hardship, it doesn't necessarily follow that there was a taking of property. This is why zoning laws passed after you purchased your house can be enforced without the government being forced to pay you. When the first American zoning laws were passed and challenged in court, SCOTUS said that zoning restrictions weren't per se a taking because it was always implied that real property rights were subject to implied restrictions related to public health & safety. (Common law nuisance was used to support the argument, but crucially a nuisance is a manifest injury, whereas zoning laws are typically speculative at best, and in hindsight usually ineffective and even counterproductive. Forcing governments to internalize the cost of poor policy decisions is precisely the function of requiring just compensation, yet zoning laws are unfortunately permitted to subvert that dynamic.)
Implied limitations are especially numerous and broad in the context of regulatory property. The courts could easily say that grants of copyright come with implied reservations to the government; and that the government reserved the right to limit the grant, ex post facto, for the public benefit, such as when material is incorporated into a public law.
- dragonwriter 10y ago> Copyright and patents are regulatory property. They're created by government, and what rights that property entails is defined entirely by the government. All "property" is conceptually fictional, but government is effectively restricted from, for example, redefining the meaning of real property in a way that subverts constitutional protections against takings. This, and your whole post, make a very good and interesting point. There is definitely a potential distinction (and, AFAIK, no clear case law on it) here, but I think the distinction is less in regulatory property vs. other property classes and more in the fact that copyright and patent are temporary property. I don't think there is anything that clearly stops new, government-issued property grants (whether of real property or otherwise) from being limited in a way which would permit some later conditional reversion to government use -- the limitation would be part of the property granted ab initio and thus there would be no taking -- but existing property rights cannot be curtailed in favor of the government without compensation. A retroactive change to existing grants even of regulatory property like copyrights and patents that amounts essentially to an early termination (and making something covered by such an exclusive right freely and publicly available would be essentially an early termination) would seem to me to still be a compensable taking, though I will agree that I haven't seen any cases of this being litigated and there is potentially tension between Article I power to grant (and define the scope of) the exclusive rights and the Fifth Amendment takings clause here that makes it somewhat murky.
- wahern 10y agoI'm not sure that duration of the right is a better way to distinguish things. Taxi medallions are a similar form of regulatory property in that they grant monopoly rights. In New York I believe title vests with whomever possesses the physical medallion and is in perpetuity, but in San Francisco it's more like a license, isn't directly transferable, and has a defined duration. A few years ago it cost several hundred thousand dollars to purchase a medallion from SF. People often financed the purchase with bank loans. To combat Uber San Francisco dramatically increased the supply of medallions so that the effective value dropped precipitously and is still going down, I think. Many medallion owners are under water, and increased competition from new medallion owners likely caused some people to go bankrupt. (Uber had a similar effect but I'm sure if we tried hard enough we could tie a bankruptcy directly to SFMTA's change of policy.) I can't imagine a court finding this state of affairs to be illegal or requiring any kind of compensation even though the city basically extracted millions of dollars from people's pockets and then screwed them over. How bad does it need to get before it becomes a taking? It's pretty bad now and AFAIK there's still no actionable claim that can be or has been made. And I don't see how the limited duration of the medallion would matter; if anything a more limited duration implies the purchaser expected to make a return on his investment faster. Now imagine the city removes all laws that restricted access to providing taxi services. But it still maintained the medallion and the restrictions (insurance, checkups) required of medallion holders. As a practical matter the medallions would be worthless, but you can still say that you own one and are governed by stricter regulations. So perhaps riders will pay a premium (1 dollar? 10 cents?) for that reassurance. Now imagine a city outright cancels a medallion system. Your metal medallion or piece of paper instantly becomes a curio. I think a court could legitimately say that the regulatory property was impliedly limited by the city sustaining the monopoly. That is, you paid for the government-created monopoly right only in so far as the government chose to maintain the statutory scheme. It's hard to drawn a line between this scenario and the previous two scenarios while keeping a straight face. The law draws arbitrary lines, but that doesn't mean they're entirely divorced from meaningful considerations, like concerns about consistent treatment. With real property or chattel we can at least pretend that there's intrinsic value to the property, and draw the line at preventing governments from harming that intrinsic value by it taking physical possession from you. Often for real property that's exactly how the line is drawn--you can pay $1 million for a piece of land that you can no longer build on, but as long as you can still pitch a tent a court can legally find there was no taking. (There are other elements that also control, but it's still possible and has happened.) But that fiction is totally indefensible when we're talking about a piece of paper whose only intrinsic value, if anything, relates to the regulatory framework it exists within. When you look at the law of regulatory takings, where you can't depend on analogies with physical possession to delineate what is a taking or not a taking, you rely on investment backed expectations and similar rules that balance foreseeable restrictions on your property against how much value you've lost by new government regulations. In the taxi medallion case even that approach doesn't help much, perhaps because it would be odd for courts to penalize governments for _rescinding_ laws, and especially for liberalizing restraints on trade. So given all this context, I can't imagine there being much problem with the government passing a law that says copyrighted works lose _some_ protections when incorporated into published law. Presumably you still couldn't, for example, copy and distribute the POSIX standard in situations unrelated to dissemination and discussion of the incorporating law. The value of the copyright might be significantly diminished, but there's still some commercial value, especially if we assume people will remain law abiding. And remember that you never _paid_ anything to the government for your copyright. Unlike a taxi medallion, your copyright was granted free-of-charge. Copyright may have persuaded you to make investments, but depending on the kind of property we're taking about, courts can choose to make that fact dispositive or irrelevant--especially when they can invoke the legal fiction that the limitation was always implied and thus foreseeable, and therefore you were an idiot for not taking that into account. Whatever the boundaries of the law are in this area, I think partial limitations on the scope of your already granted copyright are likely to fall well within the boundaries of acceptable changes not requiring compensation, especially if the carve-out is tailored to serve an honest-to-goodness public purpose. I think there's a strong argument to made where literally or effectively rescinding the copyright is illegal without compensation. I also think there's a strong argument that doing so would be entirely legal. It's a fascinating question. But neither of those extremes are implicated here. And note that duration doesn't really figure into any of this, which is why I don't think it's relevant.