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>protection Except from ever more sophisticated side-channel attacks. I can see why someone would want to have it in cloud machines. But I hope it never makes
by the8472 10y ago
>protection
Except from ever more sophisticated side-channel attacks.
I can see why someone would want to have it in cloud machines. But I hope it never makes it into enduser devices, it's only going to be used for DRM there.
- SXX 10y ago> it's only going to be used for DRM there. It's will be also useful for spyware developers too.
- the8472 10y agoThinking about it, an alternative would be the ability to use user-supplied debug keys (in the BIOS) instead of intel signing keys. That way neither DRM nor malware would not be possible because the user could enter debug mode to inspect the enclaves if he wanted to but could still use SGX to secure his own applications because malicious code would not have access to the private keys.
- userbinator 10y agoIntel clearly wants complete control over what gets to run on the PC platform --- which is rather disturbing, but seems to be the way a lot of other companies are moving these days. Introducing SGX and "verified" software and promoting it as the best thing for everyone is only the first step. It's only a matter of time before they convince everyone to eventually deprecate "insecure" (i.e. free) software that doesn't use it, completely killing the "P" in "PC". I'd consider SGX a small step forward for security and a big step backward for personal freedom... it makes me sad just how accurate Stallman was nearly 20 years ago: https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.en.html As such, I don't consider this announcement great news at all --- it's downright scary, an indicator of where things are going.
- digi_owl 10y agoIts been a slow boiling frog ever since the Palladium debacle.
- IOT_Apprentice 10y agoThe issue is secure computing isn't happening and the current approach to security is broken. Malware and viruses and firmware hacks, ransomeware. And this approach of laziness is spreading to IOT and will lead to massive national infrastructure failures. State sponsored attacks you the US via the NSA, by Russia, China and stateless organizations will yield digital carnage. The more our everyday things are integrated with compute the great propensity for hacks, loss of data, loss of identity etc. The current OS platforms don't even offer you any form of real protection of your person. And companies like Facebook, Google et all are all about mining YOU.
- Asooka 10y agoIt's already here, I have it on my i7-6700k Edit: I've disabled it in UEFI, but the functionality is definitely there.
- amluto 10y agoIt can be used as a programmable secure element. Think disk encryption (with protection against brute forcing), storage of SSH and TLS keys, credit card authentication, etc.
- the8472 10y agoI did not say that it will have zero potential security applications. What I'm saying is that its current threat model also defends against any access by the owner of the machine, even though that is not necessary to achieve application security. Not even boot time configuration can override any of it. So it is unnecessarily user-hostile because it can be used to implement DRM and similar schemes where the user has no control over the execution on his hardware. It does not provide an escape hatch when it should.
- amluto 10y agoIn a threat model where the Bad Guy (intelligence organization? police? criminals?) have physically taken the machine, how exactly do you define owner? What about a cloud service that wants to deny themselves access to your data, despite the fact that they own the physical hardware? The iPhone secure element, for example, is specifically designed to defend attackers with physical possession.
- the8472 10y agoSee my other post: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11977403 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11977403 The cloud provider could operate by accepting a pubkey provided by you, thus they would not have the private key.
- amluto 10y agoBut can they prove that they are operating using your pubkey? If so, then you're back to square one -- your malware will prove that it's operating with Intel's (or the malware author's) pubkey. If not, then there's no security.
- witty_username 10y agoI don't have any problems with it being in enduser devices. Let the enduser decide whether to use products with DRM or not.
- SXX 10y agoEndusers have no idea what DRM is. In short period of time there won't be any products without DRM at all.
- witty_username 10y agoSo if endusers are fine with it, then what's wrong? Intel Software Guard Extensions just allow for DRM, they don't do DRM.
- teacup50 10y agoGenuine question since I haven't read the SGX docs in detail; What's to stop us from implementing a broken SGX via trap-and-emulate?
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- drdaeman 10y agoI suppose a CPU would contain some secret key material of its own, that can be used to authenticate the hardware.