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> The standard reply is that evidence obtained from torture can't be compelling because it is by definition unreliable You're conflating the reason evidence fr
by mseebach 10y ago
> The standard reply is that evidence obtained from torture can't be compelling because it is by definition unreliable
You're conflating the reason evidence from torture is inadmissible with one of the arguments against torture.
Evidence from torture can't be admitted because we won't condone torture, ever (or, that's the theory, the real world is more, erhm, nuanced). The fact that intelligence from torture is unreliable is just one of a suite of arguments against torturing people in the first place, not a universal fact which is true for any information obtained through torture.
> since some claims can easily be independently verified
That's basically the Jack Bauer school of torture: You have a bad guy, and you know for a fact that he knows where the bomb is, and if/when he tells you, you can confirm immediately. If that situation occurred in the real world, I would assume that most people would bite their tongues and accept torture. But there is no evidence that it does. It's "What was your role in planning the attack? Who is the person in this picture? Who knows where Osama is hiding?" [source: Zero Dark Thirty] -- Sure, eventually, you can sort-of confirm these things, but torture really isn't effective if you have months-long feedback cycles.
- thaumasiotes 10y ago>> The standard reply is that evidence obtained from torture can't be compelling because it is by definition unreliable > You're conflating the reason evidence from torture is inadmissible with one of the arguments against torture. No, I'm complaining that in much of what I read on this topic, the argument I stated is presented in the terms I stated it in: no evidence given under torture can ever be trusted, because people under torture will say whatever you tell them to say. I find that aggravating, because it is clearly wrong. It's misleading to say it's one of a suite of arguments presented against torturing people in the first place; it is one of two, the other being that we shouldn't torture people because it is invariably morally wrong. I don't think it's a coincidence that arguments that we should never torture people no matter what rely so heavily on different premises of invariability. But while the moral-incorrectness invariability claim can be defended, the untrustworthiness invariability claim can't be.