3 ms·
I'm not sure I have it, but I believe that with DSA, given the message, signature and message specific private value, you can derive the private key. Wright is
by maxerickson 10y ago
I'm not sure I have it, but I believe that with DSA, given the message, signature and message specific private value, you can derive the private key. Wright is calling that message specific value a nonce, but for DSA, it has to be secret and unpredictable ( https://rdist.root.org/2010/11/19/dsa-requirements-for-random-k-value/ https://rdist.root.org/2010/11/19/dsa-requirements-for-rando... ).
In the Playstation hack, a single private value was mistakenly used in multiple messages (so it could be recovered from just a couple signatures https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/15/suddendeathentropy.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/06/15/suddendeathentropy... ), but it's also true that if you have information about how the private value was created and it was poorly done, you can just check all the remaining possibilities. So that's what the cryptographer is talking about, given information about sufficiently poor generation of the message specific secret, you can pull private keys out of a single signature.
- throwaway7767 10y agoBut in the context of bitcoin, it seems likely that if the bitcoin client originally had such a problem, someone would have already exploited it to steal funds. All the old funds, mined with the original version of the bitcoin software, are still just waiting there at the original addresses. Especially in light of the creative crypto attacks people have done on other implementations (like the one where attackers stole from android wallets based on a flaw in the system-wide android PRNG). Money is a powerful motivator.