8 ms·
HEIST: HTTP Encrypted Information Can Be Stolen Through TCP-Windows [pdf]
- j_s 10y agoSurprisingly, we found that not only do our attacks remain possible, we can even increase the damaging effects of our attacks by abusing new features of HTTP/2. Interesting!
- userbinator 10y agoI don't think it's that surprising, it's pretty much a truism that more features mean more complexity, chance for bugs, and attack area --- especially features which have yet to mature for a while in practical use.
- rubiquity 10y agoThe paper goes on to describe why. The short version is a big part of HTTP/2's performance comes from header compression via the HPACK algorithm. Anything that compresses can be compromised if the attacker can inject data into the compressed output. This paper does a really nice job of concisely explaining BREACH and CRIME.
- Animats 10y agoThere's a provision in RFC 7541 that applies here. There's a way to indicate that a header field must not be compressed. Security-critical header fields such as keys and nonces should not be compressed. The RFC notes: "Note that these criteria for deciding to use a never-indexed literal representation will evolve over time as new attacks are discovered." So the protocol has a feature for this. Everything that sends HTTP2 needs to update the list of fields not to compress, but that can be done by the sending end without any change to the receiving end. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7541#section-7.1.3 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7541#section-7.1.3
- cperciva 10y ago"Note that these criteria for deciding to use a never-indexed literal representation will evolve over time as new attacks are discovered." Or, in other words: "We know that this is insecure. Maybe someone will fix it later."
- madgar 10y agoThat casual dismissal can be applied just as casually to the entire history of networking technologies, and it would be just as lazy and intellectually dishonest.
- Animats 10y agoTrue, but the HTTP/2 people were building a wrapper for data, not a security protocol. At least they put in a feature to suppress compression. Because of that, this can be fixed from one end; it's not necessary to deploy new browsers.
- honkhonkpants 10y agoJust the text, for those of you unwilling to open PDFs from security researchers: http://pastebin.com/rG3RD6hw http://pastebin.com/rG3RD6hw
- joshka 10y agoA pdf probably isn't going to be able to run JavaScript in your browser (the primary mechanism that this attack utilizes. Pastebin on the other hand... ;)
- nmjohn 10y agoNo, but depending on what program you open it with it may be able to do far worse than execute javascript in a browser sandbox. [0][1] [0]: https://blog.didierstevens.com/2010/03/29/escape-from-pdf/ https://blog.didierstevens.com/2010/03/29/escape-from-pdf/ [1]: https://thestack.com/security/2016/06/09/pdf-exploit-found-in-default-google-chrome-reader/ https://thestack.com/security/2016/06/09/pdf-exploit-found-i...
- pests 10y agoExcept some major browsers like Chrome do their entire PDF rendering in JavaScript.
- JonathonW 10y agoChrome's PDF renderer is a PPAPI plugin written in C++. Firefox is the one with the Javascript-based PDF renderer.
- userbinator 10y agopurely by running (malicious) JavaScript inside the victim's browser I've said it many times and I'll say it again: keep JS off by default and enable it only for the few trusted sites that absolutely need it. Interestingly, the authors mention disabling 3rd-party cookies as a countermeasure, but not JS.
- zzzcpan 10y agoIt's not that simple, browser vendors don't really want you to do that. Google even outright sabotaged such behavior in chrome some time ago. You had to type in url masks manually to enable javascript for trusted sites.
- JonathonW 10y agoHuh? Per-site Javascript is controlled through the site permissions UI like everything else in Chrome-- that's the popover that comes up when you click the page or lock icon in the address bar. There's even an icon that appears on the right side of the address bar when Javascript is blocked, giving the option to add an exception if clicked.
- zzzcpan 10y agoYou probably don't use chrome with disabled javascript, so you haven't noticed the change. It was broken on purpose for a couple of months.
- Scarbutt 10y agothat will break the Internet.
- hobs 10y agoThe internet is not javascript, no matter how hard everyone tries to pretend it is.
- deleted 10y ago
- Grom_PE 10y agoAh, third-party cookies, the bad idea to begin with, is causing problems again. Hopefully this will force browser vendors to disable that misfeature by default.
- lossolo 10y agoYou mean those vendors that make money using third party cookies to track users?
- cesarb 10y agoAnother option, for those sites which rely on third-party cookies to work (they're rare, but they do exist; so far, I've only found one), would be to scope the third-party cookies. That is, if both foo.com and bar.com do a request to thirdparty.com, each would have their own set of cookies for thirdparty.com, and both would be different from the cookies used when thirdparty.com is accessed directly.
- niftich 10y agoThe techniques are interesting and clever, but isn't this "attack" only possible on websites that fail to properly protect against unapproved cross-origin requests, meaning they would be vulnerable anyway? I re-read the specs to make sure [1] but isn't it on the server to alter the response to potentially nothing if the cross-origin response didn't come from source the server expects? The paper says: "Similar to the defense of blocking 3rd-party cookies, the web server could also block requests that are not legitimate. A popular way of doing this, is by analysing the Origin and/or Referer request headers. However, it is still possible to make requests without these two headers, preventing the web server to determine where to request originated from. As a result, this technique can not be used to prevent attacks" On the contrary; the cross-origin access control spec (last edit in 2014) has an entire section on how to prevent malicious cross-origin requests like this, with verbiage like: "This extension enables server-side applications to enforce limitations (e.g. returning nothing) on the cross-origin requests that they are willing to service." If the server properly implements cross-origin access control by, say, returning nothing, the malicious cross-origin requesting script can't perform reflection attacks, and there's nothing interesting to measure with TCP windows and compression and the like. [1] https://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/ https://www.w3.org/TR/access-control/
- lossolo 10y agoUnless you have open redirection on one of your routes you are right. CSP is the answer. https://chloe.re/2016/07/25/bypassing-paths-with-open-redirects-in-csp/ https://chloe.re/2016/07/25/bypassing-paths-with-open-redire...
- Buge 10y ago> fail to properly protect against unapproved cross-origin requests It is not standard to block cross origin requests, in fact it rare or impossible in many cases. It is standard to block cross origin requests that perform an action, usually a POST request. But a GET request that just gets data is normally perfectly allowed cross origin. If I click a link from Google search results to the reddit homepage, that's a cross origin GET request, but reddit has to allow it, and recognize me as logged in. Also anything that could be embedded (such as an embedded Facebook comment box) would be required to allow cross origin GET requests.
- ComodoHacker 10y agoA common way to mitigate side-channel attacks is to add random noise to the side channel. In this case the original side channel is timing of network requests. Thus we can randomize time of network packets arrival, simulating unstable network link and trading speed for security. This can be done in the browser, at OS level client-side or at the server side. It's strange this method isn't mentioned in the paper. Also I wonder if inherently varying latency of mobile and inhabited Wi-Fi networks can by itself prevent this type of attacks. Edit: grammar.
- ibotty 10y agoAdding noise is not going to help much. You can just run the test many times and you can use statistics. The only thing helping is deterministic noise: For every security-related thing, you have a deterministic delay. That way you can not apply statistics. Unfortunately that won't work here, at least I don't know how it could.
- madgar 10y agoActually, timing attacks almost always rely on statistical methods in practice due to the inherent noise in relying on coarse timing data. So adding random noise very rarely helps at all other than increasing the amount of data required for the already-prepared statistical methods used in the attack.
- majortennis 10y agoalmost perfectly acrostic
- kyled 10y agoThis sounds very similar to the Time attack from 2013. https://youtu.be/rTIpFfTp3-w https://youtu.be/rTIpFfTp3-w . I hope they got credited. They used a timing side channel attack to extract data from a response when compression was enabled and user data is reflected back in a response. This attack can be done inside the browser and abuses how data is segmented when sent over tcp.
- bluesmoon 10y agoThe building blocks were described even earlier than that: http://www.slideshare.net/bluesmoon/messing-with-javascript-and-the-dom-to-measure-network-characteristics http://www.slideshare.net/bluesmoon/messing-with-javascript-... And here: http://www.lognormal.com/blog/2011/11/14/analysing-network-characteristics/ http://www.lognormal.com/blog/2011/11/14/analysing-network-c...