> Real security must start with the content itself, and then use encryption as an additional layer. Extrapolating from this to other reasons you might operate

> Real security must start with the content itself, and then use encryption as an additional layer. Extrapolating from this to other reasons you might operate in an adversarial environment, for instance political dissidence, this conclusion has a rather chilling effect. The content of the communication itself must be severely limited in how it can assist coordination of outside efforts in order to maintain the anonymity of the members. Or in the inverse, if the member's have strong identities (via PGP WoT, et al) then the /only/ barrier protecting them from their adversary is the control of the keys themselves. Not that this is any great revelation, per se. But it means that in the cases where you're using encryption as the basis for communicating with a group in secret, that you still must experience a chilling effect on the content of your messages. In other words, encryption alone is not sufficient to achieve the same result as "freedom of speech" at a social level.