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I agree that approval voting is simpler conceptually. I like that IRV lets me prioratize my vote. It's not that much more complicated. Counting the vote is a lo

I agree that approval voting is simpler conceptually. I like that IRV lets me prioratize my vote. It's not that much more complicated. Counting the vote is a lot harder but the voters don't have to do that. If 60% prefer Gore to Bush and 90% of them prefer Nader to Gore then you don't get the "correct" result. You'd have Gore beating Nader with 60% vs 54% approval when 54% (the majority) of the population actually prefered Nader to Gore. They can't risk leaving Gore unapproved because then Bush might win. IRV solves this.

AnthonyMouse 10y ago
You're only getting that result by having 100% of the voters who prefer Nader to Gore approve of both while 100% of the voters who prefer Gore to Nader only approve of Gore. In which case approval voting does what it's supposed to do and gives the election to the candidate with the highest approval. Moreover, the problem you're trying to solve is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which is provably impossible to do. You could have a third of voters prefer each candidate but majorities prefer Nader to Gore, Gore to Bush and Bush to Nader.
- MawNicker 10y ago
  I see what you're saying about Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. I don't think I was specific enough. You're right in the general case and IRV doesn't solve that problem. What I mean is that 54% could prefer Nader outright. But since they also prefer Gore to Bush they have to approve of Gore or else Bush may win. This causes Gore to have the highest approval even though he wasn't the majority's most desired candidate. It wouldn't fix the bias towards those expected to win.
  - AnthonyMouse 10y ago
    > But since they also prefer Gore to Bush they have to approve of Gore or else Bush may win. Only the Gore voters have to do the same thing, and then Nader wins if he has more support. Because a small percentage of people will vote only for their preferred candidate and risk Bush, which will be proportional to the support that candidate has and thus give Nader the win if he actually has more support. The thing you're really objecting to is why range voting is better than approval voting. With range voting the Nader supporters can give Nader 10, Gore 9 and Bush 0, the Gore voters swap Gore and Nader and then there is less brinkmanship necessary to get the right outcome. But that's the cost of using the one which is easier to explain. And range voting is more complicated than approval voting, but it's simpler than IRV, so you're really just making the argument for range voting over approval voting. I feel like the trap you're falling into is to grade approval voting based on whether it does what IRV does. The problem with IRV is that it tends to do crazy things. So for example, imagine everybody expects that in a runoff between Bush and Nader, Bush wins. But between Bush and Gore, Gore wins. So then people who would vote for Nader can't vote for him because it would give the election to Bush again. But even weirder, Bush voters can vote for Nader in order to give the election to Bush. So IRV doesn't solve the most important problem, because people will still be clamoring for third parties not to run and for people not to vote for them for fear that they'll harm the major party most similar to them.
    - MawNicker 10y ago
      Ok I think I'm with you. Thank you for this actually. I really appreciate it. Range voting doesn't seem that bad. People are used to taking surveys. I have failed many times to explain IRV and this does seem to have the same benefit. Also brinkmanship is an awesome word that I did not know.
- deleted 10y ago
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- ClayShentrup 10y ago
  Arrow's Theorem only applies to ranked voting methods. http://scorevoting.net/AppCW.html http://scorevoting.net/AppCW.html

AnthonyMouse 10y ago

You're only getting that result by having 100% of the voters who prefer Nader to Gore approve of both while 100% of the voters who prefer Gore to Nader only approve of Gore. In which case approval voting does what it's supposed to do and gives the election to the candidate with the highest approval. Moreover, the problem you're trying to solve is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which is provably impossible to do. You could have a third of voters prefer each candidate but majorities prefer Nader to Gore, Gore to Bush and Bush to Nader.

MawNicker 10y ago
I see what you're saying about Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. I don't think I was specific enough. You're right in the general case and IRV doesn't solve that problem. What I mean is that 54% could prefer Nader outright. But since they also prefer Gore to Bush they have to approve of Gore or else Bush may win. This causes Gore to have the highest approval even though he wasn't the majority's most desired candidate. It wouldn't fix the bias towards those expected to win.
- AnthonyMouse 10y ago
  > But since they also prefer Gore to Bush they have to approve of Gore or else Bush may win. Only the Gore voters have to do the same thing, and then Nader wins if he has more support. Because a small percentage of people will vote only for their preferred candidate and risk Bush, which will be proportional to the support that candidate has and thus give Nader the win if he actually has more support. The thing you're really objecting to is why range voting is better than approval voting. With range voting the Nader supporters can give Nader 10, Gore 9 and Bush 0, the Gore voters swap Gore and Nader and then there is less brinkmanship necessary to get the right outcome. But that's the cost of using the one which is easier to explain. And range voting is more complicated than approval voting, but it's simpler than IRV, so you're really just making the argument for range voting over approval voting. I feel like the trap you're falling into is to grade approval voting based on whether it does what IRV does. The problem with IRV is that it tends to do crazy things. So for example, imagine everybody expects that in a runoff between Bush and Nader, Bush wins. But between Bush and Gore, Gore wins. So then people who would vote for Nader can't vote for him because it would give the election to Bush again. But even weirder, Bush voters can vote for Nader in order to give the election to Bush. So IRV doesn't solve the most important problem, because people will still be clamoring for third parties not to run and for people not to vote for them for fear that they'll harm the major party most similar to them.
  - MawNicker 10y ago
    Ok I think I'm with you. Thank you for this actually. I really appreciate it. Range voting doesn't seem that bad. People are used to taking surveys. I have failed many times to explain IRV and this does seem to have the same benefit. Also brinkmanship is an awesome word that I did not know.
deleted 10y ago
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ClayShentrup 10y ago
Arrow's Theorem only applies to ranked voting methods. http://scorevoting.net/AppCW.html http://scorevoting.net/AppCW.html