11 ms·
Microsoft proves backdoor keys are a bad idea
- daenney 10y agoI genuinely hope this will influence the whole government mandated back door debate for the better but I'm afraid that this will just be forgotten in a matter of minutes. Like Gove said "we've had enough of experts", especially when their educated opinions don't suit us.
- SixSigma 10y agoExcept the "no encryption at all" crowd gets a louder voice.
- Razengan 10y agoDid anything come of this? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY
- slg 10y agoIf a terrorist attack occurred and it was clear that it could have been prevented if the authorities could have read encrypted information, would that change your opinion of backdoors? If not, why are you criticizing the other side for being just as steadfast in their beliefs as you are in yours? The truth is that no policy is going to be 100% effective so I'm not sure why either side of the debate should overadjust based on a single failure
- mulmen 10y agoI would not criticize the other side of the debate for being steadfast. I will however criticize the belief itself. I will base my criticism on actual events such as this one instead of hypotheticals. I do not think considering this case in the encryption/backdoor debate is an over-adjustment based on a single failure. I think this a relevant example of the risks of creating and using a golden key. If you discount every individual example what are you left with? As daenney stated, the hope is to influence debate, not base the decision entirely on one event. Do you believe this situation has no relevance to the encryption and backdoor debate? Are you arguing that because no policy will be 100% effective we just shouldn't bother with a discussion?
- slg 10y ago>I will base my criticism on actual events such as this one instead of hypotheticals. The problem is that due to its nature, you only hear about one side of these events. We never hear about the attacks that were stopped or could have been stopped by backdoors. Many people take that as proof that these events don't happen but as the old saying goes absence of proof is not proof of absence. Without that proof, all we can do is provide hypotheticals. I am not arguing that this story isn't relevant. I am arguing that people who feel this story should change their opponents minds are guilty of hypocrisy. In my personal view, both side in this debate have pros and cons. However, most in the tech community refuse to acknowledge that which results in zero progress.
- elmigranto 10y ago> absence of proof is not proof of absence I don't think this applies here. I suppose your point is goverment's exploits might be effective but they keep it low not to expose the fact of their existence. Well, this might very well justify anything from 1984 or any other anti-utopia — "let us do whatever, it is effective and needed, but we won't give any facts or details, because it might compromise our system".
- slg 10y agoYou are proving my point. Not everything is black and white. Not every slope is slippery. There is room for discussion and compromise. You comparing the people on the other side of the debate to fans of 1984 style totalitarian government gets nothing accomplished just like people on the other side saying you are enabling terrorists gets nothing accomplished. The only difference is that the other side of the debate is already in power. So if the tech community doesn't even want to discuss this issue, guess which side of the issue will win the debate and decide future encryption law.
- int_19h 10y agoWriting the law is easy. Enforcing it, on the other hand ...
- woodman 10y agoAre you of the opinion that all beliefs are above ridicule, or just this one? Because in my opinion the idea of a government controlled key escrow is the most stupid thing I've heard suggested and its proponents are either willfully ignorant or just insane. Recent history is full of major failures on the part of the USG to properly safeguard data of the most sensitive nature, as well as cases where they had collected clear text intel and just failed to connect the dots. So there is nothing to gain and everything to lose; they have enough data, they should work on their analytics before they endeavor to intentionally weaken everybody's security.
- bradford 10y ago(disclaimer, MS employee, non-security expert here). I've read through the article, here, and in other places, and I'm seeing sentiment that this is a big fuck up on Microsoft's part. I might be completely misunderstanding, but I just don't see it. In order to use the backdoor, you've got to flash firmware, so, you've got to have physical access to the device. If an attacker has physical access to your device, you're already screwed. So, I don't doubt that the key exists (I had to use it myself when testing RT devices back in the win8 days), but what's the exploit here? Why is it, as the title suggests, a 'bad idea'? Isn't a secure boot policy that can be bypassed with physical access more secure than none?
- Knuff 10y agoThe point the register makes is not that this allows unlocking devices (though that's interesting in it's own right), but that is done via a "secret key" that now got exposed. Very similar to what the government wants with key escrows and other backdoor mechanisms for decryption of communication. Maybe to clarify: it highlights the mechanism (golden key) is flawed. That Microsoft uses it for boot loaders is unimportant.
- astrodust 10y agoIn other words, if Microsoft can't keep the proverbial cat in the bag what hope do other less tech-savvy companies or organizations have?
- cptskippy 10y agoLike the IoT makers who lock their devices by means of clear text passwords hardcoded into the device firmware? Most companies don't go to the extent of having a cryptographically secure key validated by a TPM. At least MS is trying to secure the system.
- beagle3 10y agoMS are trying to secure their monopoly. If they wanted to secure the system, key management would be up to the user.
- tryp 10y agoThe researchers' writeup, in a very fun form, can be found at https://rol.im/securegoldenkeyboot/ https://rol.im/securegoldenkeyboot/ With text as follows for those whom the joviality of the original presentation is undesirable: irc.rol.im #rtchurch :: https://rol.im/chat/rtchurch https://rol.im/chat/rtchurch Specific Secure Boot policies, when provisioned, allow for testsigning to be enabled, on any BCD object, including {bootmgr}. This also removes the NT loader options blacklist (AFAIK). (MS16-094 / CVE-2016-3287, and MS16-100 / CVE-2016-3320) Found by my123 (@never_released) and slipstream (@TheWack0lian) Writeup by slipstream (@TheWack0lian) First up, "Secure Boot policies". What are they exactly? As you know, secureboot is a part of the uefi firmware, when enabled, it only lets stuff run that's signed by a cert in db, and whose hash is not in dbx (revoked). As you probably also know, there are devices where secure boot can NOT be disabled by the user (Windows RT, HoloLens, Windows Phone, maybe Surface Hub, and maybe some IoTCore devices if such things actually exist -- not talking about the boards themselves which are not locked down at all by default, but end devices sold that may have secureboot locked on). But in some cases, the "shape" of secure boot needs to change a bit. For example in development, engineering, refurbishment, running flightsigned stuff (as of win10) etc. How to do that, with devices where secure boot is locked on? Enter the Secure Boot policy. It's a file in a binary format that's embedded within an ASN.1 blob, that is signed. It's loaded by bootmgr REALLY early into the windows boot process. It must be signed by a certificate in db. It gets loaded from a UEFI variable in the secureboot namespace (therefore, it can only be touched by boot services). There's a couple .efis signed by MS that can provision such a policy, that is, set the UEFI variable with its contents being the policy. What can policies do, you ask? They have two different types of rules. BCD rules, which override settings in the on-disk BCD, and registry rules, which contain configuration for the policy itself, plus configuration for other parts of boot services, etc. For example, one registry element was introduced in Windows 10 version 1607 'Redstone' which disables certificate expiry checking inside mobilestartup's .ffu flashing (ie, the "lightning bolt" windows phone flasher); and another one enables mobilestartup's USB mass storage mode. Other interesting registry rules change the shape of Code Integrity, ie, for a certain type of binary, it changes the certificates considered valid for that specific binary. (Alex Ionescu wrote a blog post that touches on Secure Boot policies. He teased a followup post that would be all about them, but that never came.) But, they must be signed by a cert in db. That is to say, Microsoft. Also, there is such a thing called DeviceID. It's the first 64 bits of a salted SHA-256 hash, of some UEFI PRNG output. It's used when applying policies on Windows Phone, and on Windows RT (mobilestartup sets it on Phone, and SecureBootDebug.efi when that's launched for the first time on RT). On Phone, the policy must be located in a specific place on EFIESP partition with the filename including the hex-form of the DeviceID. (With Redstone, this got changed to UnlockID, which is set by bootmgr, and is just the raw UEFI PRNG output.) Basically, bootmgr checks the policy when it loads, if it includes a DeviceID, which doesn't match the DeviceID of the device that bootmgr is running on, the policy will fail to load. Any policy that allows for enabling testsigning (MS calls these Retail Device Unlock / RDU policies, and to install them is unlocking a device), is supposed to be locked to a DeviceID (UnlockID on Redstone and above). Indeed, I have several policies (signed by the Windows Phone production certificate) like this, where the only differences are the included DeviceID, and the signature. If there is no valid policy installed, bootmgr falls back to using a default policy located in its resources. This policy is the one which blocks enabling testsigning, etc, using BCD rules. Now, for Microsoft's screwups. During the development of Windows 10 v1607 'Redstone', MS added a new type of secure boot policy. Namely, "supplemental" policies that are located in the EFIESP partition (rather than in a UEFI variable), and have their settings merged in, dependant on conditions (namely, that a certain "activation" policy is also in existance, and has been loaded in). Redstone's bootmgr.efi loads "legacy" policies (namely, a policy from UEFI variables) first. At a certain time in redstone dev, it did not do any further checks beyond signature / deviceID checks. (This has now changed, but see how the change is stupid) After loading the "legacy" policy, or a base policy from EFIESP partition, it then loads, checks and merges in the supplemental policies. See the issue here? If not, let me spell it out to you plain and clear. The "supplemental" policy contains new elements, for the merging conditions. These conditions are (well, at one time) unchecked by bootmgr when loading a legacy policy. And bootmgr of win10 v1511 and earlier certainly doesn't know about them. To those bootmgrs, it has just loaded in a perfectly valid, signed policy. The "supplemental" policy does NOT contain a DeviceID. And, because they were meant to be merged into a base policy, they don't contain any BCD rules either, which means that if they are loaded, you can enable testsigning. Not just for windows (to load unsigned driver, ie rootkit), but for the {bootmgr} element as well, which allows bootmgr to run what is effectively an unsigned .efi (ie bootkit)!!! (In practise, the .efi file must be signed, but it can be self-signed) You can see how this is very bad!! A backdoor, which MS put in to secure boot because they decided to not let the user turn it off in certain devices, allows for secure boot to be disabled everywhere! You can see the irony. Also the irony in that MS themselves provided us several nice "golden keys" (as the FBI would say ;) for us to use for that purpose :) About the FBI: are you reading this? If you are, then this is a perfect real world example about why your idea of backdooring cryptosystems with a "secure golden key" is very bad! Smarter people than me have been telling this to you for so long, it seems you have your fingers in your ears. You seriously don't understand still? Microsoft implemented a "secure golden key" system. And the golden keys got released from MS own stupidity. Now, what happens if you tell everyone to make a "secure golden key" system? Hopefully you can add 2+2... Anyway, enough about that little rant, wanted to add that to a writeup ever since this stuff was found ;) Anyway, MS's first patch attempt. I say "attempt" because it surely doesn't do anything useful. It blacklists (in boot.stl), most (not all!) of the policies. Now, about boot.stl. It's a file that gets cloned to a UEFI variable only boot services can touch, and only when the boot.stl signing time is later than the time this UEFI variable was set. However, this is done AFTER a secure boot policy gets loaded. Redstone's bootmgr has extra code to use the boot.stl in the UEFI variable to check policy revocation, but the bootmgrs of TH2 and earlier does NOT have such code. So, an attacker can just replace a later bootmgr with an earlier one. Another thing: I saw some additional code in the load-legacy-policy function in redstone 14381.rs1_release. Code that wasn't there in 14361. Code that specifically checked the policy being loaded for an element that meant this was a supplemental policy, and erroring out if so. So, if a system is running Windows 10 version 1607 or above, an attacker MUST replace bootmgr with an earlier one. On August 9th, 2016, another patch came about, this one was given the designation MS16-100 and CVE-2016-3320. This one updates dbx. The advisory says it revokes bootmgrs. The dbx update seems to add these SHA256 hashes (unless I screwed up my parsing): <snip> I checked the hash in the signature of several bootmgrs of several architectures against this list, and found no matches. So either this revokes many "obscure" bootmgrs and bootmgfws, or I'm checking the wrong hash. Either way, it'd be impossible in practise for MS to revoke every bootmgr earlier than a certain point, as they'd break install media, recovery partitions, backups, etc. - RoL disclosure timeline: ~march-april 2016 - found initial policy, contacted MSRC ~april 2016 - MSRC reply: wontfix, started analysis and reversing, working on almost-silent (3 reboots needed) PoC for possible emfcamp demonstration ~june-july 2016 - MSRC reply again, finally realising: bug bounty awarded july 2016 - initial fix - fix analysed, deemed inadequate. reversed later rs1 bootmgr, noticed additional inadequate mitigation august 2016 - mini-talk about the issue at emfcamp, second fix, full writeup release credits: my123 (@never_released) -- found initial policy set, tested on surface rt slipstream (@TheWack0lian) -- analysis of policies, reversing bootmgr/ mobilestartup/etc, found even more policies, this writeup. tiny-tro credits: code and design: slipstream/RoL awesome chiptune: bzl/cRO <3
- lawnchair_larry 10y agoWhat does leaking your private key have to do with backdoor keys? Isn't this like saying that CAs are backdoored because somewhere there exists a private key for those certs?
- gtirloni 10y agoYes. The Register usually adds a lot of extra drama to their articles. The article gets a bit saner towards the end.
- colemickens 10y agoWhat leaked key? That's... not what happened in this case.
- 45h34jh53k4j 10y agoNo private keys were leaked; however a signed policy file, that lets you disable the protections within secureboot was discovered and repurposed. Its not so much a backdoor key, but an overly permissive mechanism within microsofts secureboot implementation that could be used to implement a backdoor within the system. A similar analogy in the CA world would be when the Microsoft Terminal Server Licensing CA (which accepted user submitted signing requests) was signing certificates that worked in other contexts (ie: https). This didn't break the CA system globally just one overly permissive implementation.
- lawnchair_larry 10y agoYeah, I see now, thanks to the other source. The Register's misuse of "key" followed by excessive drivel in that article had me navigating away with the wrong impression before I could make the connection.
- rocky1138 10y ago> The Register understands that this debug-mode policy was accidentally shipped on retail devices, and discovered by curious minds including Slip and MY123. > The policy was effectively inert and deactivated on these products but present nonetheless. Whenever I read things like this, I always envision that it's not a cock-up at all, but instead a deliberate effort by righteous free software-minded people who happen to work at Microsoft and are dismayed by the things they're asked to do. But that is probably because I wish it so.
- ge0rg 10y agoa deliberate effort by righteous free software-minded people who happen to work at Microsoft Or maybe a deliberate effort by developers who are paid by a three letter agency to sneak in a backdoor that looks like an accidental bug. In this case you might be right, but the last time a similar issue was widely circulated (Heartbleed in OpenSSL), it also looked like an accident (or rather gross negligence), but its effect was much more beneficial to agencies and not usable to increase FOSS domination.
- josteink 10y ago> Or maybe a deliberate effort by developers who are paid by a three letter agency to sneak in a backdoor that looks like an accidental bug. Why would a three-letter agency bother to do that, when they could just as well get their malware EFI module signed by MS, and thus pass the secure-boot requirement? That way they wont risk exposing the existence of a backdoor on every single Windows-copy deployed worldwide. I honestly don't see the value in it for them.
- ge0rg 10y agowhen they could just as well get their malware EFI module signed by MS This is exactly what the FBI tried with Apple, causing an enormous public mud fight. Besides, the outlined method would rather be deployed by NSA, or maybe a foreign service, without legal means to get a signed malware module. Even if such legal means would exist, it would be in Microsofts best interest to fight them in court: once leaked, the malware would be clearly attributable to MS.
- 45h34jh53k4j 10y agoSo from this I think you could say this is a universal microsoft secureboot implementation bypass. all you need is the signed policy file and an older more obscure (signed) non-blacklisted bootmgr and you can exploit secureboot to glory. its almost certainly going to be used for malware - a return of bootkits for invisibility/persistence? microsoft will have to keep revoking older bootmgr's as they find them in jailbreak utils and bootkit malware. eventually they will run out, but for now, busted. tempting to go buy some winRT devices for linux!
- allendoerfer 10y agoI think people should be able to sue companies that do this. They surely did not advertise it as "secure unless we lose the key". Having a backdoor in the first place could be counted as negligent (should be counted as outright fraud).
- netsharc 10y agoIs it really a backdoor? Basically it's a policy with very permissive settings, but even without this policy, the manufacturer still needs to use encryption to sign software, and they'd still need to have a master key which they need to keep very safe. For example, in the FBI vs. Apple case, the FBI wanted Apple to write a custom version of iOS and sign it so that the phone would verify that it's legitimately from Apple, and install it. Obviously it's different than the FBI also having keys, but only because of protections of the law. I guess in Russia or China the 3 letter agencies can be a lot more persuasive about asking the manufacturers for their master keys, although the USA also has NSL's...
- josteink 10y ago> I think people should be able to sue companies that do this. They surely did not advertise it as "secure unless we lose the key". I think you misunderstand what this is. This is not a remote backdoor, which can be used by MS/NSA to hack your machine. Windows RT devices comes with a bootloader locked to only allow UEFI secure-boot signed boot media. Effectively that means Windows RT only. No Linux, FreeBSD or other free OSen for you. This is a hack, which requires you to have full admin-access on the device, which uses Microsoft's own UEFI mechanisms (policies and what not), to allow booting other non-signed media as well. Effectively this is a bootloader unlocking. With this hack in place, you can now boot Linux. Or run malware. Anything goes. It's the same as being able to disable secure-boot. And would you honestly sue HTC or whoever if you found out that the bootloader on your phone could be unlocked, to allow the installation of third party firmware? Surely you would only see that as a positive thing? Or am I missing something?
- allendoerfer 10y agoI got what this is, my point is, that it is not what they advertised. Maybe I should have made this more clear. I myself would be thankful to be able to install Linux if I had a device like that. Nevertheless some (enterprise) users would maybe like it otherwise and were screwed by Microsoft claiming something is secured, when they in fact knew, that it was not. A scenario I can think of is when the machine is not owned by the one using it and the owner wants to sandbox the user as much as possible. In this in the view of the owner it really is a backdoor. I would love to see companies getting punished for things like that. This case does not seem severe, still, what I want is that you are accountable for stuff you say. You cannot have a backdoor - being remote or not remote - if you say that the thing is secure. You knew it was not, you have committed fraud.
- contextfree 10y agoI'm actually a bit confused about how this is a "golden key" problem (if I understand what that means). As far as I can tell, the problem here is that there's a signed policy that was intended for newer versions of Windows, but is also interpreted by older versions of Windows as a valid policy with a different meaning. On Win10 1607 it means "under such-and-such conditions, merge these additional rules into the already applied policy" and on older Windows it just means "apply this policy". But the only key here in both cases is Microsoft's regular signing key. Which I guess could be considered a kind of golden key/backdoor/whatever in itself - just as in the recent Apple vs. FBI standoff you could say the fact that Apple had the technical ability to sign and install a hacked OS was a backdoor to begin with - but that doesn't seem to be what people mean.
- ruste 10y agoIs this code also used for the Xbox? It would be really cool if we could run linux/bsd easily on one of those.
- jagermo 10y agoMaybe that is the plan all along: Create shitty, easy to find backdoors to show how stupid the whole concept is? And when ask, just say: The MPAA/RIAA/NSA forced us - go complain to them.