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a home-made public key signature format instead of PGP How is 'openssl rsautl -sign' a "home-made" signature format? As for using GPG... given its security tr

a home-made public key signature format instead of PGP How is 'openssl rsautl -sign' a "home-made" signature format? As for using GPG... given its security track record, that's one of the last things I'd want to consider using for verifying signatures on binary updates. or not using signatures at all for package files The pkg repository is signed.

ivoras 10y ago
>> a home-made public key signature format instead of PGP > How is 'openssl rsautl -sign' a "home-made" signature format? It's RAW RSA DATA. You could argue it's more pure that way but if that were the case, noone would ask for more metadata-rich signatures. > As for using GPG... given its security track record, that's one of the last things I'd want to consider using for verifying signatures on binary updates. If you don't see the NIH-ism in that sentence, then I'm sorry, neither I nor nobody else can help you. > The pkg repository is signed. Can individual package files be verified off-line?
- tedunangst 10y ago
  Is it not possible for cperciva's assessment of GPG to be accurate regardless of where it was invented?
- cperciva 10y ago
  Whether code is crap is a completely separate question from where it was invented. Putting signatures onto the individual package files could expose users to mismatch attacks, and would also make it harder to defend against build-trojan theft of signing keys.
- tptacek 10y ago
  I think Colin has the better argument here. You were hyperbolic when you called rsautl a "home-made format".
- feld 10y ago
  Packages are not meant to be distributed ad-hoc. You're meant to host a repo and sign it.
frutiger 10y ago
I find it amusing that the line before your statement of distrust around GPG refers to using that bastion of solid, dependable crypto code that ships with OpenSSL.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago
  That was pretty funny. Gets better with the Snowden slides where mighty NSA basically says they can't break it in basic, use case. At Princeton, Snowden even said analysts got failure notices even for requests to decrypt GPG w/ 1,024-bit RSA at a time when paranoids wondered how long 4,096-bit might last. Haha. Next I'm going to hear that using TAIL's increases your risk of damning evidence found during a disk audit by a forensics team.
- cperciva 10y ago
  OpenSSL's crypto code isn't all that bad as long as you're not worried about side channel attacks. Most of their remote code execution bugs have been in protocol code.
  - cyphar 10y ago
    > OpenSSL's crypto code isn't all that bad as long as you're not worried about side channel attacks. I consider "horrible API that makes it basically impossible to write safe code" to be a security vulnerability. Not to mention that OpenSSL's example code actually had security vulnerabilities (they didn't check the return value from one of the IV routines, whish means that you could end up using a shorter key than you expected).

ivoras 10y ago

>> a home-made public key signature format instead of PGP > How is 'openssl rsautl -sign' a "home-made" signature format? It's RAW RSA DATA. You could argue it's more pure that way but if that were the case, noone would ask for more metadata-rich signatures. > As for using GPG... given its security track record, that's one of the last things I'd want to consider using for verifying signatures on binary updates. If you don't see the NIH-ism in that sentence, then I'm sorry, neither I nor nobody else can help you. > The pkg repository is signed. Can individual package files be verified off-line?

tedunangst 10y ago
Is it not possible for cperciva's assessment of GPG to be accurate regardless of where it was invented?
cperciva 10y ago
Whether code is crap is a completely separate question from where it was invented. Putting signatures onto the individual package files could expose users to mismatch attacks, and would also make it harder to defend against build-trojan theft of signing keys.
tptacek 10y ago
I think Colin has the better argument here. You were hyperbolic when you called rsautl a "home-made format".
feld 10y ago
Packages are not meant to be distributed ad-hoc. You're meant to host a repo and sign it.

frutiger 10y ago

I find it amusing that the line before your statement of distrust around GPG refers to using that bastion of solid, dependable crypto code that ships with OpenSSL.

nickpsecurity 10y ago
That was pretty funny. Gets better with the Snowden slides where mighty NSA basically says they can't break it in basic, use case. At Princeton, Snowden even said analysts got failure notices even for requests to decrypt GPG w/ 1,024-bit RSA at a time when paranoids wondered how long 4,096-bit might last. Haha. Next I'm going to hear that using TAIL's increases your risk of damning evidence found during a disk audit by a forensics team.
cperciva 10y ago
OpenSSL's crypto code isn't all that bad as long as you're not worried about side channel attacks. Most of their remote code execution bugs have been in protocol code.
- cyphar 10y ago
  > OpenSSL's crypto code isn't all that bad as long as you're not worried about side channel attacks. I consider "horrible API that makes it basically impossible to write safe code" to be a security vulnerability. Not to mention that OpenSSL's example code actually had security vulnerabilities (they didn't check the return value from one of the IV routines, whish means that you could end up using a shorter key than you expected).