> Exit nodes can trivially screw around with plain HTTP (both snoop on and rewrite), and it also puts them in a MitM position for new HTTPS bugs. This is no di

> Exit nodes can trivially screw around with plain HTTP (both snoop on and rewrite), and it also puts them in a MitM position for new HTTPS bugs. This is no different from your ISP or the guy next to you on the coffee shop wireless. If you don't want people to snoop and rewrite your HTTP connection, don't use HTTP. And the solution to broken HTTPS is to fix HTTPS. Tor doesn't decrease your security in either of these cases. > That's a risk you take when using Tor, and it's not a tradeoff you can reasonably convey to existing Firefox users who are used to Private mode meaning a certain thing. 1. It's not a tradeoff. Tor does not decrease your security in either case. There are cases where Tor doesn't provide privacy protections, but there's not a case I know of where using Tor provides fewer protections than not using Tor. 2. It's impossible to convey to non-technical users that private browsing doesn't provide privacy from their ISP, governments, etc. I don't understand how you can claim that providing fewer privacy protections is less confusing to the non-technical user. > Also, the Tor network probably doesn't have enough exit node capacity to handle the volume it would get. This is a solvable problem.