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None of these are an argument against HSTS. They are ways you can attack DESPITE it, IF you put in the extra effort or have specific favorable circumstances. T
by brainfire 10y ago
None of these are an argument against HSTS. They are ways you can attack DESPITE it, IF you put in the extra effort or have specific favorable circumstances.
The only way your proposed solution (secure-only protocol) avoids your identified design flaw (non-secure connections are sometimes possible) is if everyone immediately switches it and retires HTTP. That's not going to happen.
Considering a number of your attacks rely on the user not looking at the site security level (or in some cases, even at the domain name spelling), I find it curious that you think another visual indicator will make a difference.
- peterwwillis 10y agoThe argument against is it's a false sense of security. And no, you don't have to retire http. and no, we don't have to switch to it immediately. You can simply add it as a new protocol and begin educating users. No user that I personally know has ever been trained to identify markers on a browser, or the difference between 'http' and 'https'. It's all too complicated... What, is that a padlock? A check mark? Green? Blue? Yellow? What does "ache tee tee pee ess" mean anyway? But what is very simple and intuitive is the word "secure". Just make sure the first word is "secure". It even rhymes!
- pfg 10y agoYou think users cannot be trained to recognize a green padlock, but they'll know to look for "secure://"? That seems a bit ... far-fetched.
- varikin 10y agoWhy "secure"? Why not "anquan"? Google tells me that is the Chinese word for secure and since there are about 3 times as many Chinese speakers in the world than English, shouldn't we be considering them first? Or maybe we should consider Spanish first?