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> without actually doing something that provided a meaningful security guarantee. Indeed there was considerable discussion at the time that determined that Lav

> without actually doing something that provided a meaningful security guarantee. Indeed there was considerable discussion at the time that determined that Lavabit only used one SSL keypair, even for internal communication between servers, and therefore by disclosing it enabled eavesdropping on all users. Unfortunately Mr Levison's awkward situation, unpleasant as it was, was the result of poor architectural choices and too much hype. Perhaps it was best for the security of all users of the service that it closed down.

specialist 10y ago
"...Lavabit only used one SSL keypair ... poor architectural choices..." Thanks for mentioning this. I was just now wondering if its practical, useful to use multiple keypairs. What do you recommend? I don't know enough about CAs and SSL to how to partition risk. For instance, if Lavabit used their "parent" pairs to self issue "child" pairs, wouldn't the govt just ask for the parent keypairs? Being a casual user, implementer, reader of crypto stuff. It seems to me the technically correct answer is for everyone everywhere to uses unique keypairs per relationship. If true, then I'm not understanding what practical mitigation an email service provider can do. Thanks.
- Pyxl101 10y ago
  The solution that provides strong security is end-to-end encryption. This is how Signal works, the product that Moxie built: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) Levison's follow-up project DarkMail also works in a similar way while focusing on email: https://darkmail.info/ https://darkmail.info/ Although I don't have a great opinion of Lavabit, I have skimmed the technical documentation for DarkMail and it does appear to solve the problem properly and to make up for the deficiencies in Lavabit. It's not backwards-compatible with existing email, while being secure, though, so it wouldn't automatically upgrade the security of webmail. It's very difficult to secure web-based email any better than the major name-brand providers already do. DarkMail will work, but it requires a new protocol layered on top of email that handles key exchange and opportunistic end-to-end encryption.

specialist 10y ago

"...Lavabit only used one SSL keypair ... poor architectural choices..." Thanks for mentioning this. I was just now wondering if its practical, useful to use multiple keypairs. What do you recommend? I don't know enough about CAs and SSL to how to partition risk. For instance, if Lavabit used their "parent" pairs to self issue "child" pairs, wouldn't the govt just ask for the parent keypairs? Being a casual user, implementer, reader of crypto stuff. It seems to me the technically correct answer is for everyone everywhere to uses unique keypairs per relationship. If true, then I'm not understanding what practical mitigation an email service provider can do. Thanks.

Pyxl101 10y ago
The solution that provides strong security is end-to-end encryption. This is how Signal works, the product that Moxie built: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) Levison's follow-up project DarkMail also works in a similar way while focusing on email: https://darkmail.info/ https://darkmail.info/ Although I don't have a great opinion of Lavabit, I have skimmed the technical documentation for DarkMail and it does appear to solve the problem properly and to make up for the deficiencies in Lavabit. It's not backwards-compatible with existing email, while being secure, though, so it wouldn't automatically upgrade the security of webmail. It's very difficult to secure web-based email any better than the major name-brand providers already do. DarkMail will work, but it requires a new protocol layered on top of email that handles key exchange and opportunistic end-to-end encryption.