> I wouldn't be particularly shaken up by it. Given the choice between having one copy disassembled or having both disassembled, I'd choose to have one copy s

> I wouldn't be particularly shaken up by it. Given the choice between having one copy disassembled or having both disassembled, I'd choose to have one copy survive, whether or not it was the "I" copy. Both copies would be "me" as far as could be measured (ignoring the last few minutes, where I'm assuming that our experiences would be similar but not identical). Given the choice of having both of "us" survive though, I'd rather not have either life terminated. I'd be more bothered by the destruction of one of us than by the chance that I'd be the one who chooses to start a new life from scratch (or whatever we decided as our solution). Death is death, whether or not there's a substantially-identical copy. One consciousness would end.