3 ms·
I like how they keep saying first of it's kind. It was actually DOD, via Roger Schell & Steve Walker, that established the first standards for certifying securi
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
I like how they keep saying first of it's kind. It was actually DOD, via Roger Schell & Steve Walker, that established the first standards for certifying security of systems based on what stopped brilliant pentesters at that point. Also the people that helped invent INFOSEC so some credibility there. ;) Landwehr's "The Best Available Technologies for Computer Security in 1983" (link below) is an approachable text of background, example systems constructed, and requirements for secure systems as of that time.
http://www.landwehr.org/1983-bats-ieee-computer-as.pdf http://www.landwehr.org/1983-bats-ieee-computer-as.pdf
Esp see Advice for Developer section. For bonus points, compare those recommendations to today's "secure" apps or systems to see how much today's are missing. Then realize that the requirements and techniques for knocking out all the known risks have only increased since then. :) Far as the criteria, it worked with the private sector producing one high-assurance, secure system after another until NSA policy-makers killed the ecosystem:
http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-Back-Addendum.pdf http://lukemuehlhauser.com/wp-content/uploads/Bell-Looking-B...
Since then, assurance dropped greatly across the board with FOSS & non-high-assurance proprietary both forgetting about precise specs, verification, covert channels and SCM entirely. Some of that was gradually rediscovered (ex "side channels") by same people saying original criteria was useless, red tape. They keep showing an interesting ability to hold two, contradictory ideas in mind simultaneously that way. High-assurance field continues to move on with EAL7-style with demonstrators in hardware (Rockwell-Collin's AAMP7G), smartcards (MULTOS/Caernarvon), crypto (Galois' CRYPTOL), kernels (seL4), hypervisors (CertiKOS), parsers (LANGSEC), static verification (eg IRONSIDES DNS w/ SPARK), browsers (Illinois Browser OS by Tang), and so on. Definitely worth copying proven approaches in any new organization designed to certify security. Just eliminate what red-tape was there then up focus on evaluation of specific product and code. I expect Mudge to pull that off at least.
Far as how to redo evaluation process, I have a write-up below on that. Ignore the first link in the Schneier post as the Pastebin below is the cleaned-up version of it. Has the list of security problem areas and methods I used in evaluation. Originally a counterpoint to someone thinking secure coding was all that mattered.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/friday_squid_bl_419.html#c5457853 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/04/friday_squid_...
http://pastebin.com/9AwDLSTY http://pastebin.com/9AwDLSTY