> When a peer device presents a self-signed certificate as its end entity certificate with its issuer name matching one of the valid CA certificates enrolled in

> When a peer device presents a self-signed certificate as its end entity certificate with its issuer name matching one of the valid CA certificates enrolled in Junos, the peer certificate validation is skipped and the peer certificate is treated as valid" [...] This may allow an attacker to generate a specially crafted self-signed certificate and bypass certificate validation. Specially crafted? Sounds like the name just needs to be *.juniper.com. Not surprising given the company also used Dual_EC_DRBG with its own who-knows-what-or-why prime [1]. I don't see any reason to trust the technical competency of this company and I'm ashamed to know they are a supplier of US government switching hardware. 1. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/12/on-juniper-backdoor.html?m=1 http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/12/on-juniper-b...