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The customer has no way of knowing whether they are installing genuine update, or MITM-modified malicious update. Public key cryptography solves that but then y
by Const-me 10y ago
The customer has no way of knowing whether they are installing genuine update, or MITM-modified malicious update.
Public key cryptography solves that but then you have a problem how to protect the keys and crypto algorithms from tampering.
Update buttons ain't a good replacement for TPM hardware.
- mikeash 10y agoIt's not a panacea, but nothing is, and it would help a lot. It's not supposed to be a replacement for anything, just an addition.
- WalterBright 10y agoIt's an enormously harder problem to convince the customer to push the "update firmware" button on the front panel than it is to insert malware remotely without any action or knowledge on the customer's part.
- Const-me 10y agoIt’s enormously easier problem to exploit a well-known remote code execution vulnerability, that’s unpatched because updates are too easy to ignore. For the end user, it’s extremely easy to NOT push that button.