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The article was a good analysis of both the down-and-dirty mission of an aircraft carrier, (i.e. actual combat, actual support), and the strategic, big-picture
by niftich 10y ago
The article was a good analysis of both the down-and-dirty mission of an aircraft carrier, (i.e. actual combat, actual support), and the strategic, big-picture role of an aircraft carrier (e.g. force projection). So far so good.
But I was hopelessly lost when it tried to draw an analogue between the 'need for disruption' and the larger, big-picture view of why we have aircraft carriers in the first place.
Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the point, but I certainly don't want any sort of disruptive, mavericky thinking applied to how, why, when a Navy (any Navy, not just "ours") deploys force projection. This does not sound like an appealing recipe for responsible use of force and for limiting provocation of other parties to just below the level that they're willing to retaliate, and the like. So, in short, I don't understand the point the author's trying to make.
- L_Rahman 10y agoI believe you may have misunderstood the point. The author of the post suggests that why and when remain the same - to show the flag for deterrence, or to control part of the sea to protect shipping, or to protect a Marine amphibious force, or to project offensive power against any adversary in well-defended areas. Today, the way we do this carrier strike groups. The author is arguing that the carrier strike model for achieving these goals is now ~50 years old. If you were to start today from a blank slate to achieve those goals, you'd construct something very different from a strike force. This is where he's suggesting mavericky thinking ought to be applied - in coming up with those blank slate solutions.