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> Before crypto, basically all guarantees where conditional on a judge's say so. Sadly, they weren't. > With crypto this changes. Actually, with crypto it is

by cbsmith 10y ago

> Before crypto, basically all guarantees where conditional on a judge's say so. Sadly, they weren't. > With crypto this changes. Actually, with crypto it is much harder to claim that a judge's authorization isn't required to even try to subvert the privacy intent. > There is no way to deal with fraud or mistaken tranfers in bitcoin. There's no way because legally the system (for the most part) considers it outside the scope of fraud laws. > That loss of intervention hurts, and we gotta think about it. TLS doesn't create a real loss of intervention. It requires that the intervention be far more explicit and/or targeted.

rocqua 10y ago
> with crypto it is much harder to claim that a judge's authorization isn't required to even try to subvert the privacy intent. No doubt, but the issue is that a judge's authorization can be ineffective in the face of crypto. > TLS doesn't create a real loss of intervention. It requires that the intervention be far more explicit and/or targeted. That targeted intervention is really easy to block for those who want too. All it takes is not revealing a key/passphrase. > There's no way because legally the system (for the most part) considers it outside the scope of fraud laws. Not just that though, it is also impossible because the conditionals introduced by a court system are very hard to encode in a crypto system, even more so if you want to do this and be able to retain trust.
- cbsmith 10y ago
  > No doubt, but the issue is that a judge's authorization can be ineffective in the face of crypto. Only when it should be. Crypto just means you need a secret to access the data. If you can't compel the secret, why should you be able to compel the data? > That targeted intervention is really easy to block for those who want too. All it takes is not revealing a key/passphrase. You say that like it is an easy thing. Try keeping your key/passphrase protected against an adversary that can replace/intercept your keyboard, your touch screen, your mouse, your network, etc. It's just a lot more intrusive and a lot more work, which is why it has to be far more explicit and targeted. > > There's no way because legally the system (for the most part) considers it outside the scope of fraud laws. > Not just that though, it is also impossible because the conditionals introduced by a court system are very hard to encode in a crypto system, even more so if you want to do this and be able to retain trust. Those conditionals were all choices made by the legal system. Those rules can always be changed if so desired. If they aren't... maybe it is because they shouldn't be. ;-)

by cbsmith 10y ago

rocqua 10y ago

> with crypto it is much harder to claim that a judge's authorization isn't required to even try to subvert the privacy intent. No doubt, but the issue is that a judge's authorization can be ineffective in the face of crypto. > TLS doesn't create a real loss of intervention. It requires that the intervention be far more explicit and/or targeted. That targeted intervention is really easy to block for those who want too. All it takes is not revealing a key/passphrase. > There's no way because legally the system (for the most part) considers it outside the scope of fraud laws. Not just that though, it is also impossible because the conditionals introduced by a court system are very hard to encode in a crypto system, even more so if you want to do this and be able to retain trust.

cbsmith 10y ago
> No doubt, but the issue is that a judge's authorization can be ineffective in the face of crypto. Only when it should be. Crypto just means you need a secret to access the data. If you can't compel the secret, why should you be able to compel the data? > That targeted intervention is really easy to block for those who want too. All it takes is not revealing a key/passphrase. You say that like it is an easy thing. Try keeping your key/passphrase protected against an adversary that can replace/intercept your keyboard, your touch screen, your mouse, your network, etc. It's just a lot more intrusive and a lot more work, which is why it has to be far more explicit and targeted. > > There's no way because legally the system (for the most part) considers it outside the scope of fraud laws. > Not just that though, it is also impossible because the conditionals introduced by a court system are very hard to encode in a crypto system, even more so if you want to do this and be able to retain trust. Those conditionals were all choices made by the legal system. Those rules can always be changed if so desired. If they aren't... maybe it is because they shouldn't be. ;-)