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Question: any possible case of bad apples that make let's encrypt suddenly lose their trust? Eg bcoz it's free, it's used by "bad guys" just like .info tld.
by wiradikusuma 10y ago
Question: any possible case of bad apples that make let's encrypt suddenly lose their trust? Eg bcoz it's free, it's used by "bad guys" just like .info tld.
- hughes 10y agowhat's wrong with the .info tld?
- chc 10y agoPeople distrust it because it's 99% spam?
- duskwuff 10y ago.info is really not all that bad, in the grand scheme of things. .biz is much worse (and has been since its launch in 2001!), and some of the new TLDs like .top and .xyz have been abused pretty heavily as well.
- tracker1 10y agoI actually like the .info tld... perfect domain for "informational" websites, wikis etc. Though there may be better ones with the recent goldrush of new tlds available. Though I also liked .io, and felt the higher pricing and harder registration kept a lot of the squatters away.
- yacn 10y agoDo you mean .tk? AFAIK .info costs money.
- gtk40 10y agoYes, but it's usually cheaper.
- jerf 10y agoThe purpose of Let's Encrypt, and the SSL certificate infrastructure in general, isn't to prevent "bad guys" from getting certificates. It's to ensure that if you own the box, the certificate verifies that a web client is speaking directly to that box with nothing in between. (Or more generally, directly to an authorized end point by the owner of that DNS entry. Authority can be delegated.) In other words, it keeps bad guys out of the middle, not the end point. That's all SSL can do, even if it works perfectly. Bad guys will still own end points, in both the conventional sense of the word own and the pwning sense of the word own. SSL can not (directly) do much about that. If you speak SSL to a bad actor, well, there aren't any other actors between you and the bad actor, but you're still speaking on an encrypted, authenticated channel to a bad actor. This is in contrast to the DNS infrastructure in which it is sensible for a TLD owner to attempt to prevent "people they don't want on their TLD" (more generally than "bad guys" since a lot of the restrictions enforced are far beyond that).
- saynsedit 10y agoSource? I remember reports in the past decrying CAs for issuing certificates for phishing sites in the style of "gooogle.com" etc.
- jerf 10y agoThat's properly understood as a variant of getting a certificate of a domain you don't own, for practical purposes. And the point there is still that the "bad guys" shouldn't be able to get a cert that appears to identify them as Google, not that the bad guys can't get a cert. It's two different things. It is not a bug for Let's Encrypt to hand out certs to "bad" people.
- saynsedit 10y agoThat's fair and makes sense. Still, do you have a source for that type of CA policy? With all due respect, I can't tell if this is just your opinion or a codified threat model.
- vtlynch 10y ago
- sleepychu 10y agoI think there are 2 factors. 1) Do LE do a good job of ensuring that they only grant certificates to domain holders. 2) Do they do a good job of representing what they're signing (authentication versus identification http://imgur.com/a/fAaYH http://imgur.com/a/fAaYH) The certificate is a kind of "encryption only" certificate, it's treated as a second class citizen (you might get a grey lock for example) so it's encrypting the communication but it's not very useful for convincing you that you're talking to your bank when you aren't. Of course if LE don't do a good job of (1) then we're f*ed because they'll issue certificates to bad actors and LE have a hard job because now they're trusted they're a good target for DNS cache poisoning etc.
- mholt 10y agoIf Comodo and Symantec are able to retain their trust status, then Let's Encrypt most certainly can.