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Isn't this what Intel's SGX system is supposed to do? Create a trusted, isolated execution environment, that's certified by Intel (or whomever manages your PC

Isn't this what Intel's SGX system is supposed to do? Create a trusted, isolated execution environment, that's certified by Intel (or whomever manages your PC platform) not to mess with your data in malicious ways? IIRC can't it communicate directly to the keyboard,screen and the network? Besides DRM, this is probably the next best killer feature for the system if it's as secure as they claim.

rollingincache 10y ago
iSGX utilizes iME's DAL interface to access to a very limited subset of iME features that explicitly pertain to cryptography (primitives), time and calculations. iSGX is dependent on a skylake processor (due to the MEE[the hardware being iSGX] being attached/combined into the MC) and BIOS/UEFI support for iSGX. Features such as PAVP via Intel Insider are not accessible in the current implementation (version 2) of Intel Software Guard Extensions. Access to PAVP and other powerful features of iME such as iAMT has been restricted to Intel and Intel Partners (M$, DoD) through obscurity and no available documentation. However, that being said, there are several white papers authored/co-authored by Intel employees who do make use of these immensely powerful features. iSGX (nor any current technology that is known to the public) is capable of ensuring input CIA properties (without utilizing Intel Insider/PAVP to display a digital keyboard, transmitted via direct bus to NIC/eth.) Other security technologies, specifically Sanctum does provide different coverage than iSGX but there is no "unified" security technology that is a one-size-fits-all solution. iSGX's main PoF is poor security implementation by ISV's/enclave writer's. That being said it is better than TrustZone, TXT, XOM, Bastion, Aegis and Phantom in regards to the ratio of return:implementation cost. edit: additional information
jandrese 10y ago
In practice no, it's not useful for this because it has to take over everything. This makes it basically impossible to support for anything complex like a web browser. You end up having to put way too much stuff in the trusted environment. It might have worked way back in the text terminal days when it was slightly realistic for someone to build basically an entire trusted OS to run instead of your normal OS, but today that's just not going to happen.
- rollingincache 10y ago
  HAVEN (DrawBridge/MOAT) demonstrated the possibility of enclosing a stripped down OS within an enclave. Hoekstra and fellows at Intel have created a PoC secure browser plugin that utilizes an enclave. Use of middleboxes that are hardened and have iSGX support can be used as a proxy as well to limit exposure.

rollingincache 10y ago

iSGX utilizes iME's DAL interface to access to a very limited subset of iME features that explicitly pertain to cryptography (primitives), time and calculations. iSGX is dependent on a skylake processor (due to the MEE[the hardware being iSGX] being attached/combined into the MC) and BIOS/UEFI support for iSGX. Features such as PAVP via Intel Insider are not accessible in the current implementation (version 2) of Intel Software Guard Extensions. Access to PAVP and other powerful features of iME such as iAMT has been restricted to Intel and Intel Partners (M$, DoD) through obscurity and no available documentation. However, that being said, there are several white papers authored/co-authored by Intel employees who do make use of these immensely powerful features. iSGX (nor any current technology that is known to the public) is capable of ensuring input CIA properties (without utilizing Intel Insider/PAVP to display a digital keyboard, transmitted via direct bus to NIC/eth.) Other security technologies, specifically Sanctum does provide different coverage than iSGX but there is no "unified" security technology that is a one-size-fits-all solution. iSGX's main PoF is poor security implementation by ISV's/enclave writer's. That being said it is better than TrustZone, TXT, XOM, Bastion, Aegis and Phantom in regards to the ratio of return:implementation cost. edit: additional information

jandrese 10y ago

In practice no, it's not useful for this because it has to take over everything. This makes it basically impossible to support for anything complex like a web browser. You end up having to put way too much stuff in the trusted environment. It might have worked way back in the text terminal days when it was slightly realistic for someone to build basically an entire trusted OS to run instead of your normal OS, but today that's just not going to happen.

rollingincache 10y ago
HAVEN (DrawBridge/MOAT) demonstrated the possibility of enclosing a stripped down OS within an enclave. Hoekstra and fellows at Intel have created a PoC secure browser plugin that utilizes an enclave. Use of middleboxes that are hardened and have iSGX support can be used as a proxy as well to limit exposure.