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Can Topology Prevent Another Financial Crash?
- ellius 10y agoProbably not: http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=10004 http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=10004
- pdabbadabba 10y agoThis is an interesting piece, written by an obviously very smart person. But the argument really seems to reduce to: > The simple fact is that anybody who thinks they know what is going to happen is dangerous, because they are messing with something that is very powerful that they don’t even remotely understand, or understand how it will change in response to meddling. Or, more specifically, there are economic reasons why the network formed the way it should so we disturb it at our peril. Huh? First of all, this line of argument would seem to doom any attempt to regulate the economy whatsoever. One can always say: but the market is really complicated and it has developed the way it has for good reasons so its dangerous to mess with it. He's right that this will always raise the possibility of Unintended Consequences. So it's a welcome point. But he's also discounting the fact that, given people's level of expertise, and the sometimes dismal status quo, it's hardly self evident that regulation is never the right move. Returning to this case: it's the obvious response that the network may have evolved the way it did for good economic reasons, but we have good reason to doubt that these reasons adequately include the safety of the financial market as a whole in the very long term? This, of course, is why we have regulators in the first place: because the aggregate interests of private actors in the market do not always correspond to our collective social interests.
- conistonwater 10y agoHe's a bit more specific that that: > One major problem–which I’ve been on about for years, and which I am quoted about in the Nautilus piece–is that counterparty credit exposure is only one type of many connections in the financial network: liquidity is another source of interconnection. > As a practical example, not only does mandatory clearing change the topology of a network, it also changes the tightness of the coupling through the imposition of rigid variation margining. Tighter coupling can change the probability of the failure of connections, and the circumstances under which these failures occur. > Another problem is that models frequently leave out some participants. As another practical example, network models of derivatives markets include the major derivatives counterparties, and find that netting reduces the likelihood of a cascade of defaults within that network. But netting achieves this by redistributing the losses to other parties who are not explicitly modeled. As a result, the model is incomplete, and gives an incomplete understanding of the full effects of netting. > Thus, any network model is inherently a very partial one, and is therefore likely to be a very poor guide to understanding the network in all its complexity. FWIW, I think he's right to bring this up, as there are things that we already know of that the topology model doesn't cover.
- tbabb 10y agoWhenever the publisher is Nautilus and the headline ends with a question mark, I pretty much just assume that the actual answer to the titular question is "No".
- jackgavigan 10y agoCCPs can certainly help prevent a reoccurrence of what happened with Lehman Brothers, where, unlike the Treasury, the market didn't know that Lehmans net exposure was relatively small (~$6bn if I recall correctly) compared to the hundreds of billions worth of derivatives it had written, and therefore were scared that if they kept extending credit, they'd be left holding the can if Lehmans went under. Under the new regulatory regime, a re-run of the 2008 financial crisis would have engendered far less FUD and Lehmans could well have survived. Nobody would have been scared that Lehmans' potential inability would have represented an existential threat to their firm because only the CCPs would have been exposed. (This is a gross simplification but you get the point.) However, as the article makes clear, the counterparty risk is now all concentrated in just a few CCPs. We also don't know how the market will evolve after central clearing becomes mandatory. The markets have a habit of behaving with a certain ruthless efficiency when it comes to exploiting loopholes or opportunities created by regulation so, like the army that prepares for the last war, the new regulatory regime may not protect against emergent market risks and behaviours.
- eru 10y agoOne alternative would be for the regulators no longer requiring minimum standards (and giving implicit guarantees for anyone meeting those minimum standards); but instead requiring banks and other market participants to regularly reveal all their positions. Perhaps with a lag of six months or a year to let them protect trade secrets for a while.
- cm2187 10y agoI think it is rather the contrary. There has been a fundamental regulatory change that would make it more likely that a Lehman would go bust and that's a good thing: the introduction of bail-in. Bail-in is the power given to the regulator to declare a bank non viable and to impose losses on its creditor over a week end, and as a result auto-recapitalise the bank, which will be open for business and healthy the following Monday. You can see it as a flash, extra-judiciary chapter 11. The regime is designed to impose losses on regular creditors (bond holders), rather than clients taking a credit exposure to the bank through derivatives or deposits, even if in a bankruptcy these would have the same ranking and should suffer the same losses. This should reduce a lot the disruption on the market of a bank going bad. Banks have been required to hold minimum levels of bailinable wholesale debt to ensure regulators can do a large scale bail-in. This a fundamental shift which banks, regulators, and large bank creditors are well aware of, but seems to be completely unkown to the general public. That's kind of as absurd as keeping the dooms day machine secret in Dr Strangelove. The ability to do bail-in is probably the main factor that reduced dramatically the risk of another 2008-style financial crisis.
- ZoeZoeBee 10y agoI have a problem finding credence with any article which talks about preventing a future financial crash without mentioning the Central Bank Of Japan. They've taken the liberty of purchasing vast amounts of equities in the hopes of financing the Japanese retirement fund. >While the Bank of Japan’s name is nowhere to be found in regulatory filings on major stock investors, the monetary authority’s exchange-traded fund purchases have made it a top 10 shareholder in about 90 percent of the Nikkei 225 Stock Average, according to estimates compiled by Bloomberg from public data. It’s now a major owner of more Japanese blue-chips than both BlackRock Inc., the world’s largest money manager, and Vanguard Group, which oversees more than $3 trillion http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-24/the-tokyo-whale-is-quietly-buying-up-huge-stakes-in-japan-inc http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-24/the-tokyo-... Demographics and central bank balance sheets being what they are, there is no way these purchases can continue indefinitely and this is certainly not indicative of a healthy market.
- mathattack 10y agoCompletely different topic. This is talking about reducing counter-party risk in derivatives by creating central counter-parties. (Of course derivative counter-party risk was more a symptom of the real estate driven crash, but that's another story) There are dozens of other problems which can cause the next one. Most regulations fight the last war, so the next one will be different.
- pfarnsworth 10y agoIt's actually not Kevin Bacon but rather every single human is connected by 6 degrees of separation or less. Although the idea sounds crazy, it might make sense. I'm 3 degrees away from Obama, which means everyone I know is at most 4 degrees away from him, etc.
- aji 10y agoI guess now I'm 4 degrees away, since I can just send you a message if I need help delivering something to Obama!
- j2kun 10y agoIIRC the average is close to 6, the max is actually more like 12.
- carl_corder 10y agoAnother interesting and related topic are Ramsey numbers. R(3,3)=6 which means: "In any party of six people either at least three of them are (pairwise) mutual strangers or at least three of them are (pairwise) mutual acquaintances" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem_on_friends_and_strangers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem_on_friends_and_strange...
- drjesusphd 10y agoThis sounds like a tautology. What am I missing?
- carterehsmith 10y agoIf I was Mammon, I would totally engineer a crisis, get prices low, buy shit at low prices, borrow money to governments etc at usurious interest rates, then let it all go back to normal. Then I would wait until people kind of forget the crisis and stop demanding banker's heads. 6-7 years? Then goto 1. Disclaimer: not Mammon.
- eru 10y agoSolvent governments have been borrowing at absurdly cheap rates ever since the crisis.
- Mz 10y agoWell, it's an interesting piece and the ideas seem to have merit, but what we need is a lot more stability for, say, the bottom third of our population, both globally and within each nation. We really need solutions that help reduce the odds that individual lives readily come rapidly unraveled. This will help the entire system be more stable. Hint: I don't think Basic Income provides any such thing. I think it would worsen problems. Though I think reducing the degrees of separation between the Haves and Have Nots can really help and the internet has enormous potential for facilitating that. However, we need to reduce prejudice and institute some best practices. Currently, the Haves do not want to hobknob with the Have Nots even online and even when being bludgeoned with an explicit expectation of getting help developing an income, not seeking charity. They just default to this assumption that poor people are beggars and charity cases and it goes bad places.
- smaddox 10y agoMay I ask why you think basic income would worsen stability? Based on the sentence before, I would have thought you a supporter.
- Mz 10y agoJust for you, I dashed this off last night: http://micheleincalifornia.blogspot.com/2016/07/money-is-not-wealth.html http://micheleincalifornia.blogspot.com/2016/07/money-is-not...
- smaddox 10y agoI skimmed your post, but nothing in there convinced me that basic income would worsen stability. I agree that basic income will not eliminate the gap between the rich and the poor, but that's not the point. Nothing can permanently eliminate the gap between the rich and the poor; the gap is a consequence of the time-value of money. However, by reducing the lower class's reliance on debt, basic income could raise the quality of life of the lower class. The point of basic income is similar to the point of minimum wage. Individual businesses cannot choose to raise their workers wages or they will be priced out of the market by their competitors. In contrast, if every company agrees to raise their minimum wage (or is forced to by the state), then the worker's share of wages improves. Of course this is not a permanent solution, since inflation reduces the utility of the minimum wage over time. Thus, basic income, like minimum wage, would need to be adjusted over time. I also agree that money is not wealth, and I agree that the distinction is extremely important, particularly for understanding macroeconomics and ecological economics. Indeed, unsustainable divergence of money from wealth (through credit expansion of the money supply) is the prime cause of economic crises. However, under a properly controlled basic income system, such divergence could be minimized and even eliminated, thereby eliminating depressions. So, while I agree that basic income cannot solve all our economic woes, I do believe it is a step in the right direction.
- _asummers 10y agoI really enjoy almost all nautilus articles I've read so far, and they're linked pretty frequently here. So just now, I finally decided to just buy a yearly subscription to support them. All fine and dandy, easy checkout, whatever. But then after purchasing I get an email from them that says that to sign in and view content, only the email used is required, no password needed (account details are unavailable without password). I'm now thoroughly confused because even the worst security models I've seen at least pretend to have a password. What reason would that have for this security model?
- jsprogrammer 10y agoIt seems easier for the user. It is one less piece of data to enter.
- zimbatm 10y agoWhat do you have to lose? The risk of unpaying users is on them and they are compromising that for your own benefit (simplicity of access).
- jshaqaw 10y agoNo
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- pash 10y agoOne overlooked mechanism to forstall the next systemic credit crisis—this occurred to me when I studied these topics in graduate school in the years after the last crisis—is to have central banks issue credit-default swaps against the failure of major financial institutions in their jurisdictions. Since central banks can't unwillingly default on liabilities denominated in the currencies they control, this eliminates the second-order credit risk that was a major factor in the last crisis, when AIG and other institutions that issued credit insurance themselves became major sources of credit risk, first in the market for those instruments and then (due to the enormity of their losses) in the wider financial system. If a central bank must pay out on a CDS in the event of a crisis, the situation is little different from what happens anyway: central banks swell their balance sheets, effectively by printing money, to provide liquidity to the financial institutions. By acknowledging and formalizing this inevitable outcome through the issuance of credit derivatives (and by requiring major financial institutions to hold them), central banks can (a) make the financial sector pre-pay for its eventual bailing-out, (b) create a credible means by which to refuse further bailouts, and (c) facilitate a more effective and more informative market for credit instruments, which would help to prevent a crisis in the first place. I suspect that this potential tactic has been ignored mostly because it would be politically infeasible to convince a financially unsophisticated public that CDSs—financial "weapons of mass destruction", in Warren Buffet's phrase—could be part of the solution. (But then it might be feasible: central banks are not accountable to the political process in the way that legislators are.) At base, to tie this back into the submitted article, note that what I'm suggesting is little different from putting central banks into the role of central-clearing counterparties for credit risk, but with the added feature that these risks would be distilled into securities so that they can be priced and traded, with the concomitant benefits: the parties that receive credit insurance must pay for it, and markets for trading it aggregate otherwise diffuse information about the underlying credit risks. Quite separately—at the same time I was musing about this stuff, I wrote a (rushed and rather mediocre) master's thesis that tried to expose the macro-level topology of the global financial system. The idea was to use the statistical correlations between major markets and assets classes to induce the structure of a metric space [0], revealing the "stochastic distance" between markets across time [1]. This ended up not being terribly useful, due to the well known fact that correlations between most markets move toward one in a crisis; the metric structure similarly collapsed in a crisis. 0. A metric induces a topology on the same underlying set. 1. In the course of my literature review, I found out that Rosario Mantegna had the core of the idea a decade before; see, Mantegna (2000), Introduction to Econophysics: Correlation and Complexity in Finance.
- fiatmoney 10y agoFinancial networks interpret regulation as damage and route around it.
- ethbro 10y agoI'd characterize it as their fitness function is "amount of profit generated" and they attempt to maximize that. Or are you saying financial firms would voluntarily leave profit on the table in order to help mitigate systemic risk?
- fatbird 10y agoIn Alan Greenspan's testimony to Congress on the 2008 crash he said he believed Wall St. was smart enough to do exactly that: collectively manage systemic risk by factoring it in, which would necessarily reduce profits by forsaking some short terms gains. He was wrong.
- eli_gottlieb 10y agoThat sounds fine, if it means that "routing around" regulation involves actually creating the amount of redundancy necessary to survive a crash or downturn. No, not everything should be leveraged to the damn hilt. Prices are supposed to be signals about expected utilities, right? Well, those expectations can be wrong, and the system should be made to factor in the known fact that those expectations are wrong with certain known frequencies.
- superobserver 10y agoSince the money-market system is fundamentally based on debt structures, circumventing any kind of crash will be tantamount to preventing any kind of overvalued market. In other words, no amount of mathematical juggling will alter the underlying sine qua non of the (global) financial market. Frankly, any newly put forward mechanism suggested should be subjected to serious analysis and scepticism if the true goal is to avoid a crash. Looking over the history of the financial markets, however, given anyone who works within the system, I would doubt that they would care to envision, let alone implement, any kind of method that would not have a necessary relationship to their securing their bottom line.
- JustUhThought 10y agoWait, wait. I'll take this one. No. It cannot.
- scottlocklin 10y agoI hope he was well paid by somebody who doesn't like clearing houses to write that, as it appears to be the sheerest nonsense. Clearing houses are useful, and they have worked very well in futures markets for the last 100 years. Why I'm supposed to be safer because "big banks trading with each other ... and topology" remains unstated in any convincing way. I mean, despite the author's having worked on the street, he apparently never heard of correlation matrices.
- eru 10y agoIf the market monetarists' arguments are to be believed, financial crashes are not too much of a problem in any case. Recessions are. And the two need not be related. Eg Black Monday in 1987 did not cause a recession. Neither did the flash crash. Even the Great Depression did not start because of the crash of 1929. What's important is nominal GDP, and the central bank can target that to keep it on a stable growth path.
- ArkyBeagle 10y agoBest I can tell, market monetarism devolves to assumptions/beliefs about which strength of the EMH to use and about volatility. I'm interpreting "market monetarism" as "use an NGDP futures market". This should (IMO) be viewed as a decent summary: http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/excess-volatility-and-ngdp-futures.html http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2012/07/excess-volatility... I am not 100% sure I actually understand the post - I'd think that a "low pass filter" could be applied to Fed actions to address this, but it could easily be that I'm simply wrong about that. I have two competing biases - one, control theory, and two, a skepticism of how the EMH works out in real life. Also, it's not clear to me exactly what would happen if the Fed simply adopted say, a 4% inflation target.
- eru 10y agoI wouldn't use Noahpinion to learn about market monetarism. See Scott Sumner's comment on this very piece at https://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/excess-volatility-and-ngdp-futures.html?showComment=1341524261442#c5205186238350730702 https://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/excess-volati... > Also, it's not clear to me exactly what would happen if the Fed simply adopted say, a 4% inflation target. In practice, they seem to have an inflation ceiling, not an inflation target. But it has not too much to do with nGDP targeting. (Or only insofar as nGDP targeting right now would suggest looser money, so going for more inflation would do the same thing.) Also, are you talking about a 4% level target?
- ArkyBeagle 10y agoWow. I was trying to be balanced about it. I didn't read the comments ( mea culpa ). I generally read Sumner first. But I've caught that criticism of market monetarism from other sources. Now I wonder if it's valid. I was talking about two things - nGDP and a 4% inflation target. I wish we were talking about a 4% inflation target, although after watching the Yellen grilling a coupe of Mondays ago I wonder of we can even do that.