3 ms·
> It certainly challenges theories of consciousness that point to specific parts of the brain as responsible for the phenomenon. Same for theories of consciousn
by appleflaxen 10y ago
> It certainly challenges theories of consciousness that point to specific parts of the brain as responsible for the phenomenon. Same for theories of consciousness that point outside the brain or ones that look at consciousness as something pre-existing. It leads weight to those theories that claim consciousness and the self are emergent phenomena (meta abstractions) and do not really "exist" below a certain level of complexity/abstraction.
If all the parts are present and connected (albeit stressed), how does that mean that they are not responsible for a particular phenomenon, or mean that consciousness is not emergent?
I don't understand your reasoning.
- armitron 10y agoEven if we assume that all the parts are present and connected (not clear), surely having 90% reduced neural availability would lead to observable defects (e.g. psychosis, dissociative disorders/schizophrenia) if the neurons were directly responsible for consciousness. Yet this doesn't seem to be the case here (and in the other example someone else mentioned in this thread) which leads weight to the theories that treat consciousness as meta and emergent.