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You're missing the point: SSH does not provide a host key rotation/revocation mechanism. TLS does.
by jvehent 10y ago
You're missing the point: SSH does not provide a host key rotation/revocation mechanism. TLS does.
- deckar01 10y agoYou said that you are afraid of loosing users after a leak, which implies if you don't have to, you won't tell your users about the incident.
- eximius 10y agoNo, its that the fix is client side and painful. They can tell their users to fix it and they would rather leave than do it.
- deckar01 10y agoI thought users would be prompted to accept a new fingerprint. Am I missing something?
- billyhoffman 10y agoIf by "prompted" you mean: @ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @ IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY! Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now! Then, yes, users will be prompted in the scariest possible language. Compare this with HTTPS/browsers, which care not a lick if a certificate/fingerprint is different, provided that the certificate is valid and the chain is trusted.
- ibotty 10y agoWhich --coincidentally-- is exactly the problem with it.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- jvehent 10y agoNo. I said that changing the key, which must happen, will trigger a warning that will scare users away. Which is (partly) why no one uses SSH with non technical populations.
- tedunangst 10y agoYou can use cert signed keys with ssh.
- TimWolla 10y agoIt does provide host key rotation in OpenSSH 6.8+: http://blog.djm.net.au/2015/02/key-rotation-in-openssh-68.html http://blog.djm.net.au/2015/02/key-rotation-in-openssh-68.ht...
- jvehent 10y agoThis technique assumes the operator is OK with taking a few weeks for all users to register the new host key. In the event of a leak, revocation of the leaked key must be immediate. That's why we have CRLs (and OneCRL) and OCSP.