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Nobody's going to invest money into flashing each device with an individual cert just to protect against an attacker MITMing a home user's home wifi network to
by peterwwillis 10y ago
Nobody's going to invest money into flashing each device with an individual cert just to protect against an attacker MITMing a home user's home wifi network to turn off a lamp. And you'd have to bundle your own whole TLS stack and browser with the app just to get the CA validated; that's a lot of extra software engineering.
If the user really cares about security enough, they can buy their own real TLS cert and install the cert on the brick.
- jerf 10y agoAh, I meant to add to my list of bad practices sticking the same cert on every device. Sorry. To be clear, I'm saying you got me on that one. I missed that. Of course, one person steals that cert and they've cracked the system wide open. But that's the default case for crap crypto anyhow, so what's the difference, except you spent about 10 minutes in the shell and passed some parameters to your library instead of spending.... well... anything more than 10 minutes futzing around with AES and RSA and so on? Also, while I understand your use of "nobody" in the slangy English sense rather than the strict mathematical sense, I would point out that as these devices get more sophisticated, eventually they tend towards a manufacturing process that will do something to each one in the factory anyhow. For instance, if you're doing any sort of burn-in testing you've already done the vast bulk of the hard work it would take to also use that time to stick a cert on there. Yeah, your cheap knock-off Wifi light won't do that, but as the industry matures I think you'll see practices that would permit certs without much additional work.