4 ms·
You lost me the moment you mentioned Penrose. I've seldom read a more tedious fumbling for mysteries, all but Luddite in their hope for some deep mysterious law
by barrkel 17y ago
You lost me the moment you mentioned Penrose. I've seldom read a more tedious fumbling for mysteries, all but Luddite in their hope for some deep mysterious law of the universe that would prevent computers (machines working in the universe) from emulating brains (machines working in the universe) than Shadows Of The Mind. I haven't discarded it only out of having respect for books, but I have too much respect for my fellow man to risk having it sold in a second-hand bookshop.
I don't think that there is a difference between a simulation of a brain and a simulation of the mechanics of a brain. I believe that's the whole point of the Turing Test thought experiment. If it talks like a mind then it is a mind.
Actually, you're argument seemed pretty weak up until then, but Penrose was the last straw. The only thing worse you could have done is brought up the Chinese Room. Re continuity of the self, that's an interesting problem for philosophers, but it isn't a practical problem. You aren't your memories; more than your memories, you are your patterns and habits. But those also change, though not all at once. At 30, I am not the same person I was at 25, much less 20. For identity, there is just an apparent continuity of existence.
Personally, I think cryogenics is the key, as I don't think the technology for proper life extension will appear within my immediate lifetime.
- jacquesm 17y ago> I don't think the technology for proper life extension will appear within my immediate lifetime. Looks like we agree after all then. Penrose's point is that the brain might be quantum mechanical in nature.