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I think an even better question is: what does it take to become a real CA? Don't just assume 'oh, it must be really tough' if you don't know for sure. How much
by peterwwillis 17y ago
I think an even better question is: what does it take to become a real CA? Don't just assume 'oh, it must be really tough' if you don't know for sure.
How much money and what kind of resources would it take some to really create their own valid CA just for generating forged yet valid certs that browsers would not flag as invalid when used in a MITM such as those used by the device in the wired article?
- wmf 17y agoIt is fairly difficult: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/
- peterwwillis 17y agoi'm sorry, but, how is that difficult? most of that involves basic procedures for verifying someone's identity before providing a cert plus an independent party for auditing and other purposes. you don't even need any money, just to set up the basic infrastructure and steps for issuing certs as documented in provided links. i think they basically hinge on the idea that they will match up your CA with real human beings and verify you gen certs safely, but this is not a roadblock for an attacker. i think with time, patience, and an apparent genuine interest in doing things the right way, anyone could get mozilla to accept their root certificate. (and then generate certs for the black market for unauthorized people with loads of cash)
- wmf 17y agoCAcert has been trying to get into Mozilla for years and failing: http://wiki.cacert.org/InclusionStatus http://wiki.cacert.org/InclusionStatus
- olefoo 17y agoYou can create your own CA in 5 minutes with a linux box and a copy of the OpenSSL binary. The hard part is getting your signing certificate accepted into client programs, web browser manufacturers and operating system vendors are picky about who gets in and who doesn't. If you're willing to handle all of the key management yourself and you are only accepting certificates that you know you control... and you know for a fact that nobody snooped your private key from the signing station... and you never stored the signing key on any persistent storage in the clear... and you implicitly trust all connecting clients to not be spoofing authentication to users, and, and... Then you can say truthfully that you think you can trust certificates signed by that key maybe.