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The ridiculous thing about this, if accurate, is that Tor was (is?) primarily funded by an organization connected to State and CIA propaganda efforts. Most of t
by nickpsecurity 10y ago
The ridiculous thing about this, if accurate, is that Tor was (is?) primarily funded by an organization connected to State and CIA propaganda efforts. Most of them receive money from US governmemt in sone way. CIA itself uses Tor for same reason Navy created it. While FBI and NSA hate it, the CIA and State love it as a tool for protecting foreign operators or dissenters. Makes it funny they're so worried about bringing CIA in.
Anyway, the right way go do security against nation-states is creating deliverables and processes that are verified by mutually-suspicious parties. As in, with high-assurance security, you assume the people are largely malicious while focusing on vetting thd product and process throughout lifecycle. Not sure what this CIA person's role is supposed to be but it's bad INFOSEC and OPSEC if he can unilaterally do lots of damage. Shouldn't be possible.
Far as image, just like my subversion-resistant build scheme, having helpful CIA rep onboard as a check American government can trust is beneficial at least for review and testing. Have one from each major government or institution using the service acting as checks against inserted or ignored subversions. Plus non-government groups of course. That one CIA guy can compromise either service or image again makes process or trust assessment look weak.
I say let them come onboard but with non-critical access and any actions reviewed. Even if failure, it would teach important lessons.
- woodman 10y ago> Makes it funny they're so worried about bringing CIA in. Except for the fact that the USG actually buys into the concept of NOBUS, as evidenced not only in the classification system - but also foreign policy (the proliferation of AA and AT weapons comes to mind). So the USG's use of TOR provides me with zero confidence that they wouldn't actively weaken it. That said, I agree on the issue of trust - secure software shouldn't need any. They need to decide between two very distinct paths: accept the insecurity and try to control it socially (no CIA guys), or mathematically demonstrate infallibility. Because one is so hard, and the inevitable failure of the other can be ignored for now - I'm guessing that we'll see no push for formal verification :)
- nickpsecurity 10y agoWas looking forward to see what you'd say here. :) "Except for the fact that the USG actually buys into the concept of NOBUS" This is true. I considered it given a subverted, but otherwise working, Tor network would be a win-win if CIA was subjected to pressure or wanted to de-anonymize opponents. Yet, the Tor project themselves answer this one: it's vulnerable to a global, passive adversary. NSA has painstakingly built partnerships with all kinds of countries that collectively do a giant SIGINT operation. Most of them probably don't like Tor. CIA or partners can get info from NSA on these things. So, CIA can already defeat Tor for some fraction of users since their partner is outside its probability of success. On top of whatever CIA might pull. "accept the insecurity and try to control it socially (no CIA guys), or mathematically demonstrate infallibility. " Well, remember that there's always the path of just clearly specifying the functionality plus implementing it in the safest way possible. We used to call this medium assurance. OpenBSD is the code-only version of that. Praxis w/ Ada/SPARK is the spec + code version. Only around 30-50% premium in labor/cost added doing these things despite immunity to all kinds of shit. They aren't going to do it, though. They never do. Leading to... "I'm guessing that we'll see no push for formal verification :)" ...no push for that or even system-oriented languages and techniques that make the service immune to memory- or interface-level attacks that make up 80-90% of vulnerabilities. Not even that.
- woodman 10y agoWe certainly share an interest. > Yet, the Tor project themselves answer this one: it's vulnerable to a global, passive adversary. Vulnerable to traffic analysis, I'm sure certain organizations wouldn't mind seeing that vulnerability include cleartext. > ...plus implementing it in the safest way possible. I've never seen an Underhanded Ada Contest, but I'm pretty confident that a bad actor could still introduce vulnerabilities that would pass a reasonable code review and be deniable. It would be an improvement for sure, but you'd still have a trust requirement. I think a good half measure would be: fully spec'd pure functions don't need human code review - just feed patches to the theorem prover and regression tester, all the trusted human labor can then focus on things that touch global state. At the risk of incentivizing spaghetti code, you'd incentivize the production of code that really lends itself to static analysis. > ...memory- or interface-level attacks that make up 80-90% of vulnerabilities. I look forward to us getting past the memory vulnerabilities, but the next battle will be one hell of a fight - timing attacks. Thought getting people to trade C performance was tough? Try getting them to intentionally delay all comparison operations... in the entire software stack :)
- eternalban 10y ago> a tool for protecting foreign operators or dissenters. More like an edge beacon ("Hi there! I'm using tor, fyi!!"). Based on a false narrative of security to the clueless dissidents, they get their desired result (info/propaganda dissemination) and no doubt later can horse trade with their sister spooks when burning the no-longer-useful-idiots.
- nickpsecurity 10y agoOh I agree. My own recommendations are use of proxies tgat blend into crowd. One old trick was embedding stuff in HTTPS connections that looked like innocent web sites. WiFi w/ cantennas, burst radio, courier networks, and so on are also effective. Whatever it is has to blend into crowd. Tor stands out too much. Also obscures what you're doing, though. So, a double edge sword whose benefit depends on situation. Gotta think catefully. I predicted NSA would auto-target Tor users for further surveillance given uptake demographics. We saw that in the leaks. Double-edged sword. ;)