5 ms·

Your definition of physical existence above is not circular in some sense, it is circular in any sense since you define physical existence in terms of interacti

• hackinthebochs 10y ago
  It's "in some sense" because we're defining the physical in terms of causal closure, rather than explaining the true nature of the physical (i.e. what physical matter supervenes on). >are colour or sound physically existent in your definition? Hard to answer without first having some kind of theory of mind. If we take the mind to be solely comprised of physical matter then mental states are particular organizations of that matter. Color and sound being mental states/percepts, they would be particular abstractions of physical matter. The abstraction itself would have no physical existence.
  • cgio 10y ago
    I am not sure I get your definition of causal closure. Would "black is what looks the same colour when put next to a black item" qualify as a causal closure, and if yes how can that be a non purely self referential definition in any sense? On colour and sound, how do you separate between the physical representation of the abstraction and the abstraction itself? You seem to be approaching a causal closure of non-physical existence, though one I am not sure is right.
    • hackinthebochs 10y ago
      The purpose of a definition is to pick out only those instances of a set you're attempting to refer to. The set of objects subject to causal influence by members of the set is well-defined and unique. Your example with black doesn't work because there are multiple non-intersecting sets that satisfy the critera, so we need some further conceptual machinery to distinguish them. >You seem to be approaching a causal closure of non-physical existence, though one I am not sure is right. I'm not sure I follow. To be clear, the "causal closure" was referring to the fact that the physical is subject to causation, rather than a generic term describing a set of self-similar items.