3 ms·
What's so strange about stat() on the file after you open it? It's a security check against a known and abused exploit and it's not even hard to do. This seem
by jandrese 10y ago
What's so strange about stat() on the file after you open it? It's a security check against a known and abused exploit and it's not even hard to do. This seems like a simple fix to the problem.
Just make sure you fstat() the file descriptor and not stat() the file to avoid a second race condition where a malicious actor undoes their attack immediately after you open() the file to hide the evidence.
- gpvos 10y agofstat is a more recent system call than stat, so old code bases do not use it, and mail.local is quite ancient. Although a quick lookup tells me that it appeared in 4.3BSD-Tahoe (June 1988) and SysVR4 (October 1988), so one would have expected all reasonable distributions to have gotten with the program by now.
- jandrese 10y agoA little digging suggests that mail.local appeared in Version 7 Unix from 1979, so it is not a surprise that it doesn't include a syscall invented 9 years later. Still, that syscall is 28 years old now. It's kind of embarrassing that nobody has gone though and checked for ancient and obvious privilege escalation issues like this. Or I guess they have, but on different OSes. This is one big downside to fragmentation, getting fixes distributed to all of the fragments.
- caf 10y agofstat() isn't the complete fix here - it doesn't protect you against opening/creating an unintended file through a symlink, for which you need O_NOFOLLOW (which is a bit more recent).
- qwertyuiop924 10y agoI had no idea if it was common or not, which is why I said I was unsure.