7 ms·

How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/ https://libreboot.org/faq/

beedogs 10y ago
AMD and ARM have them, as well. It's almost impossible to avoid these hardware backdoors.
- r00fus 10y ago
  Cite?
  - drawnwren 10y ago
    It's in the link this comment chain is in response to.
    - anonbanker 10y ago
      No. It isn't.
      - drawnwren 10y ago
        From [1]: AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) #amdpsp This is basically AMD's own version of the Intel Management Engine. It has all of the same basic security and freedom issues, although the implementation is wildly different. The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is built in on all Family 16h + systems (basically anything post-2013), and controls the main x86 core startup. PSP firmware is cryptographically signed with a strong key similar to the Intel ME. If the PSP firmware is not present, or if the AMD signing key is not present, the x86 cores will not be released from reset, rendering the system inoperable. The PSP is an ARM core with TrustZone technology, built onto the main CPU die. As such, it has the ability to hide its own program code, scratch RAM, and any data it may have taken and stored from the lesser-privileged x86 system RAM (kernel encryption keys, login data, browsing history, keystrokes, who knows!). To make matters worse, the PSP theoretically has access to the entire system memory space (AMD either will not or cannot deny this, and it would seem to be required to allow the DRM "features" to work as intended), which means that it has at minimum MMIO-based access to the network controllers and any other PCI/PCIe peripherals installed on the system. In theory any malicious entity with access to the AMD signing key would be able to install persistent malware that could not be eradicated without an external flasher and a known good PSP image. Furthermore, multiple security vulnerabilities have been demonstrated in AMD firmware in the past, and there is every reason to assume one or more zero day vulnerabilities are lurking in the PSP firmware. Given the extreme privilege level (ring -2 or ring -3) of the PSP, said vulnerabilities would have the ability to remotely monitor and control any PSP enabled machine. completely outside of the user's knowledge. Much like with the Intel Boot Guard (an application of the Intel Management Engine), AMD's PSP can also act as a tyrant by checking signatures on any boot firmware that you flash, making replacement boot firmware (e.g. libreboot, coreboot) impossible on some boards. Early anecdotal reports indicate that AMD's boot guard counterpart will be used on most OEM hardware, disabled only on so-called "enthusiast" CPUs. [1] https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
        anonbanker 10y ago
        you just pasted a wall of text about AMD's use of ARM processors, and not ARM TrustZone, which is what we were talking about. While AMD's use of ARM processors (and with it, TrustZone) to fashion a security blackbox on your chip is dishonest and terrifying, it is not evidence that TrustZone is what you're saying it is. I invite you to research more into TrustZone, so you'll be less afraid of ARM.
        drawnwren 10y ago
        I'm sort of genuinely confused what is happening on your side of this conversation. Your account is too old to be trolling, but it surely seems like it. Here's the conversation I see: 1. How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/ https://libreboot.org/faq/ 2. AMD and ARM have them, as well. It's almost impossible to avoid these hardware backdoors. 3. Cite? and our remarks back and forth. Who is talking about ARM TrustZone? That wall of text was libre boot's explanation (from the original link) of what AMD and ARM's Intel Management Engine equivalent system is.
        anonbanker 10y ago
        your wall of text only explains AMD's management engine. not ARM. again, you should probably go look at the TrustZone documentation. it isn't what you think it is. further, your "anyone that tells you your emperor is wearing no clothes is trolling" attitude is something HN'ers attempt to avoid.
    - r00fus 10y ago
      Almost all Intel chips have ME. Not all ARMs do - does my iPhone have an ME-equivalent (ie, TrustZone is visible from OS kernel, so not equivalent).
- makomk 10y ago
  ARM doesn't have anything like the Management Engine. It has TrustZone, but that's basically just a hypervisor-like mode that some manufacturers use to run software above the OS level. A lot of the common hobbyist-friendly ARM SoCs give the user full control over what if anything runs in TrustZone mode.
  - anonbanker 10y ago
    Only non-FUD post in the chain.
  - milcron 10y ago
    Related, a presentation by Raptor Engineering "The World Beyond x86" (video and pdf slides) https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/op_twbx86.php https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/op_twbx86.php They delve into x86's freedom and security issues, then discuss the pros and cons of ARM chips versus OpenPOWER chips. For an open laptop such as Bunnie's Novena, ARM is a fine choice. For Raptor Engineering's Talos Secure Workstation, OpenPOWER was a better fit.
- milcron 10y ago
  Not impossible. Intel chips from 2008 or earlier still work. I like the Thinkpad X200, the most recent Intel-based laptop that can be flashed to use Libreboot instead of stock firmware. For workstations, Raptor Engineering is working on an open hardware motherboard design based on the POWER architecture, which IBM recently opened. https://raptorengineeringinc.com/TALOS/prerelease.php https://raptorengineeringinc.com/TALOS/prerelease.php In the future, RISC-V looks promising. There is also a subset of ARM chips which seem safe.
DenisM 10y ago
One thing was suggested here earlier is a computer that can send data out but is physically unable to receive. This you would use to create and sign content. Another computer can only receive but never send. This one is used to read messages sent to you and verify signatures. This way you can have authenticated communication. It can probably be used for encrypted communication as well, though there are problems with entering keys of your correspondents into the computer that only sends data. I don't know how practical this is, but seems resilient against hardware back doors.
- pdkl95 10y ago
  > send data out but is physically unable to receive That's a "data diode". The chat system that uses data diodes is "Tinfoil Chat". https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc.pdf https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc.pdf It should be very robust against attack, but be careful to note the exact features that TFC provides, which are a bit unusual.
beardog 10y ago
They don't. Purism is mostly a marketing gimmick.
- Taek 10y ago
  It's definitely more than a marketing gimmick. Hardware switches are a big deal. Qubes out of box is really cool. Am emphasis on using as much open source hardware as possible is excellent. If Intel is the only vulnerability, we're doing miles better than your average device, where any of a dozen sources can compromise you. Librem is not perfect. It's just a step forward but if we don't start somewhere the ball will never get rolling. I'm happy to support them, and hope the next 5 years sees a decent cpu without security problems. We're moving the right direction for once.
  - whamlastxmas 10y ago
    It is definitely a marketing gimmick on some level. They claimed an entirely open source laptop which is a complete and total lie. They are making good progress in one way, but still destroying trust in another.
    - sounds 10y ago
      Your statement "they are making good progress in one way, but still destroying trust in another" is problematic because it omits the most important detail: what is your proposed solution? A Novena from Bunnie? https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/novena https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/novena A Lemote Yeelong? They're pretty difficult to even buy... http://www.aliexpress.com/store/product/Yeeloong-Notebook-computer-8089D-white-Linux/801318_284840643.html http://www.aliexpress.com/store/product/Yeeloong-Notebook-co... minifree.org products rely on hardware being available that does not have an Intel ME or equivalent. That hardware will only get harder to find as time goes on. When faced with a challenging problem like this, I find it saddening to see the Free Software community turning on each other and fighting instead of looking for multiple parallel solutions.
      - 10y ago
bahjoite 10y ago
It's not in all intel chips and it appears that the Intel Core M-5Y10c in the Librem 11 doesn't support the management engine: see the entry for "Intel vPro Technology" under Advanced Technologies http://ark.intel.com/products/85234/Intel-Core-M-5Y10c-Processor-4M-Cache-up-to-2_00-GHz http://ark.intel.com/products/85234/Intel-Core-M-5Y10c-Proce...
- milcron 10y ago
  You're partially correct. The components which power the management engine are always present. However they lock you out of using those features unless you pay for a vPro chip. Buying a chip without vPro means the Management Engine still lives on your device, it's just that you aren't allowed to use it.
dandelion_lover 10y ago
They created a petition to Intel: https://puri.sm/posts/intel-me-less-petition-goal-met-early/ https://puri.sm/posts/intel-me-less-petition-goal-met-early/
- AdmiralAsshat 10y ago
  How did Intel respond to said petition?
andrey_utkin 10y ago
In next product, Purism will add a physical kill switch for Intel ME :)

beedogs 10y ago

AMD and ARM have them, as well. It's almost impossible to avoid these hardware backdoors.

r00fus 10y ago
Cite?
- drawnwren 10y ago
  It's in the link this comment chain is in response to.
  - anonbanker 10y ago
    No. It isn't.
    - drawnwren 10y ago
      From [1]: AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) #amdpsp This is basically AMD's own version of the Intel Management Engine. It has all of the same basic security and freedom issues, although the implementation is wildly different. The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is built in on all Family 16h + systems (basically anything post-2013), and controls the main x86 core startup. PSP firmware is cryptographically signed with a strong key similar to the Intel ME. If the PSP firmware is not present, or if the AMD signing key is not present, the x86 cores will not be released from reset, rendering the system inoperable. The PSP is an ARM core with TrustZone technology, built onto the main CPU die. As such, it has the ability to hide its own program code, scratch RAM, and any data it may have taken and stored from the lesser-privileged x86 system RAM (kernel encryption keys, login data, browsing history, keystrokes, who knows!). To make matters worse, the PSP theoretically has access to the entire system memory space (AMD either will not or cannot deny this, and it would seem to be required to allow the DRM "features" to work as intended), which means that it has at minimum MMIO-based access to the network controllers and any other PCI/PCIe peripherals installed on the system. In theory any malicious entity with access to the AMD signing key would be able to install persistent malware that could not be eradicated without an external flasher and a known good PSP image. Furthermore, multiple security vulnerabilities have been demonstrated in AMD firmware in the past, and there is every reason to assume one or more zero day vulnerabilities are lurking in the PSP firmware. Given the extreme privilege level (ring -2 or ring -3) of the PSP, said vulnerabilities would have the ability to remotely monitor and control any PSP enabled machine. completely outside of the user's knowledge. Much like with the Intel Boot Guard (an application of the Intel Management Engine), AMD's PSP can also act as a tyrant by checking signatures on any boot firmware that you flash, making replacement boot firmware (e.g. libreboot, coreboot) impossible on some boards. Early anecdotal reports indicate that AMD's boot guard counterpart will be used on most OEM hardware, disabled only on so-called "enthusiast" CPUs. [1] https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd https://libreboot.org/faq/#amd
      - anonbanker 10y ago
        you just pasted a wall of text about AMD's use of ARM processors, and not ARM TrustZone, which is what we were talking about. While AMD's use of ARM processors (and with it, TrustZone) to fashion a security blackbox on your chip is dishonest and terrifying, it is not evidence that TrustZone is what you're saying it is. I invite you to research more into TrustZone, so you'll be less afraid of ARM.
        drawnwren 10y ago
        I'm sort of genuinely confused what is happening on your side of this conversation. Your account is too old to be trolling, but it surely seems like it. Here's the conversation I see: 1. How do they deal with the intel management engine in all intel chips? https://libreboot.org/faq/ https://libreboot.org/faq/ 2. AMD and ARM have them, as well. It's almost impossible to avoid these hardware backdoors. 3. Cite? and our remarks back and forth. Who is talking about ARM TrustZone? That wall of text was libre boot's explanation (from the original link) of what AMD and ARM's Intel Management Engine equivalent system is.
        anonbanker 10y ago
        your wall of text only explains AMD's management engine. not ARM. again, you should probably go look at the TrustZone documentation. it isn't what you think it is. further, your "anyone that tells you your emperor is wearing no clothes is trolling" attitude is something HN'ers attempt to avoid.
  - r00fus 10y ago
    Almost all Intel chips have ME. Not all ARMs do - does my iPhone have an ME-equivalent (ie, TrustZone is visible from OS kernel, so not equivalent).
makomk 10y ago
ARM doesn't have anything like the Management Engine. It has TrustZone, but that's basically just a hypervisor-like mode that some manufacturers use to run software above the OS level. A lot of the common hobbyist-friendly ARM SoCs give the user full control over what if anything runs in TrustZone mode.
- anonbanker 10y ago
  Only non-FUD post in the chain.
- milcron 10y ago
  Related, a presentation by Raptor Engineering "The World Beyond x86" (video and pdf slides) https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/op_twbx86.php https://www.raptorengineering.com/TALOS/op_twbx86.php They delve into x86's freedom and security issues, then discuss the pros and cons of ARM chips versus OpenPOWER chips. For an open laptop such as Bunnie's Novena, ARM is a fine choice. For Raptor Engineering's Talos Secure Workstation, OpenPOWER was a better fit.
milcron 10y ago
Not impossible. Intel chips from 2008 or earlier still work. I like the Thinkpad X200, the most recent Intel-based laptop that can be flashed to use Libreboot instead of stock firmware. For workstations, Raptor Engineering is working on an open hardware motherboard design based on the POWER architecture, which IBM recently opened. https://raptorengineeringinc.com/TALOS/prerelease.php https://raptorengineeringinc.com/TALOS/prerelease.php In the future, RISC-V looks promising. There is also a subset of ARM chips which seem safe.

DenisM 10y ago

One thing was suggested here earlier is a computer that can send data out but is physically unable to receive. This you would use to create and sign content. Another computer can only receive but never send. This one is used to read messages sent to you and verify signatures. This way you can have authenticated communication. It can probably be used for encrypted communication as well, though there are problems with entering keys of your correspondents into the computer that only sends data. I don't know how practical this is, but seems resilient against hardware back doors.

pdkl95 10y ago
> send data out but is physically unable to receive That's a "data diode". The chat system that uses data diodes is "Tinfoil Chat". https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc.pdf https://cs.helsinki.fi/u/oottela/tfc.pdf It should be very robust against attack, but be careful to note the exact features that TFC provides, which are a bit unusual.

beardog 10y ago

They don't. Purism is mostly a marketing gimmick.

Taek 10y ago
It's definitely more than a marketing gimmick. Hardware switches are a big deal. Qubes out of box is really cool. Am emphasis on using as much open source hardware as possible is excellent. If Intel is the only vulnerability, we're doing miles better than your average device, where any of a dozen sources can compromise you. Librem is not perfect. It's just a step forward but if we don't start somewhere the ball will never get rolling. I'm happy to support them, and hope the next 5 years sees a decent cpu without security problems. We're moving the right direction for once.
- whamlastxmas 10y ago
  It is definitely a marketing gimmick on some level. They claimed an entirely open source laptop which is a complete and total lie. They are making good progress in one way, but still destroying trust in another.
  - sounds 10y ago
    Your statement "they are making good progress in one way, but still destroying trust in another" is problematic because it omits the most important detail: what is your proposed solution? A Novena from Bunnie? https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/novena https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/novena A Lemote Yeelong? They're pretty difficult to even buy... http://www.aliexpress.com/store/product/Yeeloong-Notebook-computer-8089D-white-Linux/801318_284840643.html http://www.aliexpress.com/store/product/Yeeloong-Notebook-co... minifree.org products rely on hardware being available that does not have an Intel ME or equivalent. That hardware will only get harder to find as time goes on. When faced with a challenging problem like this, I find it saddening to see the Free Software community turning on each other and fighting instead of looking for multiple parallel solutions.
    - 10y ago

bahjoite 10y ago

It's not in all intel chips and it appears that the Intel Core M-5Y10c in the Librem 11 doesn't support the management engine: see the entry for "Intel vPro Technology" under Advanced Technologies http://ark.intel.com/products/85234/Intel-Core-M-5Y10c-Processor-4M-Cache-up-to-2_00-GHz http://ark.intel.com/products/85234/Intel-Core-M-5Y10c-Proce...

milcron 10y ago
You're partially correct. The components which power the management engine are always present. However they lock you out of using those features unless you pay for a vPro chip. Buying a chip without vPro means the Management Engine still lives on your device, it's just that you aren't allowed to use it.

dandelion_lover 10y ago

They created a petition to Intel: https://puri.sm/posts/intel-me-less-petition-goal-met-early/ https://puri.sm/posts/intel-me-less-petition-goal-met-early/

AdmiralAsshat 10y ago
How did Intel respond to said petition?

andrey_utkin 10y ago

In next product, Purism will add a physical kill switch for Intel ME :)