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It's a bit frustrating to read articles like this which miss the most important regulatory change in probably the past 50 years to deal with too big to fail: th
by cm2187 10y ago
It's a bit frustrating to read articles like this which miss the most important regulatory change in probably the past 50 years to deal with too big to fail: the introduction of bail-in.
Bail-in is a fundamental change to insolvency law. It is a power given to the regulator to declare a bank non viable, whether it is because of capital or liquidity concerns, and to imposes losses on its bond holders over the course of a week end. This would auto-recapitalise the bank which should be open for business the following Monday with a healthy capital position. You can think of it as a flash, extra-judiciary chapter 11, specific to banks.
The intention is to imposes losses on wholesale investors of the bank, essentially investors in bonds and capital instruments, and to spare depositors, even if technically depositors have the same ranking than bond holders (and therefore would share the losses equally in a bankruptcy). However should the magnitude of the losses require an extraordinary large bail-in, uninsured depositors may be targeted too (essentially corporate clients and high net worth individuals).
Banks are required to accumulate a large amount of wholesale funding to ensure that there is enough debt to bail in the day the shit hits the fan.
This should largely mitigate the too big to fail, as it would avoid the messy aspects of a large bank bankruptcy (Lehman scenario) while not using any tax payer money and making investors bear the losses related to their investments.
Does it solve all problems? God knows what will be the magnitude of the next crisis. If the US, the UK or France default, that may not be sufficient to save the banking system. But it should certainly mitigate a lot the too big to fail risk. And it is extremely unlikely that a bail-out would be considered before a bail-in would have happened.
Disclaimer: I work in a bank.
- 6stringmerc 10y agoAs you work in a bank, and I've been out of direct Wall St. finance for a few years, is there enough money in the entire world to address the swaps market if a massive insolvency triggers an messy, imperfect unwinding rather than the "oh everything balances out" claim?
- cm2187 10y agoBut everything nets each other contractually. The gross position of swaps is an intellectual (and accounting) view. The only thing you can make a claim for in a court is the net position because that's your agreement with the counterparty (ISDA). The fact that this net position is calculated from a sum of gross positions doesn't mean you can go to a court with these gross positions. There are some courts that would ignore the contractual agreements. Italy is known for its weird ruling. But I do not believe the gross positions are meaningful.
- noobermin 10y agoSo, help me out, that reduces the severity of too-big-too-fail in theory, but doesn't reduce their size unless banks are disincentivized to be large enough that they need to bail-in, right? I ask because the article talks about banks being reduced in size (I guess by nebulous quantities, number of employees? AFAIK, when people say "too-big-too-fail", they mean that such an institution is too important and coupled to the system to fail, not on absolute terms like employment size,etc)
- cm2187 10y agoAbsolutely, it is approaching the problem from the other end, which is how do will still allow a large bank to fail without destabilizing the entire financial system. But there is a separate push to reduce the size of banks through regulatory constraints: - Introduction of new capital ratios (leverage ratio) - Higher capital requirements - More penal capital treatments of exposure (you have more Risk Weighted Assets against the same business) All of which result in banks deleveraging across the board. And most large international banks have now several time more capital as a % of their exposure than they had in 2006, as a result of both raising more capital and reducing their exposure.
- erdevs 10y agoYou're overselling the bail-in provisions here. Frank-Dodd and the bail-in regulations it includes certainly introduced some much-needed improvements. But let's not pretend that the bail-in is either proven in practice nor a cure of any kind in truly dire situations. The problem with the bail-in is that at the end of the day, if there isn't enough wholesale capital available, depositors are still on the hook. Indeed, we saw the only instance of the bail-in in practice (that I'm aware of at present) so far in Cyprus resulted in depositors having a portion of their savings converted to equity (in a nearly-insolvent entity). At the end of the day, the risk still lies with the public if things get bad enough at a big bank. Through their deposits, through the FDIC, or through a bail-out, if the political winds blow that way. The truly safest solution is to separate investment banking from depository banking again and to further limit both the size and the allowable exposure levels of investment banks. I don't think the bail-in can yet be framed as a good thing. It's theoretically helpful in limited situations where enough wholesale capital is available (or can be made available) to solve a crisis of liquidity. Outside those boundaries, it induces greater risk on depositors. And in that situation, it may actually be good (in a perverse way) that the public doesn't know more about it, because if they did it'd likely increase the incentive/pressure on deposit bank runs. Again, the solution here is to separate depository banking from investment banking. Or, put another way, to very tightly regulate the sorts of investments that depository banks can make. On top of that investment bank investments should be regulated more than they are today. And on top of all that, continuing with a rapid-insolvency process + bail-in would make sense for both depository and investment banks, should the need ever arise in either case (which likelihood would be greatly reduced through these further regulations). But the bail-in without these other measures carries risk and will be of only limited assistance.
- cm2187 10y agoYou are absolutely right that bail-in only helps if you have debt to bail-in, and that was not the case for Cyprus. Bail-in will only be useful when the banks have built up enough bail-inable capital, and depending on what is the definition of bail-inable capital, most banks are not there yet (regulators take different views on what constitutes good bail-inable debt). However all the draft regulations that are being prepared now point to relatively high requirements, in the region of 25-30% of the Risk Weighted Assets, which should be ample to absorb a very large loss. So if the crisis happens this week, it won't help, if it happens in 5 years or after it will certainly help a lot, and be a first line of defence before contemplating a bail out. On the separation of commercial and investment banks, I am not convinced it actually helps. Reproducing another of my comments on this article: If we take the example of the UK, all of the bank failures were because of non investment banking activities. RBS failed because of its excess of leverage as a result of its disastrous acquisition of ABN AMRO and because of its loan book, HBOS because of its loan book (essentially commercial real estate exposures), and Northern Rock because of their over-reliance on wholesale funding. There are examples of banks failing or making large losses because of the investment banking activities (Lehman, Merrill, Bear Stearn, UBS) but my point is rather that the principle "Retail banking = safe, Investment banking = risky" is simply not true. In a way, universal banks tend to be more robust than a specialized bank, as it benefits from funding and revenues diversification (and cheer size to absorb losses).
- bradleyjg 10y agoAre all equity classes wiped out in that situation? Is it only unsecured debt? What about other creditors and counterparties?
- erdevs 10y agoThe problem is that liability still falls upon depositors in a bail-in. So, at the end of the day, it's still the unwitting public's money on the hook in the worst case scenarios, even if it's not a "bail out". The expedited and more regulated insolvency proceedings are a big improvement and the bail-in provisions help within some lower boundary cases. But if "shit hits the fan", bail-in alone is not going to be enough. The point is that Wall St won't really be "tamed" until we further minimize the possibility of shit and fan colliding. To do that, we need to further limit the risks investment banks can take on and greatly limit the risks that depository banks can take on. If we don't do that, we're talking about how to cure the disease as opposed to how to prevent it. The fact is, we need more preventative measures and more cures. The bail-in is a good cure for some situations, but if the patient is too fargone it'd be too little, too late.
- bradleyjg 10y ago> greatly limit the risks that depository banks can take on Are people going to be okay with getting no interest and instead paying large-ish fees every month to cover the cost of bank branches, ATMs, debit cards, websites, money transfers, checks, and so on? If depository banks are going to be very risk adverse they won't be earning much on the use of those demand deposits. Those services have to be paid for somehow. Anyway, if the answer is yes, I don't see what's stopping people from putting their money with neo-goldsmith banks right now.
- erdevs 10y ago> Are people going to be okay with getting no interest and instead paying large-ish fees every month to cover the cost of bank branches, ATMs, debit cards, websites, money transfers, checks, and so on? Looks at bank statements: .... Zero interest, check. High fees, check. I'm pretty sure... that's how it already is? What bank do you recommend? Hook a brother up. > If depository banks are going to be very risk adverse they won't be earning much on the use of those demand deposits You realize that this is how it used to be, right? Up until 1999. I don't know about you, but I got more interest and paid fewer fees back then... I think this is oversimplifying things overall. Higher risk doesn't necessarily mean higher return in general, and definitely not when dealing with tremendously large pools of capital as depository banks do. There is a limit to how much total capital you can invest in a given level of risk, and what return you can actually achieve in practice for that level of risk. It's fallacious to think that regulating the types of risk depository banks can participate in and how much total risk they can take on would necessarily lessen their returns over the long-term in practice. Moreover, on an operational basis banks are more profitable today than possibly ever. So, those fees and low interest rates are paying for more than all their services, by a wide margin. (At least as of the last time I looked into this.)
- dasmoop 10y agoI'm not sure if that would really mitigate the too big to fail. If other financial institutions are holding these investment grade bonds and the bank fail I think we're just going to see a domino effect. The other financial institution that were holding the bonds are now going to have a big hole in their balance sheet and that could then make them insolvent. So the primary bank that failed might still be standing but you'll have many other institution getting hit pretty hard because what they considered safe capital just vanished.
- cm2187 10y agoThat's correct. The regulators are still playing with these rules but two things will mitigate that: 1. Banks are not allowed to have a too large exposure to a single counterparty, so the bail-in of a single bank should never result in another bank failing. 2. The investment in regulatory capital or in bail-inable bank capital is likely to be treated in a very penal way from a capital point of view. Banks do have this exposure naturally as they tend to be market makers for other banks paper, so typically always hold some inventory of these bonds, but these are relatively small amounts. Banks should normally not hold large positions in other banks capital and debt as these instruments are not eligible for their liquidity pools.