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> It is easy to see how that leads to the very bad Nash equilibrium of the tragedy of the commons. Tragedy of the commons in the classical sense does not have
by antisthenes 10y ago
> It is easy to see how that leads to the very bad Nash equilibrium of the tragedy of the commons.
Tragedy of the commons in the classical sense does not have a Nash equilibrium, because an actor can always chose to consume the extra unit of resources to benefit themselves more.
This lack of equilibrium is precisely why it's called a tragedy, because it inevitably leads to the over-exploitation (usually destruction) of the common good.
- ucaetano 10y agoAt any given time, you have two agents, each one has the option: a) Use more resources: +1 for them, -1.5 for everyone else b) Use same resources: +0.5 for them, +0 for everyone else There is only one Nash equilibrium: (a,a) with payout (-0.5,-0.5). Repeat it again and again without cooperation and you have the tragedy of the commons. Nash equilibrium isn't about a repeating game reaching equilibrium over time, but about the decisions multiple agents face in one specific round.
- antisthenes 10y agoIf both actors have the options of the first 2 outcomes you described then where does the (-0.5, -0.5) come from? That outcome cannot be NE by your own given inputs, since both actors can improve their outcomes by switching to a different strategy.
- ucaetano 10y agoThe outcomes of the individual decisions are added, so (-0.5, -0.5) comes from each agent picking options a, resulting in +1 for themselves and -1.5 to the other. The outcome for each agent in this case is +1-1.5=0.5 The payout matrix is: (-0.5, -0.5) (+1, -1) (-1, +1) (+0.5, +0.5) As you can see, from the [a,a] option, no agent can improve their situation by UNILATERALLY changing. In the case of [a,b], [b,a] and [b,b], one (or both) of the agents can always improve their own payout by switching from b to a. So there's only one Nash equilibrium, at [a,a].