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Retractions aren't an counterpoint against the article inasmuch as a result of the scientific process. Science is bound to get things wrong, and in a larger, gr
by whorleater 10y ago
Retractions aren't an counterpoint against the article inasmuch as a result of the scientific process. Science is bound to get things wrong, and in a larger, grander scheme of scientific processes judging science by its retractions is akin to judging someone for their childhood actions. Science develops, learns, and moves forwards, and while that doesn't render it impervious to criticism, it should be impervious to those who aren't involved in it to a significant degree. Framed in that manner, I don't think the end of the article is disturbing.
- thanatropism 10y agoI will agree that retractions are a mark of honesty on some of the actors involved in "Science". What they are not is the "sign of contradiction" of catholic faith. Honesty is not enough to claim a priesthood of the fashion he wants. This becomes even more complicated as we leave the holy sciences of physics, chemistry and biology. We are told that the popperian method of posing falsifiable hypotheses is the only way "forward" and we attempt to apply it to the poorly defined questions of areas such as cognitive psychology -- and then become startled or blame p-values when we find ourselves in the middle of a replicability crisis where any given paper may as well be false. Because physics has such a hug on its unyielding realities, we assume homogeneous "Science" is able to claim an "objective", extra-social -- and ironically unverifiable, as we can't arrive at right answers from wrong questions -- command of "knowledge". But that's not a true view of the real world, unyielding as it is to our space-age dreams.
- whorleater 10y agoYou're completely right on that the generalization of science as an objective process onto itself is unfounded at best and dangerous as worst, but isn't that a sign of growing pains in science? As science progresses, both in the easily quantifiable and more abstract fields, we should expect an eventual progression towards a further, better measures for fields such as cognitive psychology. It took physics hundreds of years to be verifiable on a large degree, and we shouldn't hold relatively newer fields to the same standard, and scientist have to start somewhere. Unto that goal, isn't it more dangerous to stifle and stall newer fields because they're experiencing growing pains?
- thanatropism 10y ago> isn't that a sign of growing pains in science? Could be that; or could be that scienticians are investigating the wrong questions altogether in these massively nonreplicable fields. Face it: science needs to learn to (1) be open to criticism (2) become well-acquainted with the critique of science (as it's expected to be well acquainted with statistical methods now) and (3) help the from-outside-science "science studies" fields grow rather than nipping them in their bud for their still-infant understanding of the meat (rather than the processes) of science. Much like no one should be allowed to go into research with the poor grasp of probability theory that "p-value imagineers" display, no one should go into research while imagining they're being inducted into a priesthood of objective thinking. Maybe Derrida is a confidence trickster, but it's not him who's "stifling" science. If anything, the Neil deGrasse Tysons of the world are stifling open societal discussion of where fundamental physics is actually going (which is -- nowhere for about 40 years now) and what "scientific studies" as portrayed by daytime TV really mean. Scientific idealism isn't doing society any favors and isn't doing science any favors. Maybe it's doing favors to cynical tenure-track professors who need to massively oversell the meaning and potential impact of their work, but that's neither here nor there: graft and rent-seeking are as old as humanity.