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The stable marriage problem has two natural algorithms that produce a stable matching: one algorithm give priority to women's choices and one gives priority to
by jknz 10y ago
The stable marriage problem has two natural algorithms that produce a stable matching: one algorithm give priority to women's choices and one gives priority to men's choices.
If the algorithm used by yc to produce the matching for each slot is based on these, which algorithm is used? The one that gives priority to women's choices or to men's choices? A variation that doesn't give priority to any gender choices?
- wrsh07 10y agoFor clarity, the "women" : "men" are "investors" : "founders" in this context
- shimon 10y agoI don't think those algorithms are applicable here, because it's normal (even good) for investors to invest in multiple companies. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem The logical optimization target for YC is the total valuation of their companies, which probably means whatever approach creates the most competition among investors. Edit: more active discussion on this topic at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12051218 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12051218
- cperciva 10y agoThe stable marriage problem has two natural algorithms that produce a stable matching: one algorithm give priority to women's choices and one gives priority to men's choices. This is true under two conditions: 1. Marriages are heterosexual; and 2. Marriages are monogamous. While startup/VC relationships are heterosexual (err, heterofinancial?), they are absolutely not monogamous, so the analogy to the stable matching algorithm already fails.