Tor itself is already a prime target for hackers. There are plenty of malicious exit nodes as is; as for nation-states, the cost of entry into polluting the Tor

Tor itself is already a prime target for hackers. There are plenty of malicious exit nodes as is; as for nation-states, the cost of entry into polluting the Tor network with your own circuits to probabilistically deanonymize users is low enough as is that you'd be stupid not to do it. By the same logic, torservers.net shouldn't exist, or ipredator's massive exit. Tor has a fair amount of relay bandwidth; Mozilla running exit nodes adds strength to where the bigger bottleneck is. There isn't a lot of personal risk in running middles or guards to the common techie; an exit node with abusive traffic can get your house raided in the United States [1] and Germany makes you responsible for traffic on your IP [2]. They have the legal and personnel resources to be able to deal with abuse complaints from bad actors, and should, for the sake of the network they support. [1] http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/seattle-police-raid-home-privacy-activists-who-maintain-tor-anonymity-network-node-1552524 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/seattle-police-raid-home-privacy-ac... [2] http://www.young-germany.de/topic/live/your-digital-rights-in-germany http://www.young-germany.de/topic/live/your-digital-rights-i...