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"the consequences elevate it to a point where it deserves its own consideration." Well, it does but maybe not here. Let's remember the situation. The considera
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
"the consequences elevate it to a point where it deserves its own consideration."
Well, it does but maybe not here. Let's remember the situation. The consideration is only applying because a person openly said they're ex-CIA. So, we apply these considerations when people say that. Result? Instead of risk going away, they just stop saying they're ex-CIA. Maybe start talking about privacy, crypto, Anonymous, blockchains, and so on. Infiltration 101 applied to Tor project. Filtering out anyone claiming to be ex-government doesn't filter out ex-government except for those specific cases. This level of consideration, if infiltration risk is high, has to be all or nothing.
"The furthest I'd suggest would be language extensions, likely implemented as external llvm modules, nothing crazy"
It's a reasonable proposition. I considered something like Cyclone, a security-aware scheme for managing heap, and with JIF-style labels for information flow. Might knock out a lot of problems while keeping code mostly the same and able for C programmers to handle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_(programming_language) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyclone_(programming_language)
https://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/ https://www.cs.cornell.edu/jif/
" Any changes to code further down stream of well specified functions shouldn't need code review. "
This is ambiguous. Are you saying that, with how they all interface, that any changes to lower-level functions should preserve interface invariants enough that higher-level stuff shouldn't have to be re-reviewed? If so, that would be reasonable. If not, please elaborate.
- woodman 10y ago> ...a person openly said they're ex-CIA. It was my understanding that he first misrepresented himself as a State Department employee, then for some reason came clean several years later. I think filtering that sort of behavior out has a lot more pros than cons. > I considered something like Cyclone... A lot of that can be done with compiler annotations, the disadvantage of course being that it isn't default behavior... which is consistent with the rest of the C universe - things are no more secure than you design them to be. > If not, please elaborate. That is what I'd say if I was an OO programmer, yes. But I'll elaborate anyway because... have you ever just been in the mood to write gibberish C? /* New unreviewed code from untrusted source */ __attribute__((const)) /* More pure than "pure" */ static int newfunc(char* src, int len){ return src ? 0 : len; } /* Imagine an incredibly comprehensive spec for this public function, right here */ __attribute__((nonnull(1,2))) /* No Cyclone needed for null safety here */ int pubfunc(char* a, char* b) { /* ... */ if (a[0] == '4') return newfunc(b, 4); /* Untrusted function covered under that amazing spec you imagined */ /* ... */ }