4 ms·
Whoa, hang on. Statistical arguments for unproven conjectures are bad, but this counterargument is as bad or worse, especially when you start talking about infi
by Analemma_ 10y ago
Whoa, hang on. Statistical arguments for unproven conjectures are bad, but this counterargument is as bad or worse, especially when you start talking about infinity. Just to address your first example:
> The number 42 does not exist (logic: pick an integer. The probability that it equals 42 is zero. QED)
I object! What is your probability distribution function over the integers? Your phrasing sort of implies a uniform distribution, but there is no such thing as a uniform distribution on an infinite set, and as soon as you pick a plausible pdf the argument stops working.
- jordigh 10y agoIt is easy to address your objection. On a uniform distribution on [n] := {0, 1, 2, ...n}, P(X=42)->0 as n->infty. This is similar to Feynmann's argument.
- tgb 10y agoYou're forgetting to integrate the probability over the domain 0 to n. If you do, you always get 1 for n at least 42.
- jordigh 10y agoThose are two separate events. I'm talking about the event n = 42, which makes sense for all [n]. You're talking about the event n >= 42, which is a very different event.
- tgb 10y agoNo, I'm not talking about integrating the probability that n >= 42. What's the chance that a random number in [n] is 42? It's 1/n, if n is at least 42. Sum that over all x in [n] and you get 1, i.e. the probability that there is a number in [n] that is 42.
- jordigh 10y agoYou're still talking about different events. The event that there is 42 in [n] is different from the even that x = 42.
- tgb 10y agoThen I guess I just don't understand what you're trying to conclude from this argument.
- jordigh 10y agoRichard Feynmann was trying to argue probabilistically about the possible existence of a counterexample to FLT. To do this, he more or less tries to put a probability value on the event "a counterexample exists". The problem is that his kind of reasoning is similar to the probability of an event such as "x = 42". Counterexamples to FLT may, a priori, be as rare as the number 42 is within the integers, i.e. with probability tending to zero as you consider larger and larger sets of integers. But a very small probability of a counterexample, even a probability that tends to zero, does not mean a counterexample doesn't exist anymore than it says that 42 doesn't exist.
- tgb 10y agoSee I can't see the analogy from your argument to Feynman's for the following reason: you are computing the probability that x=42 for an individual x and saying that it is going to 0 as x->infinity. Feynman first computes the probability that N is x^n + y^n but then integrates that over all N and n in order to get the probability that there is a solution anywhere. His argument takes into account the fact that there could be just one single lone solution in a infinite sea of non-solutions, since his probability estimate is for "there is a solution anywhere" not "this particular number is a solution". And I think that when you add that part to your estimate, you do get a probability of 1 that 42 exists somewhere, even if individually you get a low probability of it being at any given large x.
- 10y ago