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Some security professionals have expressed the view that insecure endpoints represent a good compromise. That is, without the US government being able to snoop
by Zigurd 10y ago
Some security professionals have expressed the view that insecure endpoints represent a good compromise. That is, without the US government being able to snoop on endpoint devices, encryption would have to be tightly controlled, so that the government could retain intelligence and investigatory capability.
A more cynical view would be that many security firms sell both security and forensics/surveillance. One of those two product lines has to be fundamentally defective.
Is the position that hackable endpoints are a good compromise supportable any longer? Or has it bitten US entities in the ass enough that making truly secure computing a reality for computer users, even if it blinds the surveillance state, becomes the new goal.
- EthanHeilman 10y agoI've often heard not that "insecure endpoints represent a good compromise" but instead that since: 1. endpoints are vulnerable because they are exceptionally hard to secure, 2. and attacking endpoints can be targeted and specific, the governments case that weakening encryption is necessary for warranted search is weak. Even with strong encryption the government can exploit the targeted communicant's endpoint to learn either the plaintext or the encryption keys. This isn't a compromise so much as a statement of reality and what is likely to remain reality for some time to come. Weakening encryption, for the most part, provides benefits to the government in the form of mass surveillance, but for a variety of reasons doesn't offer much benefit in the form of limited, specific searches. >making truly secure computing a reality for computer users, We can make endpoints more secure, but I see no path to endpoint security that will keep out a determined well resourced adversary.
- Zigurd 10y agoYou get what you pay for. Right now, endpoint systems are undefended, even intentionally compromised. The design of endpoint systems assumes all components can be trusted. But those components don't usually undergo testing for vulnerabilities and hidden capabilities.