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We rarely used the Internet for anything if we were doing something questionable. If we did, we did it through 3rd parties' connections with or without proxies
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
We rarely used the Internet for anything if we were doing something questionable. If we did, we did it through 3rd parties' connections with or without proxies depending on what that might show. My scheme was covert communications embedded in HTTPS to blend in, remailers through various jurisdictions that don't cooperate, face-to-face for most stuff, dead drops, calls with lineman's headset, snail mail of CD's surrounded by coupons etc, and so on. Stuff that draws no attention or has strong security against likely threat profile. Not sure how much of it would work today but no tech and low tech methods are still best. Example was bin Laden succeeding with nothing more than trusted couriers, air gaps, and USB drives until he got ratted out by someone.
What you're seeing with most posts labeled "OPSEC" is mainstream security in action where something gets popular and people run with it. Grugq at least usually has good advice embedded in. Real OPSEC avoids visible encryption, things prone to attack like Tor, and so on. Unless you want them looking directly at you or absolutely have to be all-online. Which is another, tougher type of OPSEC altogether. Mafia has the most experience with the former. I'm not sure I've seen an example of the latter I trust.
"Strong OPSEC means low efficiency, while high efficiency necessitates weak OPSEC."
This is the best statement in the post. It's always true. It's why most "OPSEC" people use in practice sucks. ;)
- armitron 10y ago"My scheme was covert communications embedded in HTTPS to blend in, remailers through various jurisdictions that don't cooperate, face-to-face for most stuff, dead drops, calls with lineman's headset, snail mail of CD's surrounded by coupons etc, and so on. Stuff that draws no attention or has strong security against likely threat profile. Not sure how much of it would work today but no tech and low tech methods are still best." This is way off the mark I think, how can something that requires _physical presence_ be best? Bringing up Bin Laden is not a good example here, as the particulars of his case made using cyber extremely difficult. The Internet is absolutely and by far the best way for anonymous and/or covert communications between individuals or groups, as long as they possess domain expertise. And this is only going to get better, not worse, mass-surveillance notwithstanding, due to the proliferation of information. That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has to use TOR and PGP, just that it's very easy to _hide_ amidst the noise and not compromise on OPSEC. Lots of ways to do that.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoHow can it be way off the mark if such methods have worked for decades while online communities keep getting decloaked and secrets inisibly copied? I think what already worked should be baseline go compare against. Plus, you can use Tor within my model so long as it's an untrusted layer among others. Important they dont see you using it. Bin Laden was a good example because he likewise employed good, pre-Internet OPSEC. He stayed away from electronic communications mediums, used physical medium for data storage, moved it with trusted couriers, and couriers activity looked normal to observers. These principles are compatible with my recommendations and held off the most powerful, SIGINT attacker in existence. They can work for others, too. ;) "That doesn't necessarily mean everyone has to use TOR and PGP, just that it's very easy to _hide_ amidst the noise and not compromise on OPSEC." Snowden links directly contradict you. Such people and data stick out like a sore thunb. They also collect what encrypted data tgeg can for five years. People using my methods would likely have been filtered and ignored. Or, avoiding the net, they'd have never been seen at all.
- armitron 10y agoYou are making wide proclamations and generalizations with nothing to back them up, this is not the mark of someone with a deep understanding of the subject matter. You're also all over the place, rather than concentrating on the point I made [physical presence]. What worked for decades, for some definition of worked -> debacles are numerous [when the Internet didn't even exist or wasn't as widely deployed/used as it is now] doesn't mean it is best _today_. This is a fool's argument, also see what Taleb has to say about tail events. Moreover, the OPSEC details of most successful groups and individuals that use the Internet to communicate, will by definition, rarely become public. We can learn by example from failures but we can't learn by example from success _unless we are insiders_. I said the particulars in the Bin Laden case are important and made cyber hard to use. That doesn't mean trusted couriers and physical storage are a good idea for the rest of us. Re: Snowden You yourself said you were using comms embedded in HTTPS to avoid sticking out like a sore thumb, how do Snowden docs contradict what I said? Read [and try to comprehend] my post again please. To reiterate, I think domain expertise gives individuals a certain degree of confidence and a solid knowledge base that they can use to build their OPSEC strategies. What would you gamble your life on if you had to, meatspace domain expertise [with a huge number of totally unknown factors/capabilities] or Internet [some unknown factors but also lots of remedies]? For most of us the answer is obvious. When I go out, I can never be confident I'm not being followed, recorded in various ways or leaking biometric evidence. Online, I can operate with an assumption of full compromise _and still come up with useful OPSEC strategies_.