4 ms·

If the host PC is compromised, does a cheap smartcard help? Just capture the PIN (like you would a password when they logon to their bank) and replay at will? M

If the host PC is compromised, does a cheap smartcard help? Just capture the PIN (like you would a password when they logon to their bank) and replay at will? Maybe if the user is very careful to only keep their smartcard in for the minimum time required it helps. So long as other bank protections are in place, it shouldn't be a step backwards. If it's used to move all liability to the consumer though, then it's a problem.

nickpsecurity 10y ago
If the PIN is to access it, then it at least limits the number of times the credential can be used. The credential doesn't leave the smartcard. Plus, there's security schemes like Flicker that remove basically the whole system on top of hardware from TCB. So, you can put PIN check on it. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/eurosys053-mccune-cr.pdf https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/...
cleeus 10y ago
If you use a smartcard, you should use a class2/class3 card reader with pin-pad and never enter the pin on you computer. So the machine can replace the hash that is to be signed, but cannot intercept and replay the PIN.
- nickpsecurity 10y ago
  It's not always possible but should be whenever possible. The concept is called a trusted path: an unspoofable, un-interceptable interface between the user and the security-critical part of the system. Was required for all high-assurance security under the Orange Book. Still used in some HSM and payment sectors. Example for other readers on p4 under Luna PCI and Igenico reader that looks like it's a kid's pocket calculator haha: https://www.keyon.ch/de/Produkte-Loesungen/SafeNet-HSM/HSM_TrueHardware-basedKeyManagement_NextGenPKIApps_FB_-EN-_web.pdf https://www.keyon.ch/de/Produkte-Loesungen/SafeNet-HSM/HSM_T... http://www.smartcardsource.com/contents/en-ca/Ingenico_myleo.pdf http://www.smartcardsource.com/contents/en-ca/Ingenico_myleo...

nickpsecurity 10y ago

If the PIN is to access it, then it at least limits the number of times the credential can be used. The credential doesn't leave the smartcard. Plus, there's security schemes like Flicker that remove basically the whole system on top of hardware from TCB. So, you can put PIN check on it. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/eurosys053-mccune-cr.pdf https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/...

cleeus 10y ago

If you use a smartcard, you should use a class2/class3 card reader with pin-pad and never enter the pin on you computer. So the machine can replace the hash that is to be signed, but cannot intercept and replay the PIN.

nickpsecurity 10y ago
It's not always possible but should be whenever possible. The concept is called a trusted path: an unspoofable, un-interceptable interface between the user and the security-critical part of the system. Was required for all high-assurance security under the Orange Book. Still used in some HSM and payment sectors. Example for other readers on p4 under Luna PCI and Igenico reader that looks like it's a kid's pocket calculator haha: https://www.keyon.ch/de/Produkte-Loesungen/SafeNet-HSM/HSM_TrueHardware-basedKeyManagement_NextGenPKIApps_FB_-EN-_web.pdf https://www.keyon.ch/de/Produkte-Loesungen/SafeNet-HSM/HSM_T... http://www.smartcardsource.com/contents/en-ca/Ingenico_myleo.pdf http://www.smartcardsource.com/contents/en-ca/Ingenico_myleo...