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If I were a national signals intelligence agency with a correspondingly huge multi-billion dollar budget, it would be trivial to run a large percentage of tor e
by walrus01 10y ago
If I were a national signals intelligence agency with a correspondingly huge multi-billion dollar budget, it would be trivial to run a large percentage of tor exit nodes... You could probably achieve it with 500 individual 1U servers colocated with random hosting companies around the globe at a budget of $250/mo * 500 = $125,000/mo, which is a tiny drop in the bucket compared to the traffic analysis capability it would give you, with the ability to capture all traffic entering/exiting each node's world-facing public ipv4/ipv6 interfaces.
edit: The major challenge would probably be continually violating various hosting companies' TOS/AUPs and getting service shut off, which would be a continual churn of provisioning new physical servers, shipping them to locations, arranging for plausibly deniable billing, etc.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoI formulated the attack myself with your numbers seeming similar. It's one of reasons I didn't trust Tor. The success rate described in Snowden docs indicate NSA might be doing this experimentally. I don't think they're fully committed to point where they're running most nodes or anything. Being careful. The difficulties wouldn't be as much as it seems. They probably wouldn't even be shut down that often. Just a small number of high-bandwidth nodes from front companies would net them a lot of intel. They could also partner with Five Eyes and Euro agencies as they all seem to want to de-anonymize Tor users. Each could have fronts doing it with their own operational techniques to muddy the situation up. Again, probably already do in a small way. We haven't even discussed QUANTUM-ing the Tor servers. They really, really need memory-safe machines & implementations from CPU up if they're expecting to withstand high-strength attackers. Haven't looked at code or supported OS's in a while but I'm guessing default implementation doesn't fit that bill. ;)
- fweespeech 10y agoWouldn't running your own entry node be enough protection still (assuming you could guarantee it wouldn't be compromised)? As far as I'm aware, control of entry & exit is required for these sorts of attacks. Running the entry node with a consistent entry point and using it as a random walk crawler with a real browser would seem to be enough for personal use as long as you aren't a criminal worth active, serious investigation that is targeted to reveal you.
- tedunangst 10y agoThese attacks require observation of entry and exit.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoExactly. Taps further enables that. Malware even more. Just a metadata, recording system could fo plenty and not take much bandwidth to leak.
- nitrogen 10y agoHypothetically an intelligence agency could "persuade" hosting companies not to shut down their boxes. One could speculate that they might do so by staging an investigation of their own box, thus getting two boxes in place.