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I found the counter-argument rather strange: > At issue is the definition of empathy. “This work is not evidence of empathy — defined as the ability to mentall
by xg15 10y ago
I found the counter-argument rather strange:
> At issue is the definition of empathy. “This work is not evidence of empathy — defined as the ability to mentally put oneself into another being’s emotional shoes,” says Povinelli. “It’s good evidence for emotional contagion and that animals are motivated to coordinate their behaviour so that distress is reduced, but that is nothing new.”
(Emphasis mine)
How could this definition of empathy possibly be proven for non-humans? Or in fact, how could it be proven for anyone but yourself?
Additionally, they present an alternate hypothesis to explain the findings: That the captive rat was somehow causing distress to the free rat and the free rat was solely motivated to reduce that distress without any concern for the other rat. While that's a valid hypothesis, it doesn't seem to hold the occam's razor test for me - especially as they admit themselves that they don't know what this distress-causing mechanism could be. (They suggest alarm calls or pheromones but couldn't find any yet)
- randcraw 10y agoHow to demonstrate empathy? Easy. Conduct experiments in which the caged rats undergo a range of living conditions from idyllic to neutral to outright torture. If the free rat favors freeing the tortured rat over the idyllic rat then it shows greater empathy.
- xg15 10y agoThat was, in (slightly) less horrible form, what they did. It's apparently still disputed that this shows empathy, however. For your experiment, you could counter-argue in the same way: Maybe the free rat was just particularly tired of the torture screams and that's why it freed that rat first...
- developer2 10y agoIf I was the outside rat, you damn well better believe the only reason I'm freeing the other rat from the idyllic environment is so I can get in there and enjoy some paradise for myself. :)
- chongli 10y agoIt can be demonstrated quite readily in humans, through media (literature, movies, TV). It happens all the time! If you've ever heard or uttered the phrase "I know exactly what the character is going through!" then you've witnessed it. It can't be proven in the sense of mathematical proofs, but then, nothing in reality can.
- taneq 10y ago> That the captive rat was somehow causing distress to the free rat and the free rat was solely motivated to reduce that distress without any concern for the other rat. Isn't that what empathy is, though? Distress caused by the perception of another creature's distress?
- slaman 10y agoI think they are arguing the difference between "that sound is annoying I'll turn that off" and "his situation is awful I don't enjoy being trapped"
- taneq 10y agoBut there's a whole spectrum of responses between the two, from "I don't like that noise" to "I don't like seeing that other rat in pain" to "I know if I don't do something about this, I'm going to feel bad later" or "It's wrong to let another animal suffer, therefore I should help him". A small mammal doesn't have to have the exact same nuanced understanding as a human would in order to still be 'feeling empathy'.
- woodandsteel 10y ago>But there's a whole spectrum of responses between the two What seems to be going on in recent decades is, through experimentation and arguments, the scientists are getting clearer on what are the various points on the spectrum.
- chriswarbo 10y agoThere have been interesting experiments on corvids which show their ability to "put themselves into another being's shoes", e.g. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2346514/ http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2346514/ (first hit on Google): > Food-caching corvids hide food, but such caches are susceptible to pilfering by other individuals. Consequently, the birds use several counter strategies to protect their caches from theft, e.g. hiding most of them out of sight. When observed by potential pilferers at the time of caching, experienced jays that have been thieves themselves, take further protective action. Once the potential pilferers have left, they move caches those birds have seen, re-hiding them in new places. Naive birds that had no thieving experience do not do so. By focusing on the counter strategies of the cacher when previously observed by a potential pilferer, these results raise the intriguing possibility that re-caching is based on a form of mental attribution, namely the simulation of another bird's viewpoint. Furthermore, the jays also keep track of the observer which was watching when they cached and take protective action accordingly, thus suggesting that they may also be aware of others' knowledge states. The key to infering that the birds were "simulating" others' decisions was that their behaviour changed depending on whether the cache was spotted by another individual or not (it also depended on the birds' past experience of pilfering; but that only shows that the tactic is learned rather than innate). Perhaps something similar could be done for empathy; for example, give the animals a mechanism to free themselves, which requires knowledge to operate (e.g. operating levers in a sequence). Replicate this experiment in the new setting, to ensure the animals, when shown the correct sequence, will reliably free themselves and others. Now, go a little further; show the correct sequence to animals in pairs, where sometimes both can see the correct sequence, and other times only one can see (e.g. one can't see past a partition). Now those animals which know the sequence also know whether their partner knows or not. Once they've freed themselves, will they go on to help free the other? If they free those which could not see the sequence, but do not free those which could see the sequence, that would be evidence in favour of empathy, i.e. they're able to "put themselves into the other animal's shoes" in terms of knowledge/information ("he doesn't know how to escape, I'll help") and emotionally ("he could escape if he wanted to, so he must not want to"). This may require controlled behaviour, to engineer a situation where both animals could escape but only one does. Maybe a dummy/puppet/etc. could be used.