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> What's the point of disabling the ability to install another OS? It comes down to the trusted base concept: once the OS is running, it can provide strong ass
by acdha 10y ago
> What's the point of disabling the ability to install another OS?
It comes down to the trusted base concept: once the OS is running, it can provide strong assurances to prevent unauthorized code from running but that can't protect against malicious code starting before the OS. An attacker could use the built-in virtualization support on most modern CPUs to load your normal OS and, with care, make it extremely hard to tell that all of your actions are compromised. Some people like that because it could be used to attack DRM schemes but it could also be used to record keystrokes, steal crypto keys, install ransomware which waits for the user to be utterly hosed before triggering the payment prompt, etc.
Having the firmware verify every bit of code before executing it avoids that problem but that poses the problem of having a trusted signing key which needs to be managed – imagine the mess if, say, Dell's key leaked – and poses the problem of getting new keys on the list for legitimate purposes (e.g. booting Linux) but not making it realistic for malware to do the same thing. I'd like to see some sort of government regulation requiring the latter but having some fairly cumbersome process to complicate social engineering attacks (e.g. reboot while holding down a switch, answer a prompt that you understand this will expose all of your personal data to the new OS, etc.).
This is also why Intel is introducing things like SGX - note the selling points on https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx:
> * Remains protected even when the BIOS, VMM, OS, and drivers are compromised, implying that an attacker with full execution control over the platform can be kept at bay
> * Benefits from memory protections that thwart memory bus snooping, memory tampering and “cold boot” attacks on images retained in RAM
- the8472 10y agoIf disk encryption keys are tied to the secure boot keys then you can maintain security and freedom at the same time. Swapping in user-supplied signing key would render the disk unreadable and thus protect the existing data from being attacked by malware. Don't drink their coolaid if they're trying to convince you that they're restricting your freedom in the name of security.
- acdha 10y agoPlease think things through more before accusing other people of drinking flavor-aid. If you re-read my comment, note that I was describing how it worked and the problem it solved, and the closest I came to endorsing a side was in favor of the government preventing manufacturers from locking users out. What you proposed still depends on something like secure boot but could be a way to satisfy that mandate by preventing manufacturers from arbitrarily restricting the configuration.
- the8472 10y agoI did read it as you saying that vendor-lockin is a necessary component instead of an implementation decision. To me the lockdown of windows RT devices does not seem like security motivated at all, considering that secure boot and TPMs in PCs share much of the same security architecture but do allow key swapping. It's more likely motivated by subsidized devices. That's why your given answer to the question why there is an OS lock-in struck me as coolaid.