5 ms·

> The problem is that many people think only the one that dies deserved to be called "you". I see this as "well, yes, obviously, because there's no continuity

by zyxley 10y ago

> The problem is that many people think only the one that dies deserved to be called "you". I see this as "well, yes, obviously, because there's no continuity of identity between the two". If I die and a perfect copy lives on, the copy is well-suited to preserve my legacy, but it's still not me.

grondilu 10y ago
If a copy of you is made, there are now two persons. Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right since being you is, by definition, a subjective experience which as such depends on a point of view.
- kamaal 10y ago
  My guess is there will some limitation which won't allow this. There will be be cut-paste and not copy-paste function here. In short 'you' can live only at one place at a time. At any given point in time only one 'you' can be active. Or its also possible that the 'you' we describe here is just everybody else, and just gets a different shape because of individual experiences. More : http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html
- zyxley 10y ago
  > Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right No: one is right, and the other believes he is right but is wrong.
  - throwanem 10y ago
    No. From my perspective, I'm the real one and the other is the copy; from the copy's perspective, the opposite situation obtains. Both are both right and wrong. The complication is that each thinks of himself as "I". But that only matters if you think of "I" as something separate, magical, not bound by the ordinary constraints that make it possible to distinguish things from other things. In other words: mind/body duality. Which, if true, negates the whole concept of brain uploading, both because you can't capture a soul merely by copying the meat it animates, and because you don't need to.
  - grondilu 10y ago
    Again: how would you tell the difference? Say the process could have happened the night before, and the person who was supposed to do it decided to do it or not on a coin toss. There is no way for the person who wakes up to know whether or not the process happened. That means that one time out of two the person would be "you" in your sense, whatever that means, and yet could not even tell for sure. You're talking about something you can't tell whether it is the case or not. It's an illusion. A copy is not just a copy. It's as good as it gets.
sparky_z 10y ago
What do you think "you" are exactly? * Are you a specific arrangement of atoms. If so, then you are constantly dying and being reborn. * Are you a specific arrangement of neurons? If so you die and are reborn every time a memory is created or a brain cell dies. * Are you an uninterrupted process of consciousness that evolves from one state to another? If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep. * Are you your soul? Give me a rigorous definition of soul. Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't tell you which one was which? "Identity" is a human abstraction, not a fundamental physical quality. We're examining hypothetical areas where that abstraction leaks.
- jonhohle 10y ago
  > Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an > exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed > (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at > once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't > tell you which one was which? imagine you had something similar to a Star Trek replicator which could clone arbitrary objects down to the subatomic level. if you cloned a unique keepsake, the clone wouldn't _be_ the keepsake, but would be identical to the keepsake. Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity (and from the point of being awoken, I'd imagine clones would instantly diverge). Identical twins are a real world example of this. At one point, they are the same organism and split into essential two identical entities. They are two unique individuals. At the point of splitting, their identity diverges.
  - kamaal 10y ago
    >>Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity Which is precisely the question your parent commenter asked here. What do you exactly mean by the term 'you' or 'identity'?
- netsharc 10y ago
  I am currently replying to you. My eyes see my phone screen, my hands feel the phone vibrating, my brain is thinking about the words to type. If I go into a red box that makes a copy of me and puts him in a blue box, and we are awakened, my brain would say "According to my sense of sight, I'm in a red box.". There is another person in a blue box, which objectively is me as well, but subjectively..? If I go to bed and my copy goes out to party, I can't say I experienced a party. Friends can say netsharc experienced a party, since the copy will behave 100% like me. If they ask "is that really you?", my copy will believe he is, he has my/his memory, etc... even if he asks himself if he is me, he will say yes. But I still would have missed the party! Another theory asks you to consider this scenario: every week/month, they replace 1% of your brain with its equivalent, identically functioning electronic part. After 1 week, your brain is 99% biological and 1% electronic. Surely you'll still feel like the normal you. What happens after 100 weeks? And what will happen if the data in that electronic brain is uploaded to the cloud/a robot? Or copied to another e-brain?
mbfg 10y ago
Let's play another game, then. Assume that over time, you go to the neuroscientist, and they replace a very small part of your brain with artificial technology of some sort. But they do so in a way that you can not tell the difference. You repeatedly do this, until there is no natural substances left in your brain. If you like, you can continue with all other body parts. Is it not you?
grondilu 10y ago
Honestly I don't get this focus on continuity. The letter "Y" is a continuous shape, unlike say the letter "i". The problem is that some people privilege one branch of the "Y", not that one is continuous and not the other. They both are.

by zyxley 10y ago

grondilu 10y ago

If a copy of you is made, there are now two persons. Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right since being you is, by definition, a subjective experience which as such depends on a point of view.

kamaal 10y ago
My guess is there will some limitation which won't allow this. There will be be cut-paste and not copy-paste function here. In short 'you' can live only at one place at a time. At any given point in time only one 'you' can be active. Or its also possible that the 'you' we describe here is just everybody else, and just gets a different shape because of individual experiences. More : http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html
zyxley 10y ago
> Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right No: one is right, and the other believes he is right but is wrong.
- throwanem 10y ago
  No. From my perspective, I'm the real one and the other is the copy; from the copy's perspective, the opposite situation obtains. Both are both right and wrong. The complication is that each thinks of himself as "I". But that only matters if you think of "I" as something separate, magical, not bound by the ordinary constraints that make it possible to distinguish things from other things. In other words: mind/body duality. Which, if true, negates the whole concept of brain uploading, both because you can't capture a soul merely by copying the meat it animates, and because you don't need to.
- grondilu 10y ago
  Again: how would you tell the difference? Say the process could have happened the night before, and the person who was supposed to do it decided to do it or not on a coin toss. There is no way for the person who wakes up to know whether or not the process happened. That means that one time out of two the person would be "you" in your sense, whatever that means, and yet could not even tell for sure. You're talking about something you can't tell whether it is the case or not. It's an illusion. A copy is not just a copy. It's as good as it gets.

sparky_z 10y ago

What do you think "you" are exactly? * Are you a specific arrangement of atoms. If so, then you are constantly dying and being reborn. * Are you a specific arrangement of neurons? If so you die and are reborn every time a memory is created or a brain cell dies. * Are you an uninterrupted process of consciousness that evolves from one state to another? If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep. * Are you your soul? Give me a rigorous definition of soul. Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't tell you which one was which? "Identity" is a human abstraction, not a fundamental physical quality. We're examining hypothetical areas where that abstraction leaks.

jonhohle 10y ago
> Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an > exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed > (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at > once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't > tell you which one was which? imagine you had something similar to a Star Trek replicator which could clone arbitrary objects down to the subatomic level. if you cloned a unique keepsake, the clone wouldn't _be_ the keepsake, but would be identical to the keepsake. Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity (and from the point of being awoken, I'd imagine clones would instantly diverge). Identical twins are a real world example of this. At one point, they are the same organism and split into essential two identical entities. They are two unique individuals. At the point of splitting, their identity diverges.
- kamaal 10y ago
  >>Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity Which is precisely the question your parent commenter asked here. What do you exactly mean by the term 'you' or 'identity'?
netsharc 10y ago
I am currently replying to you. My eyes see my phone screen, my hands feel the phone vibrating, my brain is thinking about the words to type. If I go into a red box that makes a copy of me and puts him in a blue box, and we are awakened, my brain would say "According to my sense of sight, I'm in a red box.". There is another person in a blue box, which objectively is me as well, but subjectively..? If I go to bed and my copy goes out to party, I can't say I experienced a party. Friends can say netsharc experienced a party, since the copy will behave 100% like me. If they ask "is that really you?", my copy will believe he is, he has my/his memory, etc... even if he asks himself if he is me, he will say yes. But I still would have missed the party! Another theory asks you to consider this scenario: every week/month, they replace 1% of your brain with its equivalent, identically functioning electronic part. After 1 week, your brain is 99% biological and 1% electronic. Surely you'll still feel like the normal you. What happens after 100 weeks? And what will happen if the data in that electronic brain is uploaded to the cloud/a robot? Or copied to another e-brain?

mbfg 10y ago

Let's play another game, then. Assume that over time, you go to the neuroscientist, and they replace a very small part of your brain with artificial technology of some sort. But they do so in a way that you can not tell the difference. You repeatedly do this, until there is no natural substances left in your brain. If you like, you can continue with all other body parts. Is it not you?

grondilu 10y ago

Honestly I don't get this focus on continuity. The letter "Y" is a continuous shape, unlike say the letter "i". The problem is that some people privilege one branch of the "Y", not that one is continuous and not the other. They both are.