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> smartcard Those are not at all secure against compromised hosts. > EM/RF emissions You probably don't want to use this to secure the nuclear launch codes.
by lisper 10y ago
> smartcard
Those are not at all secure against compromised hosts.
> EM/RF emissions
You probably don't want to use this to secure the nuclear launch codes. But I think you'd have to work pretty damn hard to get anything out of it. There are no external parts here, it's all one SoC, one that is specifically designed to keep proprietary code out of the hands of Chinese hackers. If it were easy to attack it would lose most of its market.
> I commend your work so far!
Thanks!
- mSparks 10y agojust thinking out loud. definately not disagreeing with your hardware choice. a good idea for a pi zero?
- lisper 10y agoYou could certainly do something like this with a pi. But it would be bulkier and probably less secure. But my initial prototyping was done with a Teensy3. It all depends on your threat model.
- mSparks 10y agoits great that we are getting access to so many tiny sweet tiny boards. just in case - pi zero: https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/pi-zero/ https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/pi-zero/ i was thinking more feature set than threat model. Namely Secure at rest storage and password generator for secure comms. i believe the pi has a hwrnd which is probably the most essential thing for such devices.
- amluto 10y ago>> smartcard > Those are not at all secure against compromised hosts. How so? Certainly there are poorly designed applications on smartcards that are vulnerable, but the smartcard itself should be fine.
- lisper 10y agoIf an attacker pwns your host they can do anything you can do. If you can access the smartcard, then the attacker can too. As soon as you plug the card in, the card is just as compromised as the host. This is the reason that the SC4-HSM has a built-in display and user inputs. These serve the same purpose as the display on a PoS terminal, except that because they are a part of the HSM itself, they can't be compromised by an attacker who pwns the host that the HSM is plugged in to. An attacker can still attempt a phishing attack, but this will be much, much harder. And for really mission-critical applications, an attacker would have to control every possible means of computing a secure hash on the host machine. I should probably write a paper about this.
- Karunamon 10y agoI thought that the whole point of a smartcard is that your keys, once loaded, can never be extracted again, even by the host. Rather than passing secrets to the host directly, there's a miniature PKI that does request/signature, secured by a password, using a hardware pinpad if you're very serious. Little window for error too, since screwing up the password some small number of times results in the card being blocked, and in some cases, destroyed. Even if the host is running hostile code, the worst it could do is forge signing requests?
- lisper 10y ago> screwing up the password If the host machine is pwned then it's not hard to steal your password. > the worst it could do is forge signing requests Well yeah, that's true. But if the card is protecting a really sensitive asset (like your bitcoin account) then a single forged request can do an awful lot of damage.
- Karunamon 10y agoThe point being that the malware either has to horn in on a legitimate request (and I'm not sure if that's possible or not given how PKI), or issue its own request, which the user has to authorize with password, ideally out of band using a hardware pinpad.