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Thank you for your thoughtful response, which I just upvoted for its very helpful content. I must confess that some of my comments were indeed superficial but
by grellas 17y ago
Thank you for your thoughtful response, which I just upvoted for its very helpful content.
I must confess that some of my comments were indeed superficial but I did want to explain briefly why I have the perspective that I do. It is perhaps as much philosophical as anything else.
In this area, there has always been a continual tension between protecting investors (the very purpose of the securities laws) and giving people freedom to invest freely in ways that promote capital formation.
The Securities Act of 1933 imposes registration requirements upon the issuers of securities. The basic idea is that stock (and other securities) can be sold to the public only when accompanied by suitable disclosure materials such that a prospective investor can have a good understanding of the risks associated with the investment. Each state also has its own version of such laws, and these are known as "blue sky" laws. Thus, any issuer that desires to sell stock to public investors must register it with the SEC and also comply with the parallel blue-sky requirements.
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from these registration requirements for private placements. This is required for small-company capital formation because such companies would choke on the compliance costs involved with registration and, more importantly, in a private placement, the problems associated with selling stock to mass numbers of small and often unsophisticated public purchasers are just not present and it is overkill to apply the full force of the registration requirements to such situations.
The question is what is a "private placement"? Before Regulation D was adopted in 1982, this whole area was a mess. Did an offering to 5 people constitute a public offering? Or to 10? Or to 20? How about if stock were sold to 5, then another 5, then another and another, and so on, all in succession? At what point did such offerings cease to be private placements and become "public" offerings and hence illegal unless accompanied by suitable SEC registration? What if stock were sold to 15 people but were done via public forms of advertising? Did that make a difference? What if the investors numbered 50 or 500 but were all sophisticated investors capable of understanding the nature of the investment? Did that make a difference? What if they were given audited financials and similar forms of disclosure as part of the offering?
All such questions went all over the board prior to the enactment of Regulation D as courts struggled to make sense of the meaning of Section 4(2), and the result was a proliferation of litigation all over the nation that could easily ensnare issuers and their principals with large legal expenses and possible large judgments. And the penalties were not small. A violation of the 1933 Act by an issuer that does an improper unregistered offering meant that investors could rescind their stock purchases out to 3 years after their purchase and, moreover, could get their money back not only from the issuers but also from the principals who controlled them.
I remember this vividly. I clerked for a federal judge in the 1979-1980 period and saw firsthand the kinds of crazy cases that could wind up in court over such issues.
And here is the key point about such litigation: it could take all shapes and sizes because of uncertainty surrounding the meaning of what constituted a private placement. In other words, a company that sought to issue stock in a private placement could never know for sure (except in really extreme cases) whether investors could come back to bite the company and its principals simply because the company wound up failing. This set up all sorts of situations where lawyers could second-guess the offering even a long time after the fact because they could always point to this or that fact or circumstances that they would argue took the offering out of the 4(2) exempt category and subjected it to registration requirements. This uncertainty made it risky for companies to attempt to raise capital via private placements and hindered such offerings accordingly.
Starting in 1982, Regulation D solved all this by bringing certainty to this process. It set out clear rules for what was or was not a private placement and it did so for various types of offerings, small and large. It did so by delineating "safe harbors" by which an issuer could know, if it met the rules, it would clearly be doing a private placement that could not be second-guessed after the fact. And, of course, by second-guessed, I mean that lawyers could not bring expensive proceedings against the company and its principals based on creative interpretations of facts and circumstances by which they would argue that an offering was not really a private placement (at least they were not likely to win such cases, and this deterred bringing them). Such issues were off the table so long as the rules of Regulation D were met.
The definition of an "accredited investor" was a key part of this because, with such investors (or at least with a predominance of them), the safe-harbor requirements could easily be met for any given offering.
Thus, in practice today, when I tell my clients to try to limit their offerings to accredited investors, I can know as a lawyer that they are on relatively safe ground in how they handle their offering. It is easy to structure such offerings without undue legal risk and hence such startups can much more easily raise capital for their ventures.
Now take that same scenario and shrink the number of accredited investors radically and the whole structure of Regulation D is compromised such that we are nowhere near as likely to have the certainty of "safe harbors" for issuers and their management but we instead have a much larger element of uncertainty and room for after-the-fact second-guessing if an investment goes bad.
If you have a startup and need to deal with large numbers of non-accredited investors (as newly and more restrictively defined), and your company goes south, it is simply much easier for investors to sue for alleged violations of the 1933 Act. This means they can sue not only the company but also its officers and directors. This means those who sit on boards face larger liability exposure. This means even VCs who invest in companies and get board sits run higher risks in subsequent offerings unless the investors are all accredited under the stricter definition. All in all, it means that capital formation efforts will be hindered as much of the activity now falls into the more uncertain category where lawyers can easily second guess.
This is the practical reality. And this is why I made my statements about this sort of bill effectively promoting the interests of the lawyers. Yes, you can say that it really protects investors and that is the purpose of the securities laws in the first place. But that was true as well of the legal landscape before Regulation D was enacted in 1982 and, though investors were theoretically protected, it also meant it was hard to raise capital without running an undue risk of potentially being devoured by lawsuits if things didn't go well with the investment. Thus, the Dodd bill signifies, for me, a move in the wrong direction, philosophically speaking. It is the same type of bent that would lead to further steps in the direction of removing "safe harbor" protections from issuers wanting to do offerings.
I don't think this is paranoid thinking. I am simply looking to the philosophy of the proponents of such changes. The state of affairs that I fear might happen as lawmakers go down this path is not something that is unheard of - after all, it did exist for over four decades prior to 1982. And it is Regulation D that altered this and that ushered in a great era of small-company capital formation.
Thus, the Dodd legislation, in giving the SEC an impetus to scale back who can be an "accredited investor," is effectively going to make this area more litigious and is going to hinder small-company capital formation activities accordingly. Maybe this is good. But laws can and do work counter-productively even if they are enacted in the name of protecting investors. Just think about what Sarbanes-Oxley did to the IPO market. The question here is what this signifies and whether it will lead to tightened laws relating to small-company formation that will make it much more difficult for startups to raise funding.
I believe that is why many of the VCs, angel groups, etc. are worried about the Dodd legislation. It is perhaps not so much in what it does as an immediate step but in what it signifies about the future of Regulation D and a strong system of small-company capital formation. No serious problems have arisen under the current system. Why tamper with it, then?
I think it is legitimate to raise questions about the motives of those who would seek to fix something that is not broken when the practical effect of such steps is to make the process much less certain and much more prone to litigation. Like I said, I hope I am wrong about the potential implications of this legislation but I worry about where it might head.
- anigbrowl 17y agoYou're welcome, and thank you in turn. We basically agree on the purpose and utility of regulation D. By clearing defining what the safe harbor provisions are, it opens the doors to capital formation for small business without imposing hugely expensive compliance requirements, and I am heartily in favor of keeping capital formation a relatively simple process - especially in times like these when credit markets remain chilly and many otherwise healthy or promising businesses are unable to expand for lack of ready capital. I also agree that imposing stricter fiscal requirements for accreditation risks shrinking the liquidity pool and thus starving one of the most dynamic segments in the economy, with serious implications for job creation and economic growth. Now, you mention that this legislation, if enacted pushes the SEC in a regulatory direction that will make this area more litigious, and here we differ, although I know I am presenting a rather flimsy theoretical opinion against your solid empirical one! It seems to me that you're assuming a shrinking liquidity pool will drive entrepreneurs to engage in increasingly risky behavior in order to develop their businesses; if the pool of accredited investors shrinks then capital will have to be sought from unaccredited ones, and uncertainty will ensue, followed by painful and expensive legal wrangling when a good portion of these ventures fail or underperform. But is it not rather simplistic to assume that if the supply of investors is artificially constrained, the demand for investment will necessarily run towards the same uncertain and litigation-prone methods of capital formation that preceded the establishment of Regulation D? Might we not instead see an increase in the number of partnerships or directorships taken up as a condition of investment, but still in accordance with other safe harbor provisions of regulation D besides those based on the net worth of a natural person? I am not attempting to argue this as a debating point. Rather, I am seeking to understand why you anticipate one outcome rather than another. For example, is it your professional experience that angels are tolerant of risk but don't wish to shoulder the various obligations of a directorship, whether due to the burdens of compliance or because it might compromise their objectivity as investors? Is the distribution of wealth such that an increase - say, a doubling - of the financial barrier to accreditation necessarily halves the size of the capital pool, or shrinks it in direct proportion to the number of angels? In other words, if middling investors with more than a million but less than two all disappeared from the angel pool, what of the fact that no upper cap on the assets of wealthier angels exists - a newly imposed $2m threshold is of no material consequence to an angel with $10m to invest, whereas the middling investor's capital contribution is necessarily limited to less than the accreditation threshold. Finally, such restrictions might create opportunities for business development companies, not unlike YC, which are large enough to shoulder the burden of compliance and act as reliable brokers for high risk investors (eg a hedge fund manager who might wish to put 1% of his fund into high risk ventures with great upside potential and can easily offset the risk with more pedestrian investments, but lacks the time or expertise to seek out many tiny startups). The 'shotgun' approach of investing small sums in many disparate ventures with the understanding that only a few will yield significant returns could probably be formalized and maybe even simplify the capital formation process for startups, as YC seems to be doing. It seems to me that one of the most common and frustrating questions for new entrepreneurs is where to find an angel in the first place - for many people and industries, finding someone who can listen to and act upon your pitch is mysterious, so I feel there's an unmet demand here for business development as a kind of brokerage service. I don't mean this as an endorsement or even a comment on the Dodd legislation as a whole - I've only read three pages of this 1300-page bill, am ambivalent about committing the 1-2 week sot evaluate the whole thing, and am painfully aware that its introduction to the senate is taking place in a charged and acrimonious political atmosphere, which is rarely a recipe for regulatory bliss. For that matter, it is inevitably molded by the global financial crisis, and as we know hard cases generally result in bad law, just as Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of compliance is thought by many people to have cost more than the problem it was intended to solve. So I appreciate your worries that the legislation might well be reactionary - by intent, in effect, or even both. It does strike me that the prescriptions in this bill as they relate to capital formation are pretty mild. To the extent that the bill is agenda-driven, I think its primary purpose is to rein in the perceived excesses of large financial institutions and the fast-talking social engineers of the financial world as exemplified by Bernie Madoff - in short, to put a leash on fat cats for the public good (one may or may not agree that this a worthy aim; I just think that this is the basic intent). I agree that startup capital formation has not been a bed of nettles for investors or played any major role in the structural problems of our financial system, and frankly I doubt the bill's intent is to choke off investment in startups. While uncertainty of the kind you describe may enrich trial lawyers, is there really so much profit to be had in litigating cases brought by investors who sit between the existing and potential future thresholds? I suppose one could see a situation where some breakout company does well and and has an IPO and is awash in cash, only for someone to point out an obscure legal failing of their very first fundraising round 5 years later and sue them for a billion...but it'd be a lot easier to buy some old company with a patent and take a vacation in Texas. I don't know a whole lot about the economics of the legal industry; it just seems to me that you're extrapolating an awful lot from a fairly bland directive to inspect and tune up one small component of the regulatory mechanism. After all, a great many people subscribe to the view that inflation is the economic equivalent of rust, and the bill basically says to consider its effects rather than issuing detailed prescriptions for dealing with it.