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Because it's not a fundamental error or indeed an error at all. What you've just expressed is one of those fascinating pieces of mental junk that clutters up s
by mike_hearn 10y ago
Because it's not a fundamental error or indeed an error at all.
What you've just expressed is one of those fascinating pieces of mental junk that clutters up social groups, a political desire that's so strongly held you've managed to rationalise to yourself that it's a fact and not a personal desire at all. But it's still not a fact.
It is trivial to use cryptography in ways that yield some sort of balance between personal privacy and the needs of the state. In fact it's almost the default:
• Client-to-server encryption with central message routing is "unbreakable" against neighbours, friends, your employer (when not using their equipment) and most importantly criminals, but is easily accessed by any police officer who can serve a warrant on the provider.
• Disk encryption enforced by secure hardware like iOS, Android, BitLocker etc can easily be given a backdoor by the manufacturers. It's only a few pages of extra code at most.
And that's about it for "mainstream use of crypto up to about 3 years ago" right? It's only since Apple and Facebook started refusing to unlock devices and claiming (wrongly) they have end-to-end encrypted their service so they can no longer comply with warrants that this situation has changed.
That's not even including other techniques like key escrow, the dual-EC RNG that the NSA was pushing (with the interesting fillip that it's got a cryptographically strong "unbreakable" backdoor!) and a whole host of other tricks that aren't really used much (we think).
PHK's article even spells this out for you - Kazakhstan breaks the supposedly unbreakable TLS by simply insisting everyone configure their computer to allow them that ability, a feature well intended by the TLS designers.
The truth is that there's a vast middle ground between "unbreakable crypto" and "effectively no crypto at all" and it is in that middle ground the virtually all services we use today sit. Enough crypto is used to keep out ordinary criminals and snoops, but not enough is used to keep out determined governments with jurisdiction. The point the author is making is that attempting to pursue the ideal of unbreakable crypto (a) won't work and (b) will actually end up making privacy worse for everyone.
- nightcracker 10y agoIf there is a backdoor, that backdoor can be used by anyone that has the key. I do not trust a government to responsibly handle such a key, as it leaking once results in total failure of security for everyone. A backdoored crypto system is a broken crypto system.
- coldcode 10y agoA backdoored crypto system is a no crypto system.
- sliverstorm 10y agoYou can always mitigate the "failure for everyone" scenario. Plethora of government keys, for example, or rotating government keys, or rapidly expiring government keys... Anyway, they've managed to keep stacks and stacks of information secret for decades and decades. It seems like it could be managed. No one has stolen the cert for *.whitehouse.gov. Sidenote, why do people call a second key a backdoor? To me, backdoor suggests exploit, not used-as-designed.
- Aelinsaar 10y agoBecause it involves trusting that no one made copies of the key, turning a locked door into a backdoor? Your mitigation ideas are sound though, and could also be used as a kind of rolling canary trap.
- mike_hearn 10y agoThere are lots of examples of governments maintaining the integrity of keys over the long term. The e-Passport system is an example of that. Another would be that the NSA had the ultimate insider hack - literally a sysadmin who dumped their entire internal wikis and document stores - and yet it appears that no key material was compromised. You can repeat "a backdoored system is no system" mantra to yourself if you like, but there are a LOT of threats that aren't governments and those are the ones people tend to care about the most.
- aminok 10y agoThreats posed by government are much more profound than those posed by any other type of organisation, because governments have much less effective checks on their power.
- Too 10y agoWhile I'm not a fan of crypto backdoors - thinking of it, aren't all public/private key pair systems a form of backdoor? If someone leaks the private key then everybody with the public key are affected? Think root CAs or app store signatures as example. They manage to keep their private keys secret quite well.
- icebraining 10y agoIt is trivial to use cryptography in ways that yield some sort of balance between personal privacy and the needs of the state. But that's the point: we've seen that this balance doesn't exist, because if the service providers have access to the plaintext, the State will not contain itself to issuing case-by-case warrants - see Room 641A, "SSL added and removed here", etc. The current move to encrypt everything is a reaction to the realization that the balance that was thought to exist, does not, and political participation is not sufficient because the information is kept hidden, so no informed political discourse is possible.
- mike_hearn 10y agoYou're arguing with something different to what I said. I pointed out that it's easy to design cryptosystems to be unbreakably strong against all adversaries except governments, and indeed can be unbreakably strong against mass eavesdropping by governments, yet still provide access on a case by case basis. And in fact this is the outcome of all kinds of natural and widely adopted designs. You're arguing that governments won't content themselves with such access. That's a different question entirely. I think many of them would and that we're heading in that direction, more or less, where mass decryption of TLS isn't done by most governments and the era of GCHQ/NSA style bulk wire tapping slowly fades away, but it doesn't matter to them much because they can still warrant the other end and ultimately that's what politicians feel safe campaigning on.
- icebraining 10y agoit's easy to design cryptosystems to be [...] unbreakably strong against mass eavesdropping by governments, yet still provide access on a case by case basis. Is it? How? Because that's certainly not the default that you referred to.
- mike_hearn 10y agoIt's absolutely the default. Imagine you own a webmail company. You secure your SMTP relays with SMTP-TLS (let's pretend it works well) and your client connections with TLS again. Now your users are safe from random creepy flatmates, criminals with wifi sniffers, your telco and even mass government surveillance. But, governments can still serve a warrant on you to get email in a targeted manner, assuming they have a working MLAT process. All you did was apply ordinary encryption to an ordinary website and you have that middle ground between "unbreakable to everyone" and "totally useless".
- Confusion 10y agoClient-to-server encryption with central message routing [..] will be abused by the NSA and anyone else that can get their hands on access. And no amount of politicking is going to change that, as it hasn't changed anything about their blatant disregard of the law thus far. BTW, 'anyone else that can get their hands on access' will include foreign nations and criminals. [..] can easily be given a backdoor [..] that magically does manage to stay out of the hands of foreign nations and criminals, where all other backdoors thus far have been discovered and abused? These arguments have a huge track record against them and I downvoted you for either acting wilfully ignorant.
- mike_hearn 10y agoHow many of the NSA's backdoors have ended up in the hands of foreign nations and criminals, again?
- michael_fine 10y agoTo be fair, the NSA did have a very high profile incided where they were considering legally mandating a physical backdoor, called the Clipper Chip, until it was proven that the chip had a gaping vulnerability. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip
- mike_hearn 10y agoThat's kind of proving my point, isn't it? They reacted to the vulnerability (decades ago) by not deploying it, and presumably learning some lessons.
- Confusion 10y agoAll of them.
- michael_fine 10y agoThat's entirely unprovable, given that we have no idea how many backdoors the NSA has, nor for the matter, are we even sure how many have been leaked.
- aminok 10y ago>Enough crypto is used to keep out ordinary criminals and snoops, but not enough is used to keep out determined governments with jurisdiction. So not enough crypto to prevent absolute centralization of power by the institution with a monopoly on violence.